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According to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, global 
temperatures are warming by approximately 0.1-0.3°C per decade. As an estimated 1.1°C of 
global temperature warming above pre-industrial levels has already occurred, 1.5°C of global 
warming will likely occur sometime between 2030 and 2052. While international coordination is 
critically needed to allocate emissions amongst states, such a suggestion raises the contentious 
question of how to equitably distribute emissions amongst states.  
 
This paper uses several equity approaches to consider what might comprise Canada’s 
“fair” emissions reduction target. A literature review conducted by this author revealed two 
studies which allow for higher atmospheric concentrations that would not limit warming to 1.5°C 
as well as three studies which comply with 1.5°C pathways. Every “fair” target suggested by 
these five studies is significantly more ambitious than Canada’s present emissions reduction 
target. At minimum, these proposed targets call for Canada to nearly double its emissions 
reduction target, however, multiple targets call for Canada to reach net-zero emissions by 2030 
and undertake mitigation efforts to further reduce emissions beyond its own borders. This paper 
concludes by highlighting several strategies to work towards setting and meeting fair emissions 






The need for climate action is both urgent and overdue. Recognizing this, the world came 
together in 2015 (almost universally) to create the Paris Agreement, which seeks to limit the 
global average temperature from warming more than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial 
levels and commits to pursuing efforts to limit this temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius 
above pre-industrial levels. Despite this admirable commitment, however, global emissions 
continue to increase.  
 
Countries presently set national emissions reduction targets with little regard to climate 
science or equity considerations. This paper highlights how the global emissions burden can be 
fairly shared amongst states in order to consider what would comprise a “fair” emissions 
reduction target in Canada.  
 
This Major Research Paper was completed in partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the degree of Master in Environmental Studies, and reflects the learning components outlined in 
my Plan of Study. The learning components are as follows:  
• Environmental Law & Policy in Canada; 
• Climate Change in a Canadian Context; and 
• Climate Change, Accountability & Distributional Justice. 
 
Researching and writing this paper on Canada’s mitigation efforts and emissions 
reduction targets has helped fulfill numerous learning objectives which fall under the learning 
components stated above, including: 
• Deepening my understanding of how laws and policies are created in Canada; 
• Gaining competency in assessing the strengths, weaknesses, and overall effectiveness of 
Canada’s environmental laws and policies; 
• Understanding the global causes and impacts of climate change, as well as Canada’s 
contribution to the problem; 
• Learning about Canada’s climate mitigation efforts, as created through laws, plans, and 
policies, and assessing their effectiveness; 
 iv 
• Fostering an understanding of the international climate change regime; 
• Gaining familiarity with the formal domestic and international structures for climate 
change policy evaluation and accountability within a Canadian context; 
• Developing a deeper understanding of the evaluative framework of GHG emissions 
reductions and evaluating its effectiveness; and 
• Deepening my understanding of distributional justice principles. 
 
Determining Canada’s “fair” emissions reduction target is an important research focus for 
several reasons. By detailing what comprises a “fair” target, this paper helps highlight the 
unfairness and inadequacy of Canada’s current emissions reduction target. This distinction could 
encourage advocacy efforts, inform forthcoming court judgments, and guide law reform to 
amend and strengthen Canada’s emission reduction target. Considering Canada’s “fair” 
emissions reduction target also illustrates the need to develop a detailed climate plan that outlines 
how such reductions will occur, and makes clear that a “fair” target cannot be met alongside the 
projected expansion of Canada’s oil and gas sector. 
 
Considering Canada’s “fair” emissions reduction target is perhaps most important, 
however, in light of its global implications. Those least responsible for the emissions that 
contributed to climate change are now most impacted—and will continue to be 
disproportionately impacted—by the effects of climate change. These voices are also those that 
have often been excluded from decision-making processes that shape global climate efforts. 
Stronger action on climate change is needed, and the onus is on well-resourced/developed 
countries who are responsible for the majority of global cumulative emissions to undertake much 
of this action. As Canada is the tenth highest-emitting state today, its failure to reduce emissions 
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Executive Summary  
 
According to the United Nations (“UN”) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(“IPCC”), an international body of leading climate scientists, global temperatures are warming 
by approximately 0.1-0.3° Celsius (“C”) per decade.1 At this rate, the IPCC claims 1.5°C of 
global warming will likely occur sometime between 2030 and 2052.2 Climate Action Tracker 
(“CAT”) predicts that a global continuation of current policy will result in 1.5°C of warming by 
2035, 2°C by 2053, and a whopping 3.2°C by the end of the century.3 
 
The Paris Agreement calls on all states to hold “the increase in the global average 
temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels” and pursue “efforts to limit the 
temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.”4 Neither this Agreement’s official or 
aspirational target will fully prevent devastating climate change5 impacts, however. According to 
the IPCC, “[w]arming of 1.5°C is not considered ‘safe’ for most nations, communities, 
ecosystems and sectors and poses significant risks to natural and human systems as compared to 
the current warming of 1°C.”6 Allowing global warming to surpass 2°C above pre-industrial 
levels will expose hundreds of millions of additional people to water scarcity and heat waves, 
exacerbating these and other impacts of climate change.7 
 
 
1 IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers” in V Masson-Delmotte et al, eds, Global warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special 
Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas 
emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable 
development, and efforts to eradicate poverty (Geneva, Switzerland: World Meteorological Organization, 2018) 
[IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers 2018”] at 6.  
2 Ibid. 
3 “Pledged action leads to 2.9°C – time to boost national climate action” (19 Sept 2019), online: Climate Action 
Tracker <climateactiontracker.org/publications/time-to-boost-national-climate-action/>. 
4 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, 21st Sess, 
FCCC/CP/2015/L9/Rev 1 (2015) [UNFCCC, “Adoption of Paris”], art 2.1(a).  
5 Throughout this paper, the term “climate change” is used to mean “a change of climate which is attributed directly 
or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to 
natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods”. See United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 (entered into force 21 March 1994) [UNFCCC], art 1. 
6 IPCC, “Sustainable Development, Poverty Eradication and Reducing Inequalities” in V Masson-Delmotte et al, eds, 
Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C Above Pre-industrial 
Levels & Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the Global Response 
to the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, & Efforts to Eradicate Poverty (Geneva, Switzerland: 
World Meteorological Organization, 2018) [IPCC, “Sustainable Development, Poverty Eradication”] 445 at 447. 
7 Ibid at 453. 
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The IPCC states that limiting warming to 1.5°C will require “rapid and far-reaching 
[system] transitions” to lower greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions.8 The United Nations 
Environment Programme (“UNEP”) advises that aligning with a cost-effective 1.5°C pathway 
would require global emissions to decrease by 7.6 percent each year between 2020 and 2030.9 
Instead of peaking or decreasing, however, global emissions have increased by an average of 1.5 
percent per year over the last decade.10  
 
Since setting its first emissions reduction target 28 years ago, Canada’s national 
emissions have, in fact, increased by 116 million tonnes of Co2eq.11 In recent years, Canada’s 
total national emissions have also increased on a net basis, despite federal commitments to 
decrease emissions. From 2010 to 2017, Canada’s total emissions grew by 23 million tonnes of 
Co2eq.12 Given that Canada is the tenth highest-emitting state today,13 its failure to reduce 
emissions impedes global mitigation efforts.   
 
Canada’s present emissions reductions target is to reduce emissions by 30 percent below 
2005 levels by 2030.14 When this target was first set in May 2015, critics already noted that the 
level of reduction was “less than what is deemed necessary by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) to avoid the catastrophic consequences of global warming.”15 Today, 
 
8 IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers 2018”, supra note 1 at 17.  
9 “Emissions Gap Report 2019” (November 2019) at xiii, online (pdf): United Nations Environment Programme 
<wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/30797/EGR2019.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> [UNEP, 
“Emissions Gap Report 2019”]. 
10 Ibid at xiv. 
11 See “Greenhouse gas emissions” (last modified 17 April 2019), online: Government of Canada 
<www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/environmental-indicators/greenhouse-gas-
emissions.html> [Government of Canada, “GHG Emissions”]. 
12 Ibid.  
13 “Largest producers of territorial fossil fuel CO2 emissions worldwide in 2017, based on their share of global CO2 
emissions” (2019), online: Statista <www.statista.com/statistics/271748/the-largest-emitters-of-co2-in-the-world/>. 
14 Government of Canada, “Canada’s INDC Submission to the UNFCCC” (last visited 3 November 2019), online: 
UNFCCC <www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Canada%20First/INDC%20-%20Canada%20-
%20English.pdf> [Government of Canada, “Canada’s INDC Submission”]. 
15 Gail Davidson & Rohan Shah, “Canada’s failure to reduce emissions: Unlawful or above the law” (1 November 
2015), online: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives <www.policyalternatives.ca/publications/monitor/canadas-
failure-reduce-emissions-unlawful-or-above-law>. 
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such a target is utterly inconsistent with the “rapid and far-reaching transitions” called for by the 
IPCC in 2018 to attempt to limit global warming to 1.5°C.16  
 
While international coordination is critically needed to allocate emissions amongst states, 
such a suggestion raises the contentious question of how to equitably distribute emissions 
amongst states. The IPCC states that “an equitable [international] regime with fair burden 
sharing is likely to be a key condition for an effective global response”.17  
 
This paper uses several equity approaches to consider what might comprise Canada’s 
“fair” emissions reduction target. Section II of this paper discusses several qualities of climate 
change that render it an extraordinarily difficult problem and emphasizes both the importance of 
a climate justice lens in considering climate solutions and the pivotal need for fair mitigation 
responses to climate change. It then examines the extent to which climate justice, equity and 
effort-sharing approaches have been considered in the international climate change regime as 
well as in states’ domestic commitments to detail the current level of incorporation of these 
principles. 
 
After providing scoping and methodology considerations in Section III, this paper details 
Canada’s present and projected emissions, as well as its emissions reduction target, in Section 
IV. This information is useful to compare against “fair share” considerations. Section V 
summarizes the equity approaches which are then used in Section VI to consider Canada’s fair 
emissions reduction target.  
 
Section VI presents the findings of a literature review on Canada’s fair emissions 
reduction target, which includes two dated studies that allow for higher atmospheric 
concentrations that would not limit warming to 1.5°C as well as three studies which comply with 
1.5°C pathways. Every “fair” target suggested by these five studies is more ambitious than 
 
16 IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers 2018”, supra note 1 at 17. 
17 IPCC, “Sustainable Development and Equity” in Edenhofer et al, eds, Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of 
Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 283 at 291 [IPCC, 
“Sustainable Development and Equity”].  
 xiii 
Canada’s present emissions reduction target. At minimum, these proposed targets call for Canada 
to nearly double its emissions reduction target, however, multiple suggested targets call for 
Canada to reach net-zero emissions by 2030 and undertake mitigation efforts to further reduce 
emissions beyond its own borders. The level of ambition required by Canada to meet any of the 
proposed “fair” targets is incompatible with Canada’s projected continuation and expansion of 
fossil fuel production (as discussed in Section IV). 
 
Section VII highlights several strategies to work towards setting and meeting fair 
emissions reduction targets in Canada, Section VIII concludes this paper, and Section IX 







The world is heating up: the last five years (2013 to 2018) have also been the hottest five 
years recorded in global history.18 According to the United Nations (“UN”) Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”), an international body of leading climate scientists, global 
temperatures are warming by approximately 0.1-0.3° Celsius (“C”) per decade.19 As an estimated 
1.1°C of global temperature warming above pre-industrial levels has already occurred,20 the 
IPCC claims that 1.5°C of global warming will likely occur sometime between 2030 and 2052.21 
Climate Action Tracker (“CAT”) predicts that a global continuation of current policy will result 
in 1.5°C of warming by 2035, 2°C by 2053, and a whopping 3.2°C by the end of the century.22 
Two new climate models, released in September 2019, predict that continued use of fossil fuels 
to propel economic growth could lead to 7°C of warming by 2100.23 
 
The Paris Agreement calls on all states to hold “the increase in the global average 
temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels” and pursue “efforts to limit the 
temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.”24 Neither this Agreement’s official or 
aspirational target will fully prevent devastating climate change25 impacts, however. According 
to the IPCC, “[w]arming of 1.5°C is not considered ‘safe’ for most nations, communities, 
ecosystems and sectors and poses significant risks to natural and human systems as compared to 
the current warming of 1°C.”26 Allowing global warming to surpass 2°C above pre-industrial 
 
18 “The 10 Hottest Global Years on Record” (6 Feb 2019), online: Climate Central 
<www.climatecentral.org/gallery/graphics/the-10-hottest-global-years-on-record>.  
19 IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers 2018”, supra note 1 at 6.  




22 “Pledged action leads to 2.9°C – time to boost national climate action” (19 Sept 2019), online: Climate Action 
Tracker <climateactiontracker.org/publications/time-to-boost-national-climate-action/>. 
23 Marlowe Hood, “Earth warming more quickly than thought, new climate models show” (17 September 2019), 
online: Phys.org <phys.org/news/2019-09-earth-quickly-climate.html>. 
24 UNFCCC, “Adoption of Paris”, supra note 3, art 2.1(a).  
25 Throughout this paper, the term “climate change” is used to mean “a change of climate which is attributed directly 
or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to 
natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods”. See UNFCCC, supra note 5, art 1. 
26 IPCC, “Sustainable Development, Poverty Eradication”, supra note 6 at 447. 
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levels will expose hundreds of millions of additional people to water scarcity and heat waves, 
exacerbating these and other impacts of climate change.27 
 
Limiting warming to 1.5°C, however, will require “rapid and far-reaching [system] 
transitions” to lower greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions.28 Revising national emissions 
reduction targets to accurately reflect the urgency and scale of efforts required could help compel 
such transitions. If countries were to simply fulfill their existing climate commitments, 70 to 100 
percent of the remaining carbon budget under a pathway that provides a 67 percent chance of 
limiting warming to 1.5°C would be exhausted by 2030.29 The IPCC warns that, under this 
‘policy pathway’, increasing the scale and ambition of emissions reduction efforts after 2030 
would not limit warming to 1.5°C,30 and Keywan Riahi et al caution that this policy pathway 
could jeopardize the possibility of limiting warming to 2°C.31 
 
Whether 1.5°C or 2°C (or more), the impacts of global warming are subject to several 
unique risks, including an unprecedented scale and an unpredictable nature, as well as a locking-
in of future impacts and positive feedback loops that accelerate further global warming.32  
 
Urgent action is needed to align global efforts with limiting warming to 1.5°C. The 
International Energy Agency and the International Renewable Energy Agency state that to 
simply have a 66 percent change of limiting warming to 2°C would require energy emissions to 
peak before 2020.33 The United Nations Environment Programme (“UNEP”) advises that 
 
27 Ibid at 453. 
28 IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers 2018”, supra note 1 at 17.  
29 IPCC, “Mitigation Pathways Compatible with 1.5°C in the Context of Sustainable Development” in V Masson-
Delmotte et al, eds, Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C 
Above Pre-industrial Levels & Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening 
the Global Response to the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, & Efforts to Eradicate Poverty 
(Geneva, Switzerland: World Meteorological Organization, 2018) 93 at 113.  
30 IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers 2018”, supra note 1 at 20. 
31 Keywan Riahi et al, “Locked into Copenhagen pledges — Implications of short-term emission targets for the cost 
and feasibility of long-term climate goals” (2015) 90 Techno Forecasting & Soc Change 8 at 19-20. 
32 “Zero Carbon Zero Poverty The Climate Justice Way: Achieving an Equitable phase-out of carbon emissions by 
2050 while protecting human rights” (2015) at 15, online (pdf): The Mary Robinson Foundation for Climate Justice 
<www.mrfcj.org/media/pdf/2014/ZeroCarbontheClimateJusticeWay.pdf>. 
33 “Executive Summary: Perspectives for the Energy Transition: Investment Needs for a Low-Carbon Energy 




aligning with a cost-effective 1.5°C pathway would require global emissions to decrease by 7.6 
percent each year between 2020 and 2030.34  
 
Instead of peaking or decreasing, however, global emissions have increased by an 
average of 1.5 percent per year over the last decade.35 International coordination is critically 
needed to determine how to allocate emissions amongst states to right this trajectory and ensure 
that a global carbon budget under 1.5°C pathways are not quickly exhausted. Such a suggestion, 
however, raises the contentious question of how to distribute emissions amongst states. The 
IPCC states that “an equitable [international] regime with fair burden sharing is likely to be a key 
condition for an effective global response”.36  
 
In recent years, Canada’s total national emissions have also increased on a net basis, 
despite federal commitments to decrease emissions. Since setting its first emissions reduction 
target 28 years ago, Canada’s national emissions have, in fact, increased by 116 million tonnes of 
Co2eq.37 From 2010 to 2017, Canada’s total emissions grew by 23 million tonnes of Co2eq.38 As 
Canada is the tenth highest-emitting state today,39 its failure to reduce emissions impedes global 
mitigation efforts.  
 
Canada’s present emissions reductions target is to reduce emissions by 30 percent below 
2005 levels by 2030.40 When this target was set by the federal government in May 2015, it was 
already considered “less than what is deemed necessary by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) to avoid the catastrophic consequences of global warming.”41 Today, 
 
34 UNEP, “Emissions Gap Report 2019”, supra note 9 at xiii. 
35 Ibid at xiv. 
36 IPCC, “Sustainable Development and Equity”, supra note 17 at 291. 
37 Government of Canada, “GHG Emissions”, supra note 11. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Statista, supra note 13. 
40 Environment and Climate Change Canada, Canadian Environmental Sustainability Indicators: Progress towards 
Canada's greenhouse gas emissions reduction target (Gatineau: Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2020) at 
5, online: Government of Canada <www.canada.ca/content/dam/eccc/documents/pdf/cesindicators/progress-
towards-canada-greenhouse-gas-reduction-target/2020/progress-ghg-emissions-reduction-target.pdf> [Environment 
and Climate Change Canada, “Canadian Environmental Sustainability”]. 
41 Davidson & Shah, supra note 15. 
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such a target is utterly inconsistent with the “rapid and far-reaching transitions” called for by the 
IPCC to attempt to limit global warming to 1.5°C.42  
 
This paper uses several equity approaches to consider what might comprise Canada’s 
“fair” emissions reduction target. It should be noted that the “fair” targets proposed in this paper 
do not consider emissions for which Canada is responsible for, but for the fact that they occur 
outside of Canada’s borders (neither does Canada’s present emissions reduction target). For 
instance, the full life-cycle emissions of products that are produced in Canada but are then used 
outside of Canada, such as exported oil and gas, are excluded, as are the overseas operating 
emissions of Canadian companies. The inclusion of these emissions would render Canada 
responsible for a much larger portion of the global mitigation burden, creating even more 
ambitious targets than those proposed in this paper. 
 
Section II of this paper discusses several qualities of climate change that render it an 
extraordinarily difficult problem and emphasizes both the importance of a climate justice lens in 
considering climate solutions and the pivotal need for fair mitigation responses to climate 
change. It then examines the extent to which climate justice, equity and effort-sharing 
approaches have been considered in the international climate change regime as well as in states’ 
domestic commitments to detail the current level of incorporation of these principles. 
 
After providing scoping and methodology considerations in Section III, this paper details 
Canada’s present and projected emissions, as well as its emissions reduction target, in Section 
IV. This information is useful to compare against “fair share” considerations. Section V 
summarizes the equity approaches that will be used in Section VI to consider Canada’s fair 
emissions reduction target.  
 
Section VI presents the findings of a literature review on Canada’s fair emissions 
reduction target, which includes two dated studies which allow for higher atmospheric 
concentrations that would not limit warming to 1.5°C as well as three studies which comply with 
 
42 IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers 2018”, supra note 1 at 17. 
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1.5°C pathways. Every “fair” target suggested by these five studies is significantly more 
ambitious than Canada’s present emissions reduction target. At minimum, these proposed targets 
call for Canada to nearly double its emissions reduction target, however, multiple suggested 
targets call for Canada to reach net-zero emissions by 2030 and undertake mitigation efforts to 
further reduce emissions beyond its own borders. The level of ambition required by Canada to 
meet any of these proposed “fair” targets is incompatible with Canada’s projected continuation 
and expansion of fossil fuel production (as discussed in Section IV of this paper). 
 
Section VII highlights several strategies to work towards setting and meeting fair 
emissions reduction targets in Canada, Section VIII concludes this paper, and Section IX 
contains an Appendix. 
II. Climate Justice: Why Fairness Matters   
 
A pivotal injustice of climate change is the way in which it disproportionately impacts 
those who have least contributed to the problem and are often “least well placed to respond”, 
while those largely responsible for the problem are “by virtue of their wealth and/or access to 
resources, most insulated from it.”43 Climate change also differs from other instances of 
historical injustice due to the multi-generational lag between its cause and effects, the fact that 
the “wrongdoing” committed is “only wrongful when done excessively”, and that this “wrong” 
was not committed by a specific generation or community.44  
Using a climate justice lens to inform climate policies can help remedy these 
imbalances.45 There are three major tenets of climate justice: distributive justice, procedural 
justice, and compensatory justice. This paper focuses on the first aspect, which may examine 
“equal rights to protection from climate impacts, equal entitlements to property rights over 
atmosphere space, and equal division of climate policy costs.”46 While largely outside the scope 
 
43 “Achieving Justice and Human Rights in an Era of Climate Disruption: International Bar Association Climate 
Change Justice and Human Rights Task Force Report” (July 2014) at 2, online (pdf): International Bar Association 
<www.ibanet.org/PresidentialTaskForceClimateChangeJustice2014Report.aspx>. 
44 Lukas H Meyer & Dominic Roser, “Climate justice and historical emissions” (2010) 13:1 Crit Rev Intl Soc & Pol 
Phil 229 at 230. 
45 International Bar Association, supra note 43 at 3. 
46 Sonja Klinsky & Hadi Dowlatabadi, “Conceptualizations of justice in climate policy” (2009) 9:1 Clim Pol’y 88 at 
92.  
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of this paper, procedural and compensatory justice are equally important components of climate 
justice. Procedural justice focuses on the representation of stakeholders in decision-making 
processes,47 while compensatory justice promotes the use of reparations for those whose interests 
have been impaired by others.48  
The following section details why a climate justice lens is aptly-suited for considering 
actions and responses to climate change. After outlining how climate justice and equity have 
been incorporated in international climate negotiations, this paper will stress the inadequacy of 
current domestic commitments to illustrate the rationale for invoking climate justice arguments 
to compel more ambitious domestic emissions reduction targets. 
 
A. The Nature of the Problem 
1. The externality of GHG emissions  
Climate change is the epitome of a “wicked problem”, defined by Knutti and Rogelj as “a 
tangle of causes and effects, all interconnected, loaded with uncertainties, involving stakeholders 
with different views”.49 One particularly challenging aspect of climate change is the borderless 
nature of its impacts. While each unit of a specific emission equally contributes to global average 
temperature warming regardless of where it was emitted, the impacts of that emission are not 
conveniently limited to the emitter. These impacts target human and social systems, which, in 
turn, infringe several fundamental human rights including the right to life, food and to be free 
from hunger, water, culture, property, adequate and safe housing, education, work and self-
determination, as well as women, children, and Indigenous people’s rights. 50  
 
A small number of countries were responsible for the vast majority of cumulative 
emissions in our atmosphere: the United States (“US”) alone has produced one-quarter of 
 
47 Harriet Bulkeley et al, “Climate justice and global cities: Mapping the emerging discourses” (2013) 23 Glob Envtl 
Change 914 at 917.  
48 Klinsky & Dowlatabadi, supra note 46 at 90. 
49 Reto Knutti & Joeri Rogelj, “The legacy of our Co2 emissions: a clash of scientific facts, politics and ethics” 
(2015) 133: Climatic Change 361 at 362.  
50 The Mary Robinson Foundation, supra note 32 at 14. 
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cumulative global emissions since 1750.51 Three-quarters of global annual emissions today are 
produced by a mere twenty nations, including Canada.52 The brunt of impacts from the global 
warming caused by those emissions, however, are felt predominantly by the world’s poorer half 
of the population, who produce only one-tenth of global annual emissions.53 
 
2. The distribution of climate impacts  
A multitude of factors render many developing countries distinctly vulnerable to climate 
change’s impacts. For instance, altered weather patterns can create droughts and flooding, 
compromising the sustainability of agricultural crops and forestry—resources which “1.2 billion 
people who live in extreme poverty heavily rely on.”54 Changing environmental conditions may 
displace populations, reduce access to resources, damage or destroy wildlife and human habitats 
and communities, erode shorelines, and impact subsistence activities.55 The International Bar 
Association’s (“IBA”) comprehensive report on “Achieving Justice and Human Rights in an Era 
of Climate Disruption” detailed that “it is the developing nations and their peoples who stand to 
suffer the most extreme consequences of rising sea levels, rising temperatures, and other human-
induced environmental shifts.”56  
 
A global index ranking countries’ vulnerability to climate change confirms that 
developing countries are the most vulnerable, ranking the following countries as the most 
vulnerable in the year 2017: Somalia, Niger, Solomon Islands, Chad, Micronesia, Guinea-Bissau, 
Sudan, Liberia, Mali, and Eritrea.57 The IPCC states that the most severe impacts of 
 
51 David R Boyd, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the 
enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, UNGA 74th Sess UN Doc A/74/161 (2019) at para 
14. 
52 These nations are (in diminishing order) China, the United States, India, Indonesia, the Russian Federation, Brazil, 
Japan, Canada, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, 
Australia, the United Kingdom, Nigeria, Argentina, Zambia and Thailand. See Ibid at para 14. 
53 Ibid at para 13. 
54 International Bar Association, supra note 43 at 41. 
55 Ibid at 41. 
56 Ibid at 45. 
57 The Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative’s Vulnerability Ranking assesses exposure to hazards, sensitivity to 
impacts of hazards, and adaptive capacity across six life-supporting sectors (health, food, ecosystems, human 
habitat, water, and infrastructure) to determine the “[p]ropensity or predisposition of human societies to be 
negatively impacted by climate hazards.” See C Chen et al, “University of Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index 
Country Index Technical Report” (November 2015) at 3, online (pdf): ND-GAIN  
<gain.nd.edu/assets/254377/nd_gain_technical_document_2015.pdf>; “Rankings” (last visited 3 November 2019), 
online: Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative <gain.nd.edu/our-work/country-index/rankings/>. 
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approximately 1.5°C of global warming “are projected for urban areas and some rural regions in 
sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia.”58 
 
In addition to inter-country inequalities, the distribution of climate impacts within a 
country—whether developed or developing—is also skewed. As Islam and Winkel note in their 
2017 paper on “Climate Change and Social Inequality”, a “vicious cycle” exists, “whereby initial 
inequality makes disadvantaged groups suffer disproportionately from the adverse effects of 
climate change, resulting in greater subsequent inequality.”59 In countries that span a large area 
or encompass several geographic regions, the distribution of impacts may also vary. For instance, 
Northern Canada is warming at a quicker rate than the rest of Canada: from 1948 to 2016, it is 
estimated that mean annual temperatures increased 2.3°C in northern Canada, as opposed to 
1.7°C in Canada as a whole.60  
The distribution of impacts is not simply skewed within or between geographic states, 
however. In a 2019 report to the UN General Assembly, UN Special Rapporteur on Human 
Rights and the Environment David Boyd detailed how “[c]imate change interacts with poverty, 
conflict, resource depletion and other factors to cause or exacerbate food insecurity, loss of 
livelihoods, infrastructure breakdown and loss of access to essential services including 
electricity, water, sanitation and health care.”61 
 
As Boyd notes, climate change disproportionately affects poor populations. Researcher 
Sam Barrett explains: “[e]xposure and sensitivity to physical events is driven by manifestations 
of poverty and underdevelopment... whereby poor education, health infrastructure and 
 
58 IPCC, “Impacts of 1.5°C global warming on natural and human systems” in V Masson-Delmotte et al, eds, Global 
Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C Above Pre-industrial 
Levels & Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the Global Response 
to the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, & Efforts to Eradicate Poverty (Geneva, Switzerland: 
World Meteorological Organization, 2018) 177 at 244. 
59 S Nazrul Islam & John Winkel, Climate Change and Social Inequality, UNDESA Working Paper 
ST/ESA/DWP/152 (2017) 1 at 2 (emphasis in original).  
60 Xuebin Zhang et al, “Temperature and Precipitation Across Canada” in E Bush & D S Lemmen, eds, Canada’s 
Changing Climate Report (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2019) 112 at 116, online (pdf): Government of Canada 
<changingclimate.ca/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2018/12/CCCR-Chapter4-TemperatureAndPrecipitationAcross 
Canada.pdf>.  
61 Boyd, supra note 51 at para 7. 
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governance structures magnify adverse consequences”.62 Academics Anna Kaijser & Annica 
Kronsell agree that “those most exposed and vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change 
are poor and marginalised people living particularly in low-income areas.”63 Boyd warns that 
climate impacts could drive an additional 100 million people into extreme poverty by 2030.64 
 
Climate change also disproportionately impacts women and girls around the world. In 
2018, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women released a General 
Recommendation to address “Gender-related dimensions of disaster risk reduction in the context 
of climate change”,65 in which they noted that many women and girls experience greater climate 
change and disaster-related risks, burdens and impacts.66 For instance, McLeod, Rall and Barr 
detail how climate change may exacerbate the rate of child marriage in countries where child 
marriage already takes place.67 Other examples of climate change’s disproportionate impact on 
women and girls were noted by Human Rights Watch in a submission to the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, and include: 
• Gender discrimination creating disadvantages in obtaining humanitarian 
assistance and climate adaptation funding or claiming reparations for harms 
resulting from climate change; 
• Women and girls, who are often responsible for securing water, fuel and food for 
their families, experiencing new obstacles due to climate change; and 
• The spreading of diseases that disproportionately impact women.68 
 
 
62 Sam Barrett, “Local level climate justice? Adaptation finance and vulnerability reduction” (2013) 23 Global Envtl 
Change 1819 at 1819. Barrett is a researcher with the International Institute for Environment and Development.  
63 Anna Kaijser & Annica Kronsell, “Climate change through the lens of intersectionality” (2014) 23:3 Envtl Pol 
417 at 418. 
64 Boyd, supra note 51 at para 7. 
65 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 37 on Gender- 
related dimensions of disaster risk reduction in the context of climate change, CEDAW/C/GC/37 (2018). 
66 Ibid at para 2. For further information about gendered impacts of climate change, see: Fatma Denton, “Climate 
change vulnerability, impacts, and adaptation: Why does gender matter?” (2002) 10:2 Gender & Dev 10. 
67 Christie McLeod, Heather Barr & Katharina Rall, "Does Climate Change Increase the Risk of Child Marriage: A 
Look at What We Know - And What We Don't - With Lessons from Bangladesh and Mozambique" (2019) 38:1 
Colum J Gender & L 96.  
68 Human Rights Watch, “Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on 
“Gender-Related Dimensions of Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change”” (2016) at 3-9, online (available for 
download): United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 
<www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/ContributionsClimageChange.aspx>.  
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In Canada, many Indigenous peoples’ dependency on the land for food and practicing 
cultural traditions and activities also renders them disproportionately vulnerable to the impacts of 
climate change. These impacts may include altered migratory patterns of wildlife, new pests, 
thinning sea ice, and increasingly unpredictable weather patterns.69  
 
3. The need for common but differentiated responsibilities 
The international climate change regime has a longstanding commitment to the principle 
of common but differentiated responsibilities (“CBDR”), which sets forth varying commitments 
for states based upon “specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and 
circumstances.”70 Principle Seven of the 1992 Rio Declaration states that 
[i]n view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have 
common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the 
responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit to sustainable development in 
view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the 
technologies and financial resources they command.71  
This language was modelled in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(“UNFCCC”).72 The Paris Agreement also echoes this language.73 
While developing countries have not historically been held to the same mitigation 
standard as developed countries, developing countries will not be able to stimulate economic 
development through unencumbered emitting in the same way developed countries have 
historically acted. Instead, their emissions will need to peak while most of their citizens strive to 
sustain or improve their means of support and increase their standard of living.74 As ActionAid et 
al note, “[p]oorer countries are now given no choice but to shift to alternative development 
 
69 Robert B Gibson et al, “From Paris to Projects: Clarifying the implications of Canada’s climate change mitigation 
commitments for the planning and assessment of projects and strategic undertakings” (January 2019) at 16, online 
(pdf): Metcalf Foundation <uwaterloo.ca/paris-to-projects/sites/ca.paris-to-
projects/files/uploads/files/p2p_full_report_23jan19.pdf>. 
70 UNFCCC, supra note 5, art 4(1). 
71 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 13 June 1992, A/CONF 151/26 (vol 1), Principle Seven. 
72 UNFCCC, supra note 5, art 3(2). 
73 UNFCCC, “Adoption of Paris”, supra note 3, art 2(2). 
74 The Mary Robinson Foundation, supra note 32 at 20. 
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trajectories at an incredibly rapid pace if the world is to avoid catastrophic climate change.”75  
Although the finite global carbon budget forces developing countries to quickly transition 
to a low-carbon economy, technological advances may permit these countries to reach similar 
levels of development with lower emissions than countries who undertook such development 
earlier.76  
 
4. The multi-generational dilemma 
About half of the carbon dioxide (“Co2”) emissions emitted each year are absorbed by 
the Earth’s forests, oceans, and other ecosystems,77 while the remaining emissions accumulate in 
the atmosphere. According to Knutti & Rogeli, approximately 15 to 40 percent of this carbon 
remains in the atmosphere for more than 1000 years.78 This means that “[m]ost aspects of 
climate change will persist for many centuries, even if emissions are stopped”.79  
 
Past generations reaped the benefits of partaking in emission-generating activities which 
have already induced an estimated 1.1°C of global temperature warming above pre-industrial 
levels.80 The world now faces the consequences of their actions, just as future generations will 
similarly bear the brunt of the impacts caused by the emissions of those who came before them. 
This concept violates the principle of intergenerational equity, which advocates “that all 
generations have an equal place in relation to the natural system, and that there is no basis for 
preferring past, present or future generations in relation to the system.”81 Intergenerational equity 
calls on each generation to ensure that future generations enjoy equal access to the planet’s 
 
75 ActionAid et al, “Fair Shares- A Civil Society Equity Review of INDCs” at 7, online (pdf): Civil Society Review 
<civilsocietyreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/CSO_FullReport.pdf>.  
76 Niklas Höhne et al, “Assessing the ambition of post-2020 climate targets: a comprehensive framework” (2018) 
18:4 Climate Pol’y 425 at 432 [Höhne et al, 2018]. 
77 NOAA Headquarters, “Earth still absorbing about half carbon dioxide emissions produced by people: study” (1 
August 2012), online: Phys.org <phys.org/news/2012-08-earth-absorbing-carbon-dioxide-emissions.html>. 
78 Knutti & Rogelj, supra note 49 at 362. 
79 “Climate Change” (last visited November 3 2019), online: United Nations <www.un.org/en/sections/issues-
depth/climate-change/>. 
80 World Meteorological Organization, supra note 20. 
81  Edith Brown Weiss, “In Fairness to Future Generations and Sustainable Development” (1992) 8:1 Am U Intl L 
Rev 19 at 20. 
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resources,82 while intragenerational equity calls for equitable access to resources between 
members of the same generation.83 
 
Intergenerational and intragenerational equity are pivotal components of climate justice, 
given that future generations typically lack a political voice in decision-making processes. The 
former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted that the representation of future generations’ 
interests is “limited to the vicarious concern of present generations”.84 The Intergenerational 
Climate Coalition’s factum in the recent Ontario Court of Appeal case regarding the 
constitutionality of the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act stated that “[d]ue to decisions 
made before they were born or able to vote, they [Canadian children] will live their entire lives 
under the mounting environmental, economic, and health stresses caused by GHG emissions.”85 
Recognizing the inadequacy of present government climate action, youth around the 
world have raised their voices to seek government accountability. A class action lawsuit was 
recently brought against the Canadian government to address their failure in adopting adequate 
emissions targets and measures to limit global warming to 1.5°C.86 While the Quebec Superior 
Court dismissed the class action certification (disagreeing with the age limits of the proposed 
class), the Judge importantly noted that the issues raised were justiciable.87 
 
In October 2019, fifteen youth from across Canada also filed a lawsuit at the Federal 
Court alleging that the Federal government’s conduct regarding climate change violates their 
 
82 Ibid at 21. 
83 “Intragenerational equity” (last visited 14 October 2019), online: InforMEA 
<www.informea.org/en/terms/intragenerational-equity>. 
84 UN Secretary-General, Report on Intergenerational Solidarity and the Needs of Future Generations, UNGA 68th 
Sess, UN Doc A/68/x (2013) at para 5. 
85 Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2019 ONCA 544 (Factum of the Intergenerational Climate 
Coalition at para 7) [Pollution Pricing Reference, ICC Factum]. 
86 Environnement Jeunesse c Procureur Général du Canada (2019), 2019 QCCS 2885 (Canlii) (Motion for 
Authorization to Institute a Class Action and Obtain the Statut of Representative: Unofficial Translation at 2.80) 
[EnJeu, “Motion for Authorization”]. For further discussion of this lawsuit and other youth-led climate suits, see 
Section VII of paper.  
87 Michael P Theroux, Laura M Gill & Stephanie Gagne, “Quebec’s Superior Court Leaves the Door Open to 




Charter-protected rights to life, liberty and security of the person, and equality.88 These cases are 
discussed further in Section VII of this paper. 
 
B. Climate Justice, Equity & a Fair Share Approach  
1. Equity & Fair Shares  
The IPCC’s fifth assessment report notes that while “climate change is a classic 
commons problem”, the ‘commoners’ are far from equal in terms of “contribution to climate 
change (past and present), in vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, in capacity to 
mitigate the problem, and in power to decide on solutions”.89  
 
Limiting warming to 1.5°C results in a finite limit to the level of permissible global 
emissions. With such a limit, every tonne of gas emitted in one country is one less tonne that can 
be emitted in other countries.90 An equitable system of emissions allocation is thus needed to 
fairly distribute this carbon budget.  
 
Knutti & Rogelj liken this question of distribution to the allocation of a pie to a group of 
children:  
How would we distribute a pie between ten kids in a fair way? One would probably give 
a tenth to each. However, imagine two kids have eaten two thirds of the pie, and we can 
only distribute the rest. The two who already ate much want more, because they are 
addicted. The others want the rest because they are hungry. Some argue they should get 
compensation in the form of other sweets because there is not much left. What would 
now be a fair distribution? Already in this simple example, different interpretations of 
fairness can be defended... The problem we are facing is similar... Much of the CO2 
budget... has already been emitted in the past, and how the remainder should be 
distributed is debated. The challenge is to find a ’fair’ allocation of the remaining carbon 
budget, between countries, between people within a country, and over time.91  
 
 
88 “15 Canadian youth launch Canada’s first federal youth climate lawsuit to protect their charter and public trust 
rights” (25 October 2019), online: David Suzuki Foundation <davidsuzuki.org/press/15-canadian-youth-launch-
canadas-first-federal-youth-climate-lawsuit-to-protect-their-charter-and-public-trust-rights/>; La Rose et al v 
Canada (Attorney General) (Statement of Claim to the Defendants), online: <davidsuzuki.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/10/Statement-of-Claim-2019-10-25-FILED.pdf> [La Rose et al, “Statement of Claim”]. 
89 IPCC, “Sustainable Development and Equity”, supra note 17 at 295. 
90 Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2019 ONCA 544 (Factum of the Intervenor, the Attorney 
General of British Columbia, at para 11). 
91 Knutti & Rogelj, supra note 49 at 367. 
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2. Climate justice, Equity & Fair Shares in the International Climate Change 
Regime 
Considerations of equity and climate justice have permeated climate change discussions 
since its emergence on the international agenda. For instance, the IPCC’s first assessment report, 
released in 1990, noted that key issues of climate change included “how to address equitably the 
consequences for all” and “whether obligations should be equitably differentiated according to 
countries’ respective responsibilities for causing and combating climate change and their level of 
development”.92 
 
The UNFCCC, created during the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, acknowledged 
that parties should take climate action “on the basis of equity and in accordance with their 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”.93 Calling on developed 
countries to “take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof”,94 the 
Convention mandated that policies and measures “take into account different socio-economic 
contexts”95 and fully consider the “specific needs and special circumstances of developing 
country Parties”.96 While developed countries committed to limiting emissions,97 the emissions 
of developing countries would be permitted to “grow to meet their social and development 
needs”.98 
 
Although this Convention shifted the mitigation burden to developed countries, it was 
still unclear as to how this burden should be equitably shared amongst these nations. Lasse 
Ringius, Asbjørn Torvanger & Bjart Holtsmark state that equitable burden sharing amongst the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) countries was a key issue 
in the climate negotiations that occurred from 1995 to 1997.99 While some developed countries 
called for equal emissions reductions—either through an equal percentage of reductions or in 
 
92 As stated in IPCC, “Sustainable Development and Equity”, supra note 17 at 289. 
93 UNFCCC, supra note 5, art 3.1.  
94 Ibid, art 3.1. 
95 Ibid, art 3.3. 
96 Ibid, art 3.2. 
97 Ibid, art 4.2(a). 
98 Ibid, Preamble. 
99 Lasse Ringius, Asbjørn Torvanger & Bjart Holtsmark, “Can multi-criteria rules fairly distribute climate burdens?” 
(1998) 26:10 En Pol’y 777 at 777. 
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alignment with a country’s level of emissions in a certain base year—other countries focused on 
an equitable distribution of abatement costs.100  
 
Adopted in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol assigned emission allowances for developed 
countries, calling on them to reduce their emissions of certain gases by a minimum of 5 percent 
below 1990 levels by 2008 to 2012.101 These states were also called to implement measures “in 
such a way as to minimize adverse effects, including the adverse effects of climate change, 
effects on international trade, and social, environmental and economic impacts on other Parties, 
especially developing country Parties”.102  
 
The fourth IPCC assessment report, released in 2007, sought to advance the deliberation 
of equitable national climate responses. The third volume in this report included a now-infamous 
“Box 13.7” (reproduced below) which used a 2°C pathway to create emissions reduction targets 
for Annex I and Non-Annex I countries.  
 




100Ibid at 777. 
101 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 11 December 1997, UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1 (entered into force 16 February 2005), art 3.1. 
102 Ibid, art 2.3. 
103 S Gupta et al, “Policies, Instruments and Co-operative Arrangements” in Bert Metz et al, eds, Climate Change 
2007 Mitigation: Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 745 at 776. 
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At the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (“COP”) in 2007, the European Union 
(“EU”), G77104 and several environmental non-governmental organizations (“ENGOs”) 
advocated that this Box’s key conclusion—that Annex I countries must reduce their emissions by 
25 to 40 percent below 1990 levels by 2020—should ground negotiations leading up to the 2009 
COP meeting. As Bård Lahn states, “drawing on the scientific credibility of the IPCC, the 
numbers came to represent ‘what science says’ that countries should do.”105  
 
Soon after the 2007 COP, however, the authors of this box, Michel den Elzen and Niklas 
Höhne, published a paper expanding on their methodology,106 which revealed that these figures 
had been informed by “a wide range of different burden-sharing proposals in the existing 
literature—some of which were mutually excluding, and some of which were strongly opposed 
by countries in the UNFCCC negotiations.”107 Den Elzen and Höhne’s paper also quantified the 
“substantial deviation from baseline” as requiring non-Annex I countries to reduce their 
emissions by 15 to 30 percent below their baseline levels by 2020.108 As den Elzen and Höhne 
presented this information as simply “quantifying what has already been implicitly assumed”, 
some scholars have questioned why these figures were not included in the original box.109 
 
With these additional targets for Non-Annex I countries, the Box’s acceptance vastly 
diminished. While many expected the IPCC’s fifth assessment report (published in 2014) to 
update or expand on this box, it instead steered clear of quantifying reduction targets altogether. 
Lahn & Sundqvist note that “[t]he IPCC seems to have abandoned attempts to establish a 
scientifically based “fixed point” for equitable sharing of emission reductions between the North 
and the South, transferring this discussion from the realm of science to the realm of politics.”110 
Indeed, the fourth chapter of the fifth assessment report stated that “scientific assessments cannot 
 
104 The G77 is the “developing countries’ negotiating bloc”. See Bård Lahn, “In the light of equity and science: 
scientific expertise and climate justice after Paris” (2018) 18: Intl Envtl Agreements 29 at 34. 
105 Ibid at 35. At the time of publication, Lahn was affiliated with the Center for International Climate Research in 
Oslo, Norway.  
106 Michel den Elzen & Niklas Höhne, “Reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in Annex I and non-Annex I 
countries for meeting concentration stabilisation targets” (2008) 91: Climatic Change 249. 
107 Lahn, supra note 104 at 35.  
108 Den Elzen & Höhne, supra note 106 at 260.  
109 Bård Lahn & Göran Sundqvist, “Science as a “fixed point”? Quantification and boundary objects in international 
climate politics” (2017) 67 Envtl Sci & Pol’y 8 at 12.  
110 Ibid at 13.  
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define what equity is and how equitable burden sharing should be implementing the Convention 
and climate policies in general”.111 
 
 The Paris Agreement was adopted in 2015 and signaled a radical shift from previous 
climate agreements in its global obligation for states to partake in mitigation efforts. The 
Agreement calls on all states to hold “the increase in the global average temperature to well 
below 2°C above pre-industrial levels” and pursue “efforts to limit the temperature increase to 
1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.”112 The Agreement is to “be implemented to reflect equity and 
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light 
of different national circumstances.”113 
 While calling for equitable implementation, however, the Paris Agreement does not 
answer the longstanding question of how such implementation is to occur. Peculiarly, the 
Agreement’s preamble notes “the importance for some of the concept of "climate justice", when 
taking action to address climate change”.114 As Lahn states, “This, of course, begs the question: 
For whom does justice matter in the global response to climate change? And, perhaps even more 
intriguing... For whom is justice apparently of no concern at all?”115  
 
After the signing of the Paris Agreement, many climate activists were hopeful that the 
Paris Rulebook would provide further insight on how equitable national targets could be 
established. While the recently-published rulebook affirms that the global stocktake—“the 
Agreement’s main mechanism for assessing countries’ differentiated contributions to the 
common temperature goals”116— will assess collective progress “in the light of equity”,117 it 
does not detail how this assessment will occur.  
 
As such, there is currently no international consensus on how to define, measure or 
 
111 IPCC, “Sustainable Development and Equity”, supra note 17 at 291. 
112 UNFCCC, “Adoption of Paris”, supra note 3, art 2.1(a). 
113 Ibid, art 2.2.  
114 Ibid, Preamble.  
115 Lahn, supra note 104 at 30. 
116 Ibid at 31. 
117 Preparations for the implementation of the Paris Agreement and the first session of the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, UNFCCC 24th Sess UN Doc FCCC/CP/2018/L.16 
(2018) at paras 1-2. 
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consider equity for national emissions reductions targets, and fair share deliberations have 
effectively been “relocated from the UNFCCC to national political processes.”118 
 
3. The Inadequacy of Nationally Determined Contributions  
Prior to the 2015 COP meeting in Paris, nearly every state submitted an intended 
nationally determined contribution (“INDC”) proposing national climate action pledges for post-
2020. Upon ratification of the Paris Agreement, these pledges were converted into nationally 
determined contributions (“NDCs”), and are to be regularly strengthened in response to the 
progress made under the Paris Agreement.119 States are presently being invited to update their 
NDCs prior to the end of 2020.120 The global stocktake will commence in 2023 and be held 
every five years thereafter. 
 
The bottom-up approach in which states set these targets, however, coupled with the lack 
of guidelines from the UNFCCC regarding indicators or metrics to compose the target, has led to 
a murky array of commitments. Some NDCs detail a specific amount of emissions reduction, 
while others provide a reduction range. Many of the commitments are unclear on the sectors 
covered, the impacts of certain mitigation activities, the base year to measure reductions from, or 
the accounting practices regarding land use and market instruments.121 Further, many of the 
proposed activities in developing countries are conditional upon receiving financial or 
technological support. This imprecision allows for a variety of possible outcomes, making it 
difficult to assess and compare commitments.  
 
It is clear, however, that many G20 countries are not on track to meet their 2030 
targets.122 A 2019 study by Michel den Elzen et al examining the G20 members’ climate policies 
against their emissions found that, collectively, the G20 members need to enact additional 
policies to reduce 2030 GHG emissions by 2.5 billion tonnes and 3.5 billion tonnes of carbon 
dioxide equivalent (“Co2eq”) to meet the targets contained within their unconditional and 
 
118 Lahn, supra note 104 at 36. 
119 UNFCCC, “Adoption of Paris”, supra note 3, art 14(1). 
120 UNEP, “Emissions Gap Report 2019”, supra note 9 at xx. 
121 Joeri Rogelj et al, “Paris Agreement climate proposals need a boost to keep warming well below 2 °C” (2016) 
534 Nature 631 at 632. 
122 UNEP, “Emissions Gap Report 2019”, supra note 9 at xvi. 
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conditional NDCs, respectively.123 The UN Emissions Gap Report notes that, globally, 4 and 6 
billion tonnes of Co2eq are needed to meet unconditional and conditional NDCs, respectively.124 
 
Given that the G20 members are together responsible for 78 percent of global annual 
GHG emissions,125 their actions are critical in affecting the success of the Paris Agreement. It is 
difficult to assess a country’s climate action simply by whether it is meeting its NDC, however, 
as there was no consensus on equity or mitigation pathways to inform these commitments. As 
such, a country that is not presently on track to meet its NDC could have a more ambitious target 
than a state that is on track to meet its commitments.  
 
This bottom-up target-setting approach also failed to ensure that the totality of pledges 
would be sufficient to limit warming to 1.5°C. The figure below, taken from the UNEP’s 2019 
Emissions Gap report, illustrates the gaps between global commitments contained in the NDCs 
and limiting warming to 2°C or 1.5°C. As illustrated, the NDCs would need to commit to 12 to 
15 billion tonnes of Co2eq of additional reductions to limit warming to 2°C or 29 to 32 billion 










Figure Two: Global GHG emissions under different scenarios and the emissions gap in 2030126  
 
123 This study examined the non-EU members of the G20 as well as the European Union as a whole. See Michel den 
Elzen et al, “Are the G20 economies making enough progress to meet their NDC targets?” (2019) 126 Energy Policy 
238 at 244. 
124 These are the median figures considered by the UNEP under different scenarios. See UNEP, “Emissions Gap 
Report 2019”, supra note 9 at xviii. 
125 Ibid at 5.  




This illustration makes clear the inadequacy of domestic targets to collectively limit 
warming to 1.5 or 2°C. The Emissions Gap Report warns that implementing the unconditional 
NDCs (coupled with consistent climate action) would have a 66 percent chance of limiting 
global average temperature warming to 3.2°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100, and 
implementing the conditional NDCs would only lower the total warming by 0.2 °C.127 As these 
 
127 Ibid at xix.  
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targets were made within the last few years, however, the gap between policies and targets may 
continue to shrink as additional policies are adopted.128 
 
While the global ambition level of states thus needs to drastically increase, neither the 
Paris Agreement, the Paris Rulebook, nor the UNFCCC have determined how to assess national 
targets in relation to 1.5°C compliant pathways. Is there a fair way to allocate a global carbon 
budget amongst states?  
 
When submitting NDCs, countries were assigned to explain how their pledge was “fair 
and ambitious, in light of its national circumstances”129—without receiving information on how 
these terms were defined.130 Harald Winkler et al studied 163 INDCs to assess how countries 
considered their contributions to be fair, noting that three levels of substantiation were provided 
to broadly justify the fairness of a state’s commitments.131 Nearly half the states (75 out of 163) 
gave no explanation to support their fairness claim, while the other half of states (86 out of 163) 
supported their claim with work from experts in their own country. Only two states (Nigeria and 
South Africa) cited the work of experts from other countries in substantiating their fairness 
claim.132  
 
Some states also used specific indicators to support their fairness claims. For example, 
Winkler et al found that 29 countries quantified an indicator of fairness, such as how their 
country’s emissions contributed to global cumulative or annual emissions.133 While 96 of the 101 
countries that cited having a “small share” of emissions in their NDC each comprise less than 1 
percent of annual global emissions, together these ‘small-emitting states’ contribute 18.2 percent 
of annual global emissions.134 
 
128 Den Elzen et al, supra note 123 at 246. 
129 Lima Call for Climate Action, UNFCCC 1/CP.20 at para 14. 
130 UNFCCC, “Adoption of Paris”, supra note 3, para 27. 
131 At the time of publication, Winkler was affiliated with the Energy Research Centre at the University of Cape 
Town. Harald Winkler et al, “Countries start to explain how their climate contributions are fair: more rigour needed” 
(2018) 18 Intl Envtl Agreements 99 at 102-3.  
132 Ibid at 102-3.  
133 Ibid at 103. 
134 Ibid at 105. 
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Surprisingly, the large majority of NDCs analyzed (122 out of 163) did not ground their 
fairness claim in science. Of the 41 states who did, only 20 states referenced compliance with a 
1.5°C or 2°C global target, and only three of these 20 states referred to the global carbon budget 
put forward in the IPCC’s fifth assessment report. Bolivia was the only country to indicate its 
compliance with an IPCC 1.5°C carbon budget.135 As Winkler et al concluded, it is particularly 
concerning that “[n]o OECD countries refer to 1.5 °C as an equity argument.”136 
 
Without consensus on how to measure equity, a coalition of scientific experts and 
international civil society organizations considered NDCs in relation to a fair share range to limit 
temperature warming to 1.5°C.137 Separating states into “wealthier” and “poorer” countries,138 
they found that “poorer countries’ NDCs exceed their fair shares of the needed global mitigation, 
by a substantial margin and even if only the unconditional components of their NDCs are 
considered,” while “wealthier countries’ NDCs fall collectively far short of their fair share of 
mitigation”.139 This echoes Yann Robiou du Pont et al’s findings, who found that the conditional 
INDCs of most developing countries were more ambitious than the average emissions reduction 
required under five equity approaches to limit global warming to 2°C.140 
 
Wealthier countries’ fair share of mitigation often exceeds a plausible level of domestic 
emissions reduction. To meet their fair share of mitigation, wealthier countries can incorporate 
financial and technological support for developing countries’ mitigation efforts into their 
commitments. This also helps developing countries, who may lack sufficient means to undertake 
either their fair share of mitigation or accomplish their full mitigation potential. Holz, Kartha & 
Athanasiou note, however, that the support from wealthier countries creates a two-pronged 
 
135 Ibid at 103. 
136 Ibid at 110. 
137 ActionAid et al, supra note 75. 
138 The authors defined “wealthier” countries as those whose fair shares of global mitigation in 2030 were larger 
than their estimated domestic mitigation potential, while countries deemed “poorer” were those for whom the 
opposite was true. The authors note that this dichotomy does not match the UNFCCC’s division of states into Annex 
1 and non-Annex 1 countries. See Christian Holz, Sivan Kartha & Tom Athanasiou, “Fairly sharing 1.5: national fair 
shares of a 1.5 °C-compliant global mitigation effort” (2018) 18: Intl Envtl Agreements 117 at 129. 
139 Ibid at 129. 
140 Yann Robiou du Pont et al, “Equitable Mitigation to achieve the Paris Agreement Goals” (2016) 7 Nature 
Climate Change 38 at 38 [du Pont et al, 2016]. See Section VI of this paper for more information.   
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obligation for poorer countries, who are to achieve their fair share of mitigation efforts as well as 
arrange and accommodate mitigation activities beyond their fair share within their jurisdiction.141  
 
These studies illustrate the need for rapid action on two fronts: countries need to act to 
meet their current targets as well as set more ambitious targets.142 Xunzhang Pan et al agree, 
noting that for most countries, “emissions before 2030 exhaust the available [fair share] 
emissions allowances under the Paris Agreement goals throughout the whole century.” 143 
 
III. Approach & Scope 
 
While equity is fundamentally enshrined in both international and domestic climate 
commitments, this value has not been meaningfully applied to inform climate policy. Instead of 
considering how a state can play an equitable role in reducing global emissions, countries’ 
domestic climate commitments are often based on a modest reduction of their national “business-
as-usual” emissions. 
 
States bear a wide range of responsibilities regarding the global mitigation burden. This 
paper predominantly uses the term “developed” countries to refer to the countries who bear the 
overwhelming responsibility for the emissions that have accumulated in our atmosphere. These 
countries may also be referenced to as the global North, or alternatively, as Annex I countries (as 
they were distinguished in previous climate agreements). The remaining states, who bear far less 
responsibility for contributing to global emissions, are referred to as “developing” countries, the 
global South, or non-Annex I countries. While these binary divisions and the use of these terms 
simplify the discussion, the author of this paper acknowledges that these terms can be seen as 
imposing a Western concept of development to analyze a country. The division between states’ 
level of responsibility is also not this clear. A “developing” country may have high historical 
emissions, perhaps due to reliance on coal or diesel fuel. Countries once considered 
 
141 Holz, Kartha & Athanasiou, supra note 138 at 131. 
142 UNEP, “Emissions Gap Report 2019”, supra note 9 at xx. 
143 Xunzhang Pan et al, “Exploring fair and ambitious mitigation contributions under the Paris Agreement goals” 
(2017) 74 Envtl Sci & Pol’y 49 at 52 [Pan et al, 2017].  
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“developing”, such as China, may also emit significant amounts of greenhouse gases today. For 
instance, while China’s per capita emissions remain quite low, its national emissions comprise 
26 percent of global emissions,144 and are more than the combined emissions of the US and the 
EU.145  
 
Equitable mitigation is also only part of a solution to reconcile the historical and present 
inequities of climate change. While outside the scope of this paper, responsibility and funding for 
adaptation measures for those who are and will be disproportionately impacted by climate 
change is another pivotal climate justice concern. As Chukwumerije Okereke & Philip Coventry 
note, “adaptation is the highest priority” for many low-income countries, and “has been viewed 
as the key link between climate change, risk, poverty, and development.”146 
 
This paper’s focus is further narrowed to consider fair share approaches for absolute 
emissions reductions targets. While some states (and corporations) have set emissions targets to 
reduce the intensity of their emissions, such metrics do not limit the level of absolute emissions 
and thus allow the continuation of rising emission levels in our atmosphere. 
 
Canada’s fair share emissions reduction target is specifically considered in this paper. 
Rather than duplicating the works of others, this paper compiles the findings of those who have 
used a variety of equity approaches to consider or derive fair share emissions allocations or 
targets for Canada. Through presenting and comparing these findings, the author of this paper 
hopes to spur further dialogue as to the inadequacy of Canada’s current emissions reduction 
target and encourage law reform to strengthen Canada’s target.  
 
In deciding which studies to include and assess within this compilation, several scoping 
decisions were made, which are laid out in Section III of this paper. Due to the rapid pace of 
 
144 This figure excludes emissions from land use change. UNEP, “Emissions Gap Report 2019”, supra note 9 at 5. 
145 Robert Rapier, “China Emits More Carbon Dioxide Than the U.S. and EU Combined” (1 July 2018), online: 
Forbes <www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2018/07/01/china-emits-more-carbon-dioxide-than-the-u-s-and-eu-
combined/#17a994d628c2>; “Co2 Emissions By Country 2019” (2019), online: World Population Review 
<worldpopulationreview.com/countries/co2-emissions-by-country/>. 
146 Chukwumerije Okereke & Philip Coventry, “Climate justice and the international regime: before, during, and 
after Paris” (2016) 7 WIREs Clim Change 834 at 842. 
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climate science and the continued accumulation of emissions in our planet’s atmosphere, many 
older pieces—which were likely cutting-edge at the time of publication—are now outdated and  
were thus excluded from this analysis. Other pieces were excluded due to the nature of their 
findings, which did not allow for translation into an emissions reduction target. Two of these 
studies still provided thoughtful consideration and have been briefly summarized in Section VI 
of this paper. 
 
This paper relies on scientific information to inform equitable distributions or “fair 
shares” of the global carbon budget. This reliance is not without flaws, as there are sizable 
uncertainties regarding the precise carrying capacity of the earth’s atmosphere for emissions 
levels, as well as variability regarding the exact severity, location, timing and frequency of 
impacts.147 Science also shields some equitable concerns. For instance, while a 1.5°C pathway 
will mitigate impacts and thus benefit vulnerable populations, this heightened ambition requires 
rapid transitions which may exacerbate inequalities. Sonja and Harald present a set of six 
elements to assess the equity implications of policy actions that are consistent with 1.5°C 
pathways.148 These elements emphasize the importance of considering the profile of the 
pathways that are used to inform emissions reduction targets. 
 
The following section will consider Canada’s present-day emissions, its projected 
emissions, and its current 2030 emissions reduction target to contextualize the importance of 
setting a fair share emissions reduction target in Canada. 
 
147 Franziskus von Lucke, “O Justice, Where Art Thou? Developing a New Take on Climate Justice” (April 2017) at 




120&EXT=pdf>. At the time of publication, von Lucke was a researcher at the University of Tübingen in Germany. 
This paper was issued by the ARENA Centre for European Studies in Oslo, Norway.  
148 Sonja Klinsky & Harald Winkler, “Building equity in: strategies for integrating equity into modelling for a 1.5°C 
world” (2018) 376 Phil Trans Royal Soc 1 at 3-5. 
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IV. Business-as Usual: Canada’s Present & Projected Emissions 
A. Where We’re At: Canada’s Present-Day Emissions  
Canada is responsible for 1.7 to 1.8 percent of the cumulative emissions in our 
atmosphere,149 and is the tenth highest-emitting state today.150 In 2017, Canada’s total GHG 
emissions totaled 716 million tonnes of Co2eq.151 This figure, while a net decrease of 2 percent 
below Canada’s 2005 emissions level,152 is nearly 19 percent larger than its 1990 emission 
levels.153  
 
Since 2005, Canada’s emissions per capita decreased from 22.7 to 19.5 tonnes of Co2eq 
per capita in 2017.154 Despite these improvements, Climate Transparency notes that Canada has 
the highest level of energy-related emissions per capita among G20 members—the G20 average 
is eight tonnes per person.155 Canada’s federal government states that Canada’s high per capita 
emissions are due to its “size, its climatic conditions, and its energy intensive, resource based 
economy.”156 
 
B. Where We Want to Go: Canada’s Emissions Reduction Target 
Canada has been setting—and failing to meet—emissions reductions targets for nearly 30 
years. Consider the following figures:  
 
 
149 Eric Kemp-Benedict et al, “The Climate Equity Reference Calculator” (2019), online: Climate Equity Reference 
Project <calculator.climateequityreference.org> [Climate Equity Reference Project, “Climate Equity Reference 
Calculator”]. 
150 Statista, supra note 13. 
151 “National Inventory Report 1990-2017: Greenhouse Gas Sources and Sinks in Canada-Part 1” (2019) at 1, online 
(pdf): Environment and Climate Change Canada <publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2019/eccc/En81-4-
2017-1-eng.pdf> [Environment and Climate Change Canada, “2019 National Inventory Report”]. 
152 Ibid at 1. 
153 Ibid at 11. 
154 Ibid at 5. 
155 “Brown to Green: The G20 Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy-Canada” (2018) at 1, online (pdf): Climate 
Transparency <www.climate-transparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/BROWN-TO-
GREEN_2018_Canada_FINAL.pdf>.  
156 “Canada’s 7th National Communication and 3rd Biennial Report: Actions to Meet Commitments Under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change” (2017) at 14, online (pdf): Environment and Climate 
Change Canada <unfccc.int/files/national_reports/national_communications_and_biennial_reports 
/application/pdf/82051493_canada-nc7-br3-1-5108_eccc_can7thncomm3rdbi-report_en_04_web.pdf>. 
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Table One: Canada’s International Climate Commitments157 
Year International 
Agreement 












1992 Rio Earth Summit Reduce emissions to 





2005 Kyoto Protocol Reduce emissions to 6 
percent below 1990 





2010 Copenhagen Accord Reduce emissions by 
17 percent below 2005 





2015 Paris Agreement Reduce emissions by 
30 percent below 2005 






As the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development to the Parliament 
of Canada notes, "[e]ach federal commitment pushed the timeline for meeting the emission target 
further into the future.”158 As detailed above, Canada’s first emissions target allowed for 
emission levels in 2000 to total more than the levels both in which the year the target was set 
(1992) as well as the baseline year (1990, in which total national emissions were reported to be 
602 million tonnes of Co2eq).159 Canada’s 2005 target was markedly more ambitious, calling for 
a 154 million tonne reduction in a seven-year period, which averages to a 22 million tonne 
reduction each year. In 2010, however, Canada adopted a significantly less ambitious target, 
calling for a 73 million tonne reduction in emissions over a ten-year period. At this time, Canada 
 
157 Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development to the Parliament of Canada, “Report 1-
Progress on Reducing Greenhouse Gases-Environment and Climate Change Canada” (2017) at Exhibit 1.4, online: 
Office of the Auditor General of Canada <www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_cesd_ 201710_01_e_42489. 
html>; See also Government of Canada, “GHG Emissions”, supra note 11; Environment and Climate Change 




also changed the baseline year in its target from 1990 to 2005 likely due to the fact that its new 
target only sought to reduce emissions to two percent above 1990 levels.160 
 
Canada’s most recent commitment was made in May 2015 when the Stephen Harper 
administration submitted its INDC to the UNFCCC.161 This target, which calls for emissions to 
be reduced by 211 million tonnes over a 15-year period (or just over 14 million tonnes each year) 
is still markedly less ambitious than the pace of reduction set by Canada in 2005. Prime Minister 
Justin Trudeau has referred to this target as a “floor” or minimum level of ambition to be 
undertaken,162 but has not officially strengthened this commitment to date. The following chart 
illustrates Canada’s recent and present emissions alongside its emissions reduction target.  
 
Figure Three: Canada’s Total Emissions for Selected Years in Comparison to its 2030 Target163 
 
 
160 While Canada’s 2010 target called for emissions to be reduced to 620 million tonnes of Co2, Canada’s emissions 
in 1990 totaled 602 million tonnes of Co2. See Government of Canada, “GHG Emissions”, supra note 11. See also 
“Backgrounder: Canada & Climate Change” (14 December 2012), online: Elizabeth May MP 
<elizabethmaymp.ca/publications/backgrounder/2012/12/14/backgrounder-canada-climate-change/>. 
161 Government of Canada, “Canada’s INDC Submission”, supra note 14. 
162 Bruce Cheadle, “Catherine McKenna says Canada won’t set emissions target, Tory targets will be ‘floor’” (9 
November 2015), online: CBCNews <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/catherine-mckenna-paris-talks-tory-target-
1.3311482>. 
163 Government of Canada, “GHG Emissions”, supra note 11; Environment and Climate Change Canada, 
“Canadian Environmental Sustainability”, supra note 40 at 5. 
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In 2016, Canada released a Mid-Century Strategy which examined pathways to reduce 
Canada’s emissions by 80 percent below 2005 levels by 2050.164 During the 2019 election 
campaign, Justin Trudeau pledged, if re-elected, to introduce a net-zero 2050 emissions 
reduction target and exceed Canada’s 2030 target.165 As no new climate plan has been released at 
the time of writing, however, this paper focuses on Canada’s existing 2030 emissions reduction 
target. 
 
C. Where We’re Going: Canada’s Projected Emissions  
In December 2016, Canada adopted the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and 
Climate Change (“Pan-Canadian Framework”).166 This framework is Canada’s first climate plan 
“to include joint and individual commitments by federal, provincial and territorial levels of 
government”.167 This plan set out two key measures which have been taken to enact a price on 
carbon pollution in Canada. Firstly, the government allowed each province and territory until the 
end of 2018 to enact a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system that met its pricing backstop.168 In 
2019, the federal pricing system (i.e., carbon tax) was applied in Ontario, New Brunswick, 
Manitoba, and Saskatchewan.169 
 
Second, an output-based pricing system was developed for large industry actors who 
report annual emissions of at least 50,000 tonnes of Co2eq. This system charges participants 
whose emissions exceed a sector-specific allowable annual emissions limit, and awards “surplus” 
 
164 “Canada’s Mid-Century Long-Term Low-Greenhouse Gas Development Strategy” (2016) at 1, online (pdf): 
Environment and Climate Change Canada <unfccc.int/files/focus/long-term_strategies/application/pdf/ 
canadas_mid-century_long-term_strategy.pdf>. 
165 For more information on this pledge, see Section VII of paper.  
166 “Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change: Canada’s Plan to Address Climate Change 
and Grow the Economy” (2016), online: Government of Canada <www.canada.ca/content/dam/themes/ 
environment/documents/weather1/20161209-1-en.pdf>. 
167 Environment and Climate Change Canada, “2019 National Inventory Report”, supra note 151 at 2. 
168 “Pan-Canadian Approach to Pricing Carbon Pollution” (last modified 3 October 2016), online: Government of 
Canada <www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/news/2016/10/canadian-approach-pricing-carbon-
pollution.html>. 
169 “Government of Canada fighting climate change with price on pollution” (23 October 2018), online: Justin 
Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada <pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2018/10/23/government-canada-fighting-
climate-change-price-pollution>. 
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credits to participants who emit less than their annual limit, which can be saved for future use or 
traded to other participants.170 
 
Despite these efforts—and Canada’s other existing climate policy measures—Canada is 
not on track to meet its 2030 target of 511 million tonnes of Co2. Environment and Climate 
Change Canada uses two cases to estimate Canada’s projected emissions reduction: 
• The “Reference” case includes policies implemented since 2015, such as a 
quickened phase out of coal-fired electricity and methane regulations, but 
assumes no further policies as of September 2018. This scenario leads to emission 
levels of 701 million tonnes of Co2eq in 2030; and 
• The “Additional Measures” case, which includes policies that have been 
announced (including under the Pan-Canadian Framework) but have not been 
fully implemented. This case results in emission levels of 616 million tonnes of 
Co2eq in 2030.171 
 
Neither policy trajectory will reduce Canada’s emissions to the extent needed to meet its 
2030 target. Environment and Climate Change Canada predicts that Canada’s emissions in 2030 
will exceed our emissions target by approximately 93 or 178 million tonnes of CO2eq for the 
“Reference” and “Additional Measures” cases, respectively.172 An additional 93 million tonnes, 
however, is more than all of Quebec’s emissions in 2017.173 In its annual Emissions Gap Report, 
the UNEP states that only half of the G20 members are currently projected to achieve the targets 
expressed in their NDCs.174 
 
 
170 Andrew T R Chachula, Sarah E Gilbert & Thomas W McInerney, “New Details on Application of Federal 
Carbon-Pricing Backstop” (6 November 2018), online: Bennett Jones <www.bennettjones.com/Blogs-Section/New-
Details-on-Application-of-Federal-Carbon-Pricing-Backstop>. 
171 “2018 Canada's Greenhouse Gas and Air Pollutant Emissions Projections” (2018) at vi, online (pdf): 
Environment and Climate Change Canada <publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2018/eccc/En1-78-2018-
eng.pdf> [Environment and Climate Change Canada, “2018 Canada Projections”]. 
172 Ibid; Government of Canada, “GHG Emissions”, supra note 11. 
173 Ibid; Barry Saxifrage, “Canada’s climate gap widens yet again” (30 January 2019), online: National Observer 
<www.nationalobserver.com/2019/01/30/analysis/canadas-climate-gap-widens-yet-again>. 
174 The countries currently projected to fall short of achieving their targets are Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, South Africa and the United States. The report notes that it is not possible to say whether another 
three member states (Argentina, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia) are on track to meet their commitments. See UNEP, 
“Emissions Gap Report 2019”, supra note 9 at xvi. 
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While Canada is not on track to meet its 2030 target, simply meeting this target would 
not fulfill Canada’s commitments under the Paris Agreement to limit warming to 2°C and strive 
to limit warming to 1.5°C. Additional efforts must also be pursued to bridge the gap between 
Canada’s present target and its international climate commitments. Although this paper critiques 
Canada’s emissions target based on burden sharing or “fair” approaches, Höhne et al note that 
there are several other ways to assess the ambition of states’ NDCs.175  
 
D. What’s Holding Us Back: The Oil & Gas Sector 
According to Canada’s 2019 National Inventory Report, oil sands emissions have 
increased by 420 percent since 1990.176 Recalling that Canada has been setting emissions 
reduction targets since 1992, consider how the oil and gas sector’s emissions have grown since 
this time:  
 
Table Two: Canada’s Oil and Gas Sector Emissions (Co2eq)177 
Year Total Oil & Gas 
Sector Emissions  
Canada’s Total Emissions Total Oil & Gas Sector 
Emissions as a Percent of 
Canada’s Total Emissions 
1992 113.5 million 
tonnes 
610 million tonnes 18.6% 
2005 157.5 million 
tonnes 
730 million tonnes 21.6% 
2017 194.5 million 
tonnes 
716 million tonnes 27.16% 
 
As shown in the above table, Canada’s oil and gas sector’s total emissions increased by 
71 percent between 1992 and 2017. This sector has also grown to represent a larger proportion of 
Canada’s total emissions during this time, and is presently the highest-emitting economic sector 
in Canada.178 The oil and gas sector is projected to contribute 211 million tonnes of Co2eq to 
 
175 Höhne et al divide possible assessment approaches into two categories: 1) A category related to moral obligations 
includes fair share approaches, as well as emissions reduction from 1990 levels (the base year named in the 
UNFCCC, 1992), a change in recent trends, and the timing and level of per capita emissions; and 2) A category 
which contains several approaches related to technical necessity. See Höhne et al, 2018, supra note 76 at 427-8. 
176 Environment and Climate Change Canada, “2019 National Inventory Report”, supra note 151 at 59. 
177 Government of Canada, “GHG Emissions”, supra note 11. 
178 Environment and Climate Change Canada, “2019 National Inventory Report”, supra note 151 at 11. 
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Canada’s total emissions in 2030,179 which would comprise more than 40 percent of the 511 
million tonnes of emissions permissible under Canada’s 2030 target.180 
These figures help make clear Oil Change International’s stance that there is “no scenario 
in which tar sands production increases and the world achieves the Paris goals.”181 Prominent 
Canadian ENGOs Stand.earth and Environmental Defence agree. Their 2018 report, Canada’s 
Oil and Gas Challenge: A Summary Analysis of Rising Oil and Gas Industry Emissions in 
Canada and Progress Towards Meeting Climate Targets, depicts how the oil and gas sector’s 
emissions will dominate Canada’s carbon budget under a 1.5°C pathway. 
Figure Four: Industry’s Projected Share of Canada’s Climate Targets182 
 
 
179 Environment and Climate Change Canada, “2018 Canada Projections”, supra note 171 at 10. 
180 Environment and Climate Change Canada, “Canadian Environmental Sustainability”, supra note 40 at 5. 
181 “Climate on the line: Why new tar sands pipelines are incompatible with the Paris goals” (January 2017) at 5, 
online (pdf): Oil Change International <priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2017/01/climate_on_the_line_FINAL-
OCI.pdf>. 
182 This graph is presented in megatonnes. 1 megatonne = 1 million tonnes of Co2eq. See Environmental Defence & 
Stand.Earth, “Canada’s Oil & Gas Challenge: A Summary Analysis of Rising Oil and Gas Industry Emissions in 
Canada and Progress Towards Meeting Climate Targets” (2018) at 12, online (pdf): Stand.Earth 
<www.stand.earth/sites/stand/files/Canadas_Oil%2BGas_Challenge_0.pdf>. 
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 It is unrealistic to expect Canada’s remaining sectors to reduce their emissions by 80 
percent by 2030 to accommodate the continued expansion of the oil and gas sector. 
Alternatively, Stand.earth and Environmental Defence cite the IPCC’s conclusion that global oil 
production needs to decline by 37 and 87 percent below 2010 levels by 2030 and 2050, 
respectively.183 Given that Canada’s oil sands comprise 14 percent of global reserves184 and are 
one of the most carbon-intensive methods of production,185 Stand.earth and Environmental 
Defence call for Canada to, at minimum, reduce its production by equivalent amounts. This 
would translate to a 60 percent reduction in Canada’s total GHG emissions from 2005 levels—
which is twice as ambitious as its current 2030 target.186  
The incompatibility of expanding the oil and gas sector and meeting Canada’s climate 
commitments highlight the importance of setting and implementing a more ambitious emissions 
reduction target in Canada. The following section maps out the equity approaches to be used in 
the analyses regarding Canada’s fair share emissions reduction target. 
 
V. Equity Approaches to Derive a “Fair Share” 
 
Over the last thirty years, academics have grappled with how to apply various equity 
principles to “fairly” allocate emissions from a global carbon budget amongst states.187 These 
approaches frequently create an annual emissions allowance for individual states, which can then 
be compared against a state’s projected emissions to create a “fair share” target. If a state’s fair 
 
183 Oil Change International, supra note 181 at 6. 
184 Alex D Charpentier, Joule A Bergerson & Heather L MacLean, “Understanding the Canadian oil sands industry’s 
greenhouse gas emissions” (2009) 4 Envtl Research Letters 1 at 2. 
185 Christophe McGlade & Paul Ekins, “The geographical distribution of fossil fuels unused when limiting global 
warming to 2°C” (2015) 517 Nature 187 at 190. 
186 Stand.Earth, supra note 182 at 6-7. 
187 Adam Rose, “Reducing conflict in global warming policy: The potential of equity as a unifying principle” (1990) 
18:10 Energy Pol’y 927. See also Adam Rose et al, “International Equity and Differentiation in Global Warming 
Policy: An Application to Tradeable Emission Permits” (1998) 12 Envtl & Resource Econ 25; Peter Bohm & Bjorn 
Larsen, “Fairness in a Tradable-Permit Treaty for Carbon Emissions Reductions in Europe and the former Soviet 
Union” (1994) 4:3 Envtl & Resource Econ 219; Jae Edmonds, Marshall Wise & David W Barns “Carbon 
Coalitions: The Cost and Effectiveness of Energy Agreements to Alter Trajectories of Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions” (1995) 23:4-5 Energy Pol’y 309; Richard Richels et al, “The Berlin Mandate: The Design of Cost-
Effective Mitigation Strategies” in John Weyant, ed, Energy and Environmental Policy Modeling (New York: 
Springer US, 1999) 67; Adam Rose & Brandt Stevens “The Efficiency and Equity of Marketable Permits for Co2 
Emissions” (1993) 15:1 Resource & Energy Econ 117; Ringius, Torvanger & Holtsmark, supra note 99. 
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share target is a negative allowance, then the country is meant to eliminate its own emissions as 
well as undertake additional mitigation efforts in other countries to fulfill this target. In some 
instances, a state’s emissions may be less than its annual allowance, meaning that the state can 
“fairly” continue to emit (typically to allow the state to achieve additional development). 
 
According to a 2016 review by P. Zhou and M. Wang, 106 papers had been published in 
“major environmental and climate economics journals” since 1990 on allocating emissions.188 
Two-thirds of the studies in this review considered emissions allocations by fairness, while 
another 28 percent considered allocation by efficiency, and the remaining five percent 
considered both principles.189 Over three-quarters of the studies concentrated on national 
emissions allocations (the remainder focused on regional allocations and the distribution of 
permits amongst firms).190  
 
An oft-cited comparison of studies is Nikolas Höhne, Michel den Elzen and Donovan 
Escalante’s 2014 paper, “Regional GHG reduction targets based on effort sharing: a comparison 
of studies”.191 In this paper, Höhne, den Elzen and Escalante analyzed more than forty studies 
which considered the equitable allocation of emissions, and classified them in seven categories 
of effort-sharing approaches to allow for easier comparison: responsibility; responsibility, 
capability and need; capability-need; cost-effectiveness; staged approaches; equality; and equal 
cumulative emissions per capita (“ECEPC”).192 
 
In 2014, the IPCC’s fifth assessment report adopted these categories of equity-sharing 
approaches, with the exception of cost-effectiveness, “explaining that it can be distinguished 
from effort sharing per se in the sense of determining which country should pay for the 
reductions on normative grounds, although it helps in determining the geographical location of 
cost-effective mitigation opportunities”.193 
 
188 P Zhou & M Wang, “Carbon dioxide emissions allocation: A review” (2016) 125 Ecological Econ 47 at 55. 
189 Ibid at 53. 
190 Ibid at 52. 
191 Niklas Höhne, Michel den Elzen & Donovan Escalante, “Regional GHG reduction targets based on effort 
sharing: a comparison of studies” (2014) 14:1 Climate Pol’y 122. 
192 Ibid at 125. 
193 As explained by Takeshi Kuramochi et al, “Comparative assessment of Japan’s long term carbon budget under 
different effort sharing principles” (2016) 16:8 Climate Pol’y 1029 at 1032. 
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The six equity categories allocate national emissions allowances from a global carbon 
budget based on the following metrics:194  
1. Responsibility: Allocates national emissions allowances based on states’ historical or 
cumulative emissions;  
2. Capability: Allocates national emissions allowances based on a country’s capability to 
finance climate mitigation efforts as determined by its gross domestic product (“GDP”) 
or the human development index (“HDI”);195 
3. Equality: Allocates national emissions allowances on a per capita basis;  
4. Responsibility-capability-need: Determines a country’s emissions allowance based on 
responsibility and capability indicators, as well as a country’s need to sustainably 
development; 
5. Equal cumulative per capita: Allocates per capita emissions rights collectively to a state; 
and  
6. Staged Approaches: Allocates national emissions allowances in various stages with 
differing commitments. 
 
These six categories each promote a different distribution of the global mitigation burden. 
Some categories, such as responsibility, consider the “appropriate moral agent” to be the state, 
and thus assign emission allowances based on the state’s emitting history. Other categories, 
while still assigning the burden to the state, consider the individual to be the moral agent and 
base a state’s emissions based on the country’s population.196 
 
Each equity category contains several allocation schemes which yield significantly varied 
emissions allowances. As several papers and reports already provide a fulsome review of the 
 
194 Leon Clarke et al, “Assessing Transformation Pathways”, in O Edenhofer et al, eds, Climate Change 2014: 
Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 413 
at 458. See also: Takeshi Kuramochi et al, supra note 193 at 1031-2; Pan et al, 2017, supra note 143 at 50. 
195 The Human Development Index is a well-known ranking system created by the United Nations Development 
Programme, and is based on the average longevity, education and income of a country’s population. See “Human 
Development Index” (last visited 2 November 2019), online: United Nations Development Programme 
<hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi>.  
196 For more discussion on appropriate moral agents in climate policy, see Klinsky & Dowlatabadi, supra note 46 at 
101. 
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many approaches, this paper will not do so.197 The following section will, instead, briefly 
summarize the approaches to be used later in this paper to analyze Canada’s fair share of the 
global mitigation burden.   
 
A. Responsibility  
1. Historical Responsibility Approach  
During the 1997 Kyoto Protocol negotiations, the Brazilian government suggested that 
the global mitigation burden be allocated amongst developed countries based on their historical 
cumulative emissions.198 Although not adopted at the negotiations, this approach—particularly as 
an expanded version that includes all states—has frequently been considered as one fair method 
to allocate emissions.  
 
The IPCC’s fifth assessment report lists three main grounds to justify this approach:  
• Climate change was caused by these historic emissions; 
• There is a finite amount of greenhouse gases that can be emitted to the 
atmosphere; and  
• These historical emissions created benefits that should be paid for and used to 
provide capacity to undertake mitigation efforts.199  
 
As Bas J van Ruijven et al note, this approach will allocate a greater portion of the mitigation 
burden to those countries which industrialized earlier and thus have a longer emitting period than 
countries which industrialized later.200 
 
 
197 See for e.g. Daniel Bodansky, “International Climate Efforts Beyond 2012: A Survey of Approaches” (December 
2004), online (pdf): Pew Centre on Global Climate Change 
<www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/2004/11/international-climate-efforts-beyond-2012-survey-approaches.pdf>; 
Pan et al, 2017, supra note 143 at 51; Xunzhang Pan et al, “Equitable Access to Sustainable Development: Based on 
the comparative study of carbon emission rights allocation schemes” (2014) 130 Applied Energy 632 at 635. 
198 UNFCCC Secretariat, Paper No 1: Brazil - Proposed Elements of a Protocol to The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, Presented By Brazil in Response to The Berlin Mandate, 7th Sess (1997). 
199 IPCC, “Sustainable Development and Equity”, supra note 17 at 318. 
200 Bas J van Ruijven et al, “Emission allowances and mitigation costs of China and India resulting from different 
effort-sharing approaches” (2012) 46 Energy Pol’y 116 at 118. 
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 There are several perspectives on the appropriate year to begin accounting for emissions 
under this approach. Izzet Ari & Ramazan Sari distinguish between these views by using the 
phrase “historical contribution” to consider a state’s emissions dating as far back as 1751 (to 
account for the impact of the industrial revolution).201 Alternatively, the phrase “historical 
responsibility” accounts for emissions produced since 1990, the year in which the first IPCC 
report was published and the UNFCCC negotiations began, bringing an end to the period of 
“excusable ignorance”.202 
 
Von Lucke believes that 1990 is too late to begin accounting for a state’s historical 
responsibility, however, noting that climate change was well understood by the late 1980s 
onwards.203 Others advocate for including historical emissions when “climate change became 
reasonably suspected of being a problem, and greenhouse gas emissions thus identifiable as a 
pollutant worthy of policy action”, beginning in the 1960s or 1970s.204 Von Lucke disputes the 
idea of not accounting for emissions prior to this time period, however, stating that it “effectively 
allocate[s] them to all states equally, which does not seem fair either”.205 
 
Since the Brazilian proposal, several variations of this approach have emerged. While 
most iterations consider emissions used within a nation’s borders, one alternative approach is to 
account for a state’s embodied emissions,206 which include “all emissions associated with 
consumed goods back to the original source that produced the emissions even if products were 
transshipped through other countries/regions or were intermediate constituents in a multiregional 
supply chain”.207 This approach can greatly alter a state’s total amount of emissions. For 
 
201 Izzet Ari & Ramazan Sari, “Differentiation of developed and developing countries for the Paris Agreement” 
(2017) 18 Energy Strategy Reviews 175 at 176. Ari is the Head of Turkey’s Department of Environment and 
Sustainable Development, and Sari is a professor at Middle East Technical University, Department of Business 
Administration, Department of Earth System Sciences, and is a co-editor of the Routledge Handbook on Energy 
Economics. 
202 Lucas Bretschger, “Climate policy and equity principles: fair burden sharing in a dynamic world” (2013) 18 Envt 
and Devt Econ 517 at 526; Benito Müller, Niklas Höhne & Christian Ellermann, “Differentiating historic 
responsibilities for climate change” (2009) 9:6 Climate Pol’y 593 at 604; Ari & Sari, supra note 201 at 176. 
203 Von Lucke, supra note 147 at 11. 
204 IPCC, “Sustainable Development and Equity”, supra note 17 at 318. 
205 Von Lucke, supra note 147 at 11. 
206 IPCC, “Sustainable Development and Equity”, supra note 17 at 318. 
207 Steven J Davis & Ken Caldeira, “Consumption-based accounting of Co2 emissions” (2010) 107:12 Proc Natl 
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instance, Mark Lee notes that nearly half of the carbon extracted in Canada is exported beyond 
its borders, and is thus not accounted for in its quantification of emissions.208 
Another variation of this approach considers whether specific individuals should be 
accountable for their emissions, as well as whether individuals should also be held accountable 
for their ancestors’ emissions. In addition to ethical questions about accountability for someone 
else’s actions, this iteration is highly unpractical due to the difficulty in tracing historical 
emissions of specific individuals.209 
 
 The historical responsibility approach has several shortcomings. Firstly, it excludes any 
consideration of a country’s population or economic status. For instance, this approach would 
soon require large emissions reductions from emerging economies such as China and India—
who still have large amounts of poverty. Failing to account for a country’s level of development 
in allocating emissions allowances could perpetuate poverty rates and free the richer high-
emitting nations of their full historical responsibility.210 
 
This approach also considers all emissions produced over a period of time to be equal. 
Some may consider this unfair, given that technological advances may allow developing 
countries to reach similar levels of development with lower emissions than countries who 
undertook such development earlier.211 This approach is heavily impacted by the scope of 
emissions considered. Some developed countries are responsible for significant forestry and 
land-use change emissions, which are frequently excluded from emissions analyses due to data 
uncertainty.212  
 
Finally, such an approach may not be practical. The Expert Group that developed the 
Oslo Principles on Global Climate Change Obligations detail the difficulties in determining the 
 
208 Marc Lee, “Extracted Carbon: Re-examining Canada’s Contribution to Climate Change through Fossil Fuel 
Exports” (January 2017) at 10, online (pdf): Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives 
<www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National%20Office%2C%20BC%20Office/201
7/01/ccpa_extracted_carbon_web.pdf>. 
209 Von Lucke, supra note 147 at 9-10. 
210 Ibid at 13. 
211 See Höhne et al, 2018, supra note 76 at 432. 
212 Van Ruijven et al, supra note 200 at 118. 
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legal impact of historical emissions and states that “the debate about “historical contributions” 
has been rather vague and undetermined.”213 They go on to state that a formula based on vague 
criteria will “unnecessarily complicate things” and “be a stumbling block for global solutions... 
[and] also for the protection of the most vulnerable countries”.214 
 
B. Capability  
1. Ability to Pay Approach  
In 2017, Andries F Hof et al examined the global abatement cost for states to fulfil their 
NDCs in 2030, finding that fulfilling the unconditional NDCs would cost states between $58 
billion to $135 billion USD, while implementing the conditional domestic NDCs would cost an 
additional $39 billion to $56 billion USD.215 According to Hof et al, the additional global 
abatement costs required to adhere to 2°C pathways range from $234 billion USD to $400 billion 
USD, and that “[f]or 1.5°C, the additional costs are about twice as high.”216 
 
While such costs are exceptionally high, the “cost of the consequences of climate change 
in the case of inaction will far exceed the cost of preventing them.”217 A report published by the 
Global Commission on Adaptation in September 2019 noted that a $1.8 trillion investment in 
weather warning systems, infrastructure, dry-land farming, mangrove protection and water 
management would lead to $7.1 trillion in net benefits.218 
 
Given these high costs, some fair share approaches consider the fair distribution of costs 
associated with reducing global emissions amongst states. The Ability to Pay approach considers 
a country’s means to fund mitigation efforts as determined by a country’s average standard of 
living, and “assumes that richer countries need to take more responsibility in reducing Co2 
 
213 Oslo Principles on Global Climate Change Obligations” (2015) at 2, online: Expert Group on Global Climate 
Obligations <climateprinciplesforenterprises.files.wordpress.com/2017/12/osloprincipleswebpdf.pdf>. 
214 Ibid at 20-21. 
215 The large range in figures is due to the use of different baseline scenarios. See Andries F Hof et al, “Global and 
regional abatement costs of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and of enhanced action to levels well 
below 2°C and 1.5°C” (2017) 71 Envtl Sci & Pol’y 30 at 33. 
216 Ibid at 35. 
217 Expert Group on Global Climate Obligations, supra note 213 at 44. 
218 “Adapt Now: A Global Call for Leadership on Climate Resilience” (September 2019) at 3, online: Global 
Commission on Adaptation <cdn.gca.org/assets/2019-09/GlobalCommission_Report_FINAL.pdf>. 
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emissions than poorer countries”.219 Under this methodology, emissions allocations are inversely 
derived from a global carbon budget based on a state’s national GDP per capita.220 Such an 
approach might exclude portions of a developing country’s population from binding targets until 
their GDP reaches a pre-determined “development threshold”.221 A proposed variation of this 
framework allocates a greater proportion of the reduction burden based on the number of high-
emitting individuals that live within a country by using a luxury threshold. Once an income 
reaches the development threshold, “a linearly increasing percentage of that income (and the 
associated emissions) are counted towards national capability (and responsibility), until, when 
the luxury threshold is reached, it is fully counted toward national capability.222 
 
While this approach considers “fairness” to be an equitable distribution of emission costs, 
it does not consider the most efficient use of funds to minimize total abatement costs globally.223 
Richie Merzian and Rod Campbell also note that this approach is difficult to implement due to its 
reliance on economic projections which “are inherently unreliable, particularly over the decadal 
timeframes associated with global mitigation efforts”.224 
 
While this approach focuses on a state’s capability to fund mitigation efforts, an 
important consideration which merits further discussion is whether and how the corporations 
headquartered or operating within a country ought to reduce their emissions. This issue is 
discussed further in Section VII of this paper. 
 
C. Equality 
1. Equal Annual Emission Per Capita Approach 
This population-based approach, which assumes universal participation, asserts that a 
global carbon budget ought to be divided amongst countries either on a per capita basis or based 
 
219 Zhou & Wang, supra note 188 at 49.  
220 See, for e.g. Bodansky, supra note 197. 
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222 Climate Equity Reference Project, “Climate Equity Reference Calculator”, supra note 149. 
223 Bretschger, supra note 202 at 525. 
224 Richie Merzian & Rod Campbell, “Advance Australia’s fair share: Assessing the fairness of emissions targets” 
(12 June 2018) at 10, online (pdf): Australia Institute 
<www.tai.org.au/sites/default/files/P507%20Advance%20Australias%20Fair%20Share%20FINAL_1.PDF>. 
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upon projected population levels over a pre-determined period.225 After creating a global budget, 
an annual limit is derived, which is then shared amongst countries. This approach typically 
categorizes countries as “developed” or “developing”, with differing emissions targets for the 
two groups.  
 
The Expert Group that developed the Oslo Principles on Global Climate Change 
Obligations support this approach’s “fairness” in that it allocates equal emissions to every human 
being. However, Klinsky & Dowlatabadi point out that allocating emissions to a nation on a per 
capita basis does not ensure that the emission allocations are distributed equally within the 
country.226 The Oslo Principles’ Expert Group calls for this approach to further limit obligations 
for developing countries to fulfill the CBDR principle.227 
 
A further weakness of this approach is its failure to consider the highly unequal 
distribution of cumulative emissions that have already caused 1°C of warming in the 
atmosphere.228 As mentioned above, however, the Expert Group finds criteria regarding 
historical contribution to be vague and advocate that some sophistication ought to be sacrificed 
for certainty, noting that a per capita approach is easy to calculate.229 
 
Additionally, allocating emissions equally does not necessarily correlate with an equal 
mitigation burden, given the global variation in a state’s population density, technological lock-
in, the extent of natural resources it possesses, differing climates and several other 
circumstances.230 Given these clear weaknesses, most fair share approaches that seek to consider 
equality combine facets of this approach with other effort-sharing approaches, rather than relying 
solely on this approach.  
 
 
225 Ibid at 9. 
226 Klinsky & Dowlatabadi, supra note 46 at 92.  
227 Expert Group on Global Climate Obligations, supra note 213 at 73. 
228 IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers 2018”, supra note 1 at 6.  
229 Expert Group on Global Climate Obligations, supra note 213 at 20-21.  
230 Klinsky & Dowlatabadi, supra note 46 at 92.  
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2. Contraction and Convergence Approach 
This approach is grounded in the belief that the atmosphere is a global common.231 Here, 
a long-term global carbon budget is created (forming the “contraction”), and emissions are 
allocated to states to reduce from current levels to equal per capita emissions by a pre-
determined year (“convergence”). This approach assumes that emissions trading would be used 
to balance the differing supply and demand of emissions allowances.232  
 
A significant flaw with this approach is its lack of consideration for the differing 
capabilities of countries to decrease emissions or their ability to subsume mitigation costs,233 as 
well as its exclusion of historical responsibility.234 Additionally, as allowances are initially 
distributed on a per capita basis, this may allocate surplus emissions to developing countries.235 
 
D. Responsibility-Capability-Need  
1. Greenhouse Development Rights Framework 
The Greenhouse Development Rights (“GDR”) framework is perhaps the most fair stand-
alone approach. The GDR framework uses a global responsibility-capacity index (“RCI”), which 
assesses a state’s cumulative per capita emissions since a given year as well as its per capita 
income. The framework also uses a “development threshold” to address inequity within a 
country which excludes the income (and thereby emissions) of individuals who make below this 
threshold, which was set at $7,500 – or 1.25 times above the global poverty line of $6,000 in 
2009.236 A state’s fair share of mitigation is then derived by considering its portion of the 
difference between a global carbon budget and a baseline scenario (typically no climate 
 
231 Michel den Elzen & MM Berk, “Bottom-Up Approaches for Defining Future Climate Mitigation Commitments” 
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conceptual approach to long term climate policy” (2006) 6:2 Climate Pol’y 181 at 183.  
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and Developing Countries” (February 2003) at 41, online (pdf): ECOFYS GmbH on behalf of the Federal Ministry 
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236 Paul Baer et al, “Greenhouse Development Rights: A Proposal for a Fair Global Climate Treaty” (2009) 12 
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policy).237 The Climate Equity Reference Project’s (“CERP”) online calculator (discussed in 
Section VI of this paper) is an interactive tool that allows the user to determine the start year for 
considering historical responsibility, the minimum development threshold, and how to weigh the 
two indicators.238 
 
This approach’s use of individual income, instead of average per capita values, allows for 
consideration of income inequality—both between and within countries—to be accounted for,239 
ensuring that wealthy individuals residing in poorer countries are included in global 
calculations.240  
 
However, Narasimha Rao notes that this approach does not ensure that those exempt 
from the threshold receive any benefit from this exemption or are shielded from mitigation 
measures that impose nation-wide costs.241 The approach’s creators acknowledge this 
shortcoming, stating that it “offers no way to prevent national elites from escaping all burdens 
and shifting them to their poorest citizens.”242  
 
Further criticism has been raised regarding this approach’s simplistic definition of 
capacity. Political and International Affairs Professor David Schlosberg, while deeply 
appreciative of the framework, notes that it reduces climate justice to “minimal development” 
and focuses on accumulating capital, which ignores the ample scholarly work done to advance 
the definition of development as “the attainment of a range of capabilities necessary to have a 
functioning life.”243 Philosophy Professor Kenneth Shockley agrees with such sentiments, calling 
the GDR framework “one of the most interesting and promising [burden-sharing] efforts” while 
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also finding fault with its inability to “miss any features of development that are not reducible to 
individual financial standing.”244 
 
Despite these valid shortcomings, the approach’s ability to consider both historical and 
present-day responsibility for emissions alongside the distribution of wealth between and within 
states renders it a more fulsome approach than those approaches which consider a single factor.  
 
E. Equal Cumulative Emissions per Capita  
The ECEPC approach is founded in the belief that all humans have equal value as well as 
“equal claims to global collective goods”.245 This framework, which incorporates the equal 
annual emission per capita approach, posits that all countries should receive equal per capita 
emission allowances over an agreed period of time (which may consider years that have already 
occurred as well as future years). After determining a global carbon budget and pathway, 
emissions allowances are calculated based on the per capita cumulative emissions for each 
country during the pre-determined period of time.246  
 
While Gibson et al suggest that this approach is the most fair emissions-based sharing 
approach,247 the author of this paper disagrees with this finding. Unlike the GDR framework, this 
approach ignores capability considerations. As such, a country with both high historical 
responsibility and high levels of poverty would be called upon to more aggressively reduce 
emissions under this approach than the GDR framework. Further, the ECEPC approach would be 
practically challenging to execute, given both the ever-changing populations of states and the 
unknown and imprecise populations of some areas in developing countries. Similar to the 
historical responsibility approach, challenges may also arise regarding the appropriate year to 
start considering cumulative emissions. 
 
 
244 Kenneth E Shockley, “A gentle critique of the Greenhouse Development Rights framework” (2013) 4 WIREs 
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247 Gibson et al, supra note 69 at 49.  
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F. Staged Approaches 
1. Multi-Stage Approach 
This approach uses differing stages to allow developing countries to gradually work 
towards increasingly stringent commitments. Within this approach, various stages have been 
proposed. For instance, den Elzen and Berk suggest a three-tiered system in which states 
graduate from having no commitment (Stage 1) to emissions limitation or intensity targets (Stage 
2), and finally, having absolute reduction targets (Stage 3).248 Others have proposed a four-staged 
system, which also begins with no commitments in the initial stage. Countries then create 
pledges for sustainable development (Stage 2), set a moderate absolute target (Stage 3), and, 
lastly, establish an absolute target to align with a sustainable per capita level of emissions (Stage 
4).249 The multi-stage approach can also be classified under a capability principle. 
 
2. Triptych Approach 
This staged sectoral approach analyzes key emitting sectors to create a national target. 
While different iterations of this approach include different sectors, its original iteration assessed 
emissions from the power sector, energy-intensive industries and the domestic sector.250 
Technological opportunities and states’ differing technological baselines are taken into 
consideration in creating sectoral emissions allowances. Phylipsen et al also state that 
“differences in standard of living, in fuel mix, in economic structure and the competitiveness of 
internationally oriented industries” are considered in creating these allowances.251 Combining 
these allowances determines a country’s national emissions target.252  
This approach is exemplified by the EU’s Burden Sharing Agreement, which utilized 
some of the above-listed considerations to allocate emissions reductions amongst its member 
states to fulfill its Kyoto target.253 Zhou and Wang note that while this approach considers the 
 
248 den Elzen & Berk, supra note 231 at 28.  
249 Höhne et al, 2003, supra note 233 at 28. 
250 Tommi Ekholm et al, “Effort sharing in ambitious, global climate change mitigation scenarios” (2010) 38 Energy 
Pol’y 1797 at 1798. 
251 G J M Phylipsen et al, “A Triptych sectoral approach to burden differentiation; GHG emissions in the European 
bubble” (1998) 26:12 Energy Pol’y 929 at 934. 
252 Höhne et al, 2003, supra note 233 at 44-45. See also den Elzen & Berk, supra note 231 at 25. 
253 Paul Boothe & Félix-A Boudreault, “Sharing the Burden: Canadian GHG Emissions” (2016) at 5, online: 
Lawrence National Centre for Policy and Management <www.ivey.uwo.ca/cmsmedia/2169603/ghg-emissions-
report-sharing-the-burden.pdf> [Boothe & Boudreault, 2016(b)]. 
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differing potentials of emissions reduction amongst countries, it requires a cumbersome amount 
of data to set the efficiency indicators.254 Ekholm et al also clarify that, as only the national target 
is binding, this approach simply “uses sectoral mitigation potentials to arrive on a more accurate 
estimate on how much reductions are feasibly attainable in a given country and leaves the 
country free to choose how to pursue its target.”255 
G. Fair Share Range 
Many of the above approaches provide valuable insight into suggesting a country’s 
possible “fair share”. As there is a lack of consensus in the international community as to the 
superior approach, some scholars have advocated that a “fair share range” be created using 
multiple approaches or sources. With this approach, a country’s target that falls within this range 
is considered to be fair by at least one of the included approaches.  
 
A fair share range based on multiple approaches calculates several fair share targets or 
allocations, which can then be averaged to provide an average fair share target, or can be used to 
form the lower and upper bounds of a fair share range. For instance, ActionAid et al used an 
“equity range” that considered a country’s fair share based on a 50 percent weighting of two 
indicators that assessed fair share allocations in line with principles of responsibility and 
capability to assess states’ NDCs.256  
 
Some scholars have instead opted to create a fair share range based on the compilation of 
other’s studies. For example, the fair share range of emissions reduction levels for developed 
countries presented in Box 13.7 (see Section II of this paper) was developed through 
consideration of the findings and information presented in more than twenty studies.257  
 
A key benefit of a fair share range is its compilation of several emissions reduction 
strategies “that would be expected from different groups of countries under a wide range of 
different burden-sharing proposals”.258 As a 1990 paper by Adam Rose astutely pointed out, 
 
254 Zhou & Wang, supra note 188 at 51. 
255 Ekholm et al, supra note 250 at 1799. 
256 ActionAid et al, supra note 75 at 2. 
257 Den Elzen & Höhne, supra note 106 at 252-3. 
258 Lahn & Sundqvist, supra note 109 at 13. 
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differing criteria on what constitutes equity results in greatly differing policy implications for 
states.259 ActionAid et al also noted that there are “a range of interpretations” of the equity 
principles outlined in the UNFCCC.260 A fair share range incorporates several equity 
considerations, minimizing the need to form a political consensus on a single equity approach.261  
 
This idea is also exemplified by CAT, who compiled a database of more than 40 studies 
and conducts its own analyses to assess fair shares for a set of countries who collectively emitted 
81 percent of global emissions in 2010.262 Their methodology is fully detailed later in this paper. 
 
H. Conclusion  
The Historical Responsibility approach intuitively seems fair in that it accounts for states’ 
historical emissions. However, is this approach a realistic solution? As there is no set start year, 
it may prove difficult for the international community to agree upon a time to begin accounting 
for emissions. Further, this approach does not factor in a state’s level of development or 
economic status. As such, if a state with high poverty levels was tasked with a large mitigation 
burden, funding for social services could be reallocated to climate action, which could 
exacerbate poverty rates. 
 
The Ability to Pay approach is perhaps more realistic than the Historical Responsibility 
approach, given its focus on a state’s capability to fund mitigation efforts. The use of a 
development threshold also accounts for inequality within states, a component which is not 
accounted for in most of the other approaches. However, this approach is based on economic 
projections, which could prove to be unreliable.  
 
The Equal Annual Emission per Capita approach treats every human as equal, and 
allocations are simple to calculate. In a similar nature to the Historical Responsibility approach, 
this approach could unduly burden developing countries and increase poverty rates. While the 
 
259 Rose, supra note 187 at 933. 
260 ActionAid et al, supra note 75 at 1.  
261 Lahn & Sundqvist discuss this in terms of the potential of Box 13.7 to “resolve the complex issue of equity 
between the North and the South”. See Lahn & Sundqvist, supra note 109 at 13. 
262 “Global Pathways” (last visited 12 October 2019), online: Climate Action Tracker 
<climateactiontracker.org/methodology/global-pathways/> [Climate Action Tracker, “Global Pathways”]. 
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Contraction and Convergence Approach similarly works towards equal per capita emissions, its 
multi-decade convergence period seems inappropriate, however, given the urgent need for far-
reaching action. Both of these approaches ignore a state’s historical actions and its ability to fund 
mitigation efforts.  
 
The ECEPC approach also incorporates equality considerations into its approach, and 
accounts for previous emissions, however, both this approach and the Equal Annual Emission 
per Capita approach would be difficult to implement, as states’ populations are always-changing. 
The Multi-Stage approach respects the CBDR principle by allowing states to have more or less 
stringent commitments, however, it is unclear how states would be allocated to each stage.  
 
The GDR framework is perhaps the most fair standalone approach, due to its 
consideration of a state’s historical responsibility and its per capita income, and the ability to 
account for inequality within a country by use of development and luxury thresholds. Similar 
difficulties arise, however, in terms of determining a start year to account for emissions. 
 
The Fair Share range similarly incorporates several considerations into determining 
allocations. This is beneficial as it negates the need to agree on which approach ought to be used, 
and allows for states’ differing priorities to be included within such an analysis. However, this 
figure may be misleading, as a country which adopts a target within the lower portion of its fair 
share range is still not meeting its true “fair share” of the mitigation burden. If this approach is 
used, it is important to make clear that a state must meet at least the middle point of their fair 
share range in order to truly be undertaking its “fair share”. 
 
VI. Where We Need to Go: Canada’s Fair Share Emissions Target 
 
With a population of 37.5 million people, Canada presently accounts for 0.48 percent of 
the world’s population,263 yet in 2014, its emissions comprised 1.6 percent of global annual GHG 
 
263 “Canada Population 2019” (last modified 10 October 2019), online: World Population Review 
<worldpopulationreview.com/countries/canada-population/>. 
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emissions.264 Canadians’ Co2 emissions per capita are amongst the highest of all states,265 and its 
energy-related emissions per capita are the highest of the G20 members.266 It is worth reiterating 
that these emissions exclude the full life-cycle emissions of products that are produced in Canada 
but used outside of Canada, and that the inclusion of such emissions would render Canada 
responsible for a much greater portion of the global mitigation burden. 
 
Over the last two decades, several scholars and practitioners have grappled with the 
matter of establishing a fair emissions target or allocation for Canada. During this time, two 
phenomena have shifted the goalposts of climate policy. First, understanding of climate science 
has evolved. In the 1990s, many believed that the limit for atmospheric Co2 was 550 parts per 
million (“ppm”).267 The IPCC’s fifth assessment report states, however, that this level of Co2eq 
concentrations in 2100 would be “more unlikely than likely” to limit warming below 2°C.268 The 
IPCC advocates for limiting warming to 1.5°C, which likely requires atmospheric concentrations 
below 430 ppm of Co2eq by 2100.269   
 
This increased understanding of climate science has, unfortunately, not been 
accompanied by sufficiently-amplified global efforts. The continued growth of global emissions 
now require that more drastic efforts occur within a shorter period of time.  
 
This paper’s consideration of Canada’s fair share focuses on analyses that aligns with the 
IPCC’s call for limiting atmospheric concentrations to below 430ppm of Co2eq. However, two 
“outdated” studies which used a higher limit for atmospheric concentration are first highlighted. 
These studies, which also call for Canada to adopt a more ambitious emissions reduction target, 
 
264 “Global greenhouse gas emissions” (30 May 2019), online: Government of Canada 
<www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/environmental-indicators/global-greenhouse-gas-
emissions.html>. 
265 “CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)” (last visited 3 November 2019), online: The World Bank 
<data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC?most_recent_value_desc=true>. 
266 Climate Transparency, supra note 155 at 1. 
267 Joseph Romm, “What is the safe upper limit for atmospheric CO2?” (1 January 2008), online: Grist 
<grist.org/article/parting-company-with-mckibben-and-maybe-hansen/>. 
268 “Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report Summary for Policymakers” (2014) at 22, online (pdf): IPCC 
<www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf> [IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers 
2014”]. 
269 Ibid at 21. 
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further emphasize the inadequacy of Canada’s present target. After the initial review of these two 
studies, the following sections will examine the recent works that delineate interpretations of 
Canada’s fair share.    
 
A. Outdated Studies & Findings 
1. Can multi-criteria rules fairly distribute climate burdens? OECD results 
from three burden sharing rules270 
Ringius, Torvanger and Holtsmark’s 1998 paper was excluded from this paper’s analysis 
as it calls for OECD countries to collectively reduce emissions by 20 percent below 1993 levels 
but does not translate this figure into a quantifiable figure nor set targets for non-OECD 
countries.271 
 
Ringius, Torvanger and Holtsmark created three formulas to illustrate different burden-
sharing approaches to inform subsequent climate negotiations. Recognizing that countries may 
differ in their preferred distribution of weight amongst the formula’s indicators, each formula 
was adopted with different weighting of its components to produce four cases.  
 
Despite being published more than twenty years ago, their findings call for more stringent 
reductions than Canada’s emissions or 2030 target.272 Figure Six compares the low and high 






270 Ringius, Torvanger & Holtsmark, supra note 99. At the time of publication, the three authors were affiliated with 
the Center for International Climate and Environmental Research in Oslo, Norway. 
271 This is in part due to the inability to obtain data for Iceland, as well as the exclusion of Czech Republic, Korea 
and Mexico (who were recent OECD members and non-Annex 1 parties) and Hungary and Poland (who are OECD 
members but economies in transition countries). 
272 See Section IX of this paper. 
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Figure Five: Canada’s Total Emissions for Selected Years in Comparison to its 2030 Target and 




Even the least stringent emissions reductions called for by Ringius, Torvanger and 
Holtsmark is significantly more ambitious than Canada’s 2030 target; this fact is especially 




273 Government of Canada, “GHG Emissions”, supra note 11; Environment and Climate Change Canada, 
“Canadian Environmental Sustainability”, supra note 40; Ringius, Torvanger & Holtsmark, supra note 99. 
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2. Effort sharing in ambitious, global climate change mitigation scenarios274 
 
This 2010 paper by Tommi Ekholm et al utilizes two reduction targets which would lead 
to the stabilization of emissions at concentration levels of 485 and 550 ppm Co2eq by 2100.275 
As detailed above, concentration levels of 550ppm are “more unlikely than likely” to limit 
warming below 2°C, while concentration levels of 485 ppm are “unlikely” to limit warming to 
1.5°C.276 
 
Given the dated atmospheric limits, it is alarming that Ekholm et al’s findings call for 
Canada’s emissions to fall to approximately 360 to 410 million tonnes of Co2eq by 2020.277 To 
arrive at these findings, Ekholm et al utilize a multistage approach and a triptych approach. The 
multistage approach is comprised of four stages: In the initial stage, states do not have binding 
commitments. Upon entering the second stage, countries commit to moderate reductions (i.e., 10 
percent below the baseline scenario). In the third stage, countries commit to positively binding 
targets which are more stringent than in the previous stage. In the final stage, states set 
substantial reduction targets. 
 
The triptych approach utilized by Ekholm et al includes the following six sectors: 
electricity, industry, fossil fuel production, agriculture, domestic, and waste. After establishing 
targets for each sector, a country’s emissions allocations are determined by adding these sectoral 
targets.278 
 
The figure below details the range of emissions allocated to Canada under each approach 
for the year 2020, as based upon two atmospheric limits. 
 
274 Ekholm et al, supra note 250. At the time of publication, all six authors of this study were associated with the 
VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, Ecofys Germany GmbH and/or TKK Helsinki University of 
Technology. 
275 Here, the authors state that the stabilization of emissions at concentration levels of 485 and 550 ppm Co2eq by 
2100 would lead to average global warming of approximately 1.8°C and 2.1°C, respectively. Ibid at 1800. 
Recall, however, that the IPCC has stated that a concentration level of 550ppm is “more unlikely than likely” to 
limit warming to 2°C. See IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers 2018”, supra note 1 at 22. 
276 IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers 2014”, supra note 268 at 22. 
277 See Appendix. 
278 Ekholm et al, supra note 250 at 1798-99. 
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Figure Six: Canada’s Total Emissions for Selected Years in Comparison to its 2030 Target and 




It bears repeating that the atmospheric limits in this study are significantly higher than the 
limits called for by the IPCC in recent years. It should also be noted that such emissions 
allocations are for the year 2020, while Canada’s target—which is significantly higher—calls for 
less emissions reductions a full decade later.  
 
The following figure utilizes the same two atmospheric limits and details the range of 




279 Ibid; Government of Canada, “GHG Emissions”, supra note 11; “Canadian Environmental Sustainability”, supra 
note 40 at 5. 
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Figure Seven: Canada’s Total Emissions for Selected Years in Comparison to its 2030 Target 
and the 2050 Emissions Allocations Suggested by Ekholm et al280 
 
 
While there is presently a strong call in the international community for emissions to 
reach net zero by 2050 (see Section VII of this paper), this was not the case when Ekholm et al’s 
paper was published in 2010. This graph also illustrates the shortcomings of Canada’s 2030 
target in that meeting this target would still require Canada to undertake significantly more 
ambitious climate efforts in order to meet the ranges suggested by Ekholm et al above. 
 
3. Summary/Conclusion 
Although these studies have less stringent emissions reductions scenarios than called for 
by climate scientists today, these studies call for Canada to have a significantly more stringent 
emissions reduction target than it presently does. The twelve cases presented in Ringius, 
Torvanger and Holtsmark’s 1998 paper called for Canada to reduce its emissions to 358 to 396 
million tonnes of Co2 in 2010, which is nearly half of Canada’s actual 2010 emissions (693 
million tonnes of Co2). Ekholm et al’s 2010 paper called for Canada’s emissions to fall to 
 
280 Government of Canada, “GHG Emissions”, supra note 11; “Canadian Environmental Sustainability”, supra note 
40 at 5; Ekholm et al, supra note 250. 
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approximately 360 to 410 million tonnes of Co2eq by 2020, which is close to half of Canada’s 
2017 emissions levels (716 million tonnes of Co2). Both studies, despite considering earlier 
target years, advocate for significantly more stringent targets than Canada’s 2030 target (511 
million tonnes of Co2eq).  
 
B. Studies and Findings for Analysis  
It is important to compare like with like. The following three studies all considered 
Canada’s fair share emissions allowance or reduction target within their analysis or 
supplementary data, and included both Co2 and non-Co2 gases. All three analyses excluded 
LULUCF emissions, as this data is “subject to very large uncertainties and fluctuations”.281 As 
the Climate Equity Reference Calculator notes, “including LULUCF emissions in a single 
framework together with Co2 emissions from fossil fuel and industry and non-Co2 gases, 
presupposes the problematic view that emissions from LULUCF and other sources are 
essentially fungible and emissions reductions in either space perfectly equivalent”.282 Emissions 
reductions through LULUCF activities, such as planting and rehabilitating trees, differ in that 
they are non-permanent and can be reserved by the cutting down of such trees.283 CAT states that 
it excludes LULUCF emissions from its assessments for several reasons, including the various 
approaches used to account for LULUCF emissions and the different “drivers and dynamics 
between fossil fuel and industrial GHG emissions and LULUCF.”284 
  
Some slight differences occurred within these calculations, however, which are important 
to note. One of the studies excluded emissions from international shipping and aviation sectors, 
stating a lack of current policies to ground strong mitigation scenarios in these areas and noting 
that “[l]ower emissions from this sector would reduce the mitigation burden on all countries.”285 
 
281 “The Climate Equity Reference Calculator database” (last visited 12 October 2019), online: Climate Equity 
Reference Project <climateequityreference.org/calculator-information/the-climate-equity-reference-calculator-
database/> [Climate Equity Reference Project, “CERP Calculator Database”].  
282 Ibid. 
283 “Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF)” (last visited 11 December 2019), online: United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change <unfccc.int/topics/land-use/workstreams/land-use--land-use-change-
and-forestry-lulucf>. 
284 “NDC Ratings and LULUCF” (last visiting 11 December 2019), online: Climate Action Tracker 
<climateactiontracker.org/methodology/indc-ratings-and-lulucf/>. 
285 du Pont et al, 2016, supra note 140 at 44. 
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The authors of these three studies also used slightly different global mitigation pathways 
to derive the carbon budgets which are then distributed amongst nations. Several of the studies 
provided information that drew from both 1.5°C and 2°C compliant pathways; the information 
presented in this paper uses only the information from the former pathways. Du Pont et al’s 
study286 uses the average calculations from two pathways where emissions peak by 2020 and 
there is more than a 50 percent chance of returning to a maximum of 1.5°C by 2100.287 While the 
CERP calculator allows the user to select from various pathways, all of the information provided 
in this paper utilizes a “1.5°C low energy demand” scenario, a pathway which minimally exceeds 
1.5°C and has nearly a 66 percent chance of limiting warming to 1.5°C in 2100.288 Finally, CAT 
uses several models to create a 1.5°C pathway that limits GHG concentration levels to 440 
ppm.289 
 
Slight variations were also present in the outputs chosen to detail the studies’ findings. 
Some studies allocated presented emissions allowances, whereas others detailed mitigation 
burdens, and different baseline and target years were used within the latter. To allow for easier 
comparison between the studies, the author of this paper has translated the studies’ findings to 
conform under one indicator: Canada’s percentage of emissions reduction below 2005 levels by 
2030. This baseline year also allows for easy comparison against Canada’s present emissions 
reduction target. The figures presented in the following sections may not add up, due to the 
rounding of figures by either the studies’ author(s) or the author of this paper. 
 
1. Climate Equity Reference Project 
The CERP is an initiative created by EcoEquity and the Stockholm Environment Institute 
which includes an interactive calculator that can be used to determine countries or regions’ fair 
 
286 Ibid. 
287 The two models used are IMAGE 2.4; GCAM 2.0. See Ibid at 40; Yann Robiou du Pont et al, “Equitable 
mitigation to achieve the Paris Agreement Goals”, Supplementary Information (2016) Nature Climate Change 1 at 3 
[du Pont et al, 2016(b)]. 
288 Climate Equity Reference Project, “Climate Equity Reference Calculator”, supra note 149. 
289 The models used by CAT are GCAM, IMAGE, MERGE, MESSAGE, REMIND, and WITCH. See Climate 
Action Tracker, “Global Pathways”, supra note 262. Note, however, that the IPCC stated that a concentration level 
of 450 ppm is “more unlikely than likely” to limit warming to 1.5°C. See IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers 2014”, 
supra note 268 at 22. 
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share of emissions reduction under several approaches.290 This calculator uses both responsibility 
and capability indicators, which can be weighted according to the user’s preferences, to 
determine a country’s fair share target. This flexibility allows for consideration of a country’s 
fair share emissions target under three equity approaches: responsibility, capability, and 
responsibility-capability-need. The CERP was recently used by Climate Action Network Canada 
to detail Canada’s fair emissions reduction target.291 
 
With this approach, Canada’s share of the global RCI is impacted by the starting year for 
counting emissions as well as the use and value of a development and/or luxury threshold. While 
excluding a development threshold or failing to consider a meaningful threshold is considered 
“regressive”, 292 this paper has done so in calculating Canada’s fair share under a responsibility 
approach, as the responsibility equity approach does not consider a country’s capability. When 
calculating fair shares with a capability and responsibility-capability-need approach, however, an 
iteration without a development threshold is not included in this paper, given the incompatibility 
of this exclusion with a climate justice lens.  
 
a) Responsibility 
For the purposes of this analysis, the author of this paper weighted the responsibility 
indicator of the Climate Equity Reference Calculator at 100 (to exclude capability considerations 
from this analysis); development and luxury thresholds were not used. Different ‘starting years’ 
(the year to begin accounting for emissions) were then assigned to yield the following fair share 
emissions reduction targets for Canada in 2030: 
 
 
290 Climate Equity Reference Project, “Climate Equity Reference Calculator”, supra note 149. 
291 Climate Action Network Canada rounded the average of six iterations to detail that Canada’s fair emissions 
reduction target would be 140 percent below 2005 levels by 2030. See “Canada’s Fair Share Towards Limiting 
Global Warming to 1.5°C” (2 December 2019), online: Climate Action Network Canada 
<climateactionnetwork.ca/2019/12/02/canadas-fair-share-towards-limiting-global-warming-to-1-5c/>. 
292 As stated by the Climate Equity Reference website and affirmed in literature. See Climate Equity Reference 
Project, “Climate Equity Reference Calculator”, supra note 149; ActionAid et al, supra note 75 at 12; Holz, Kartha 
& Athanasiou, supra note 138 at 124. 
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Figure Eight: Canada’s Total Emissions for Selected Years in Comparison to its 2030 Target 




Using these criteria, the CERP calculator finds Canada responsible for 1.7 to 1.8 percent 
of cumulative emissions, and as such, suggests that Canada’s fair share emissions reduction 
target is 79 or 82 percent below 2005 levels by 2030. It is interesting that Canada’s “fair share” 
of emissions reduction is not significantly impacted by the year in which emissions begin to be 
accounted for. The least generous allocation (119 million tonnes of Co2eq) is a mere 16 percent 
of Canada’s 2005 emissions levels, while the most generous allocation (151 million tonnes of 
Co2eq) is only 21 percent of Canada’s 2005 emissions levels. 
 
 
293 Government of Canada, “GHG Emissions”, supra note 11; “Canadian Environmental Sustainability”, supra note 
40 at 5; Climate Equity Reference Project, “Climate Equity Reference Calculator”, supra note 149. 
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b) Capability 
To consider a country’s fair share using a capability approach, the author of this paper 
weighted the capability indicator of the Climate Equity Reference Calculator at 100 (to exclude 
responsibility considerations from this analysis). As such, the starting year has no bearing on the 
findings. A ‘development threshold’ was used to exclude portions of a country’s population 
whose GDP has not reached the $7,500 threshold, and a ‘luxury threshold’ of $50,000 was used, 
which places a greater proportion of the global reduction burden on the number of high-emitting 
individuals that live within the country whose GDP is more than this figure. These criteria 
generate the following results:  
 
Figure Nine: Canada’s Total Emissions for Selected Years in Comparison to its 2030 Target and 




294 Government of Canada, “GHG Emissions”, supra note 11; “Canadian Environmental Sustainability”, supra note 
40 at 5; Climate Equity Reference Project, “Climate Equity Reference Calculator”, supra note 149. 
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These figures call for Canada to reach net zero emissions before 2030 as well as 
undertake additional mitigation efforts to fulfill its fair share. With just a development threshold, 
CERP calls for Canada to reduce its emissions to 121 percent below its 2005 emissions levels. 
The inclusion of a luxury threshold, which shifts “obligation up the global income scale”,295 
greatly increases the ambition of Canada’s fair share target to 143 percent below Canada’s 2005 
emissions levels.  
 
c) Responsibility-Capability-Need 
As this approach combines the responsibility and capability approaches, here the 
responsibility and capability indicators of the Climate Equity Reference Calculator were equally 
weighted. Three different starting years were then used alongside a development threshold and, 

















295 Climate Equity Reference Project, “Climate Equity Reference Calculator”, supra note 149. 
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Figure Ten: Canada’s Total Emissions for Selected Years in Comparison to its 2030 Target and 




Similar to CERP’s capability findings, all six analyses under this approach call for 
Canada to reach net zero emissions before 2030, and a more stringent target is required when a 
luxury threshold is included. While the starting year to begin accounting for emissions does not 
drastically alter the level of emissions reduction, the calculator’s inclusion of a luxury 
threshold—all other variables held consistent—increases the stringency of Canada’s fair share 
target by 26 to 28 percent (depending on the starting year). 
 
 
296 Ibid; Government of Canada, “GHG Emissions”, supra note 11; “Canadian Environmental Sustainability”, 
supra note 40 at 5. 
 62 
2. Equitable mitigation to achieve the Paris Agreement goals297 
This 2016 article by Yann Robiou du Pont et al298 uses five equity approaches to 
distribute national emissions from five sets of global mitigation scenarios that align with the 
Paris Agreement goals of limiting warming to 2°C.  
One of the five equity approaches used (the constant emissions ratio) allocates emissions 
based on the current national distribution of emissions, suggesting that each country undertake an 
equal reduction of emissions. du Pont et al recognized that developed countries may support this 
approach, which perpetuates the unequal “status quo”. However, as this approach violates 
principles of climate justice, the results from this approach are not included in this paper.  
 
For the remaining four approaches, du Pont et al provide emissions allocations for 
Canada for the years 2025, 2030, 2040, and 2050 as a percentage of 2010 levels.299 The author of 
this paper has translated these figures into a percentage of Canada’s 2005 emissions levels. 
 
a) Capability 
This approach allocates each country its “fair share” of the pathway based on its 
population divided by its per capita GDP, and uses a 30-year convergence period to transition 
from the present-day international emissions ratios to an equitable ratio.300 
 
 
297 du Pont et al, 2016, supra note 140. 
298 At the time of publication, du Pont was affiliated with the Australian-German Climate & Energy College at the 
University of Melbourne. The remaining authors were affiliated with the same college, the Potsdam Institute for 
Climate Impact Research, the Energy Program at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Austria, 
the Institute for Atmospheric and Climate Science in Switzerland and/or the School of Geography at the University 
of Melbourne. 
299 These figures are then converted into emissions allocations and fair-share targets using the Canadian 
government’s emissions data for 2010 (693 million tonnes of Co2eq). See Government of Canada, “GHG 
Emissions”, supra note 11. 
300 After this period, two formulas are used. i is the index of the sum over all countries. 1) If the target pathway’s net 
emissions are positive: 𝐸𝑐 (𝑦) = 𝐸𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙(𝑦) x 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑐 (𝑦)2 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑐 (𝑦) ⁄ ∑i = {countries} 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖 (𝑦)2 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 (𝑦); and 2) If the target 
pathway’s net emissions are negative: 𝐸𝑐 (𝑦) = 𝐸𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙(𝑦) x 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑐 (𝑦)/ ∑i = {countries} 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 (𝑦). See Yann Robiou du 
Pont et al, “National Contributions for decarbonizing the world economy in line with the G7 agreement”, 
Supplementary Information (2016) Envtl Research Letters 1 at 10 [du Pont et al, “National Contributions 
Supplementary”]. 
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Figure Eleven: Canada’s Total Emissions for Selected Years in Comparison to its 2030 Target 
and the Emissions Targets Suggested by du Pont et al Under the Capability Approach301 
 
 
Du Pont’s emissions allocations under this approach are significantly less stringent than 
those provided under the CERP calculator (which called for Canada to reduce its emissions to 
121 percent or 143 percent below 2005 emissions levels by 2030). One such reason for this is 
because du Pont et al include a convergence period to transition to an equitable emissions ratio, 
while the calculator does not. However, Du Pont’s figures still suggest that Canada’s targets 
would need to greatly decrease to meet a fair share approach based on capability, and would 
need to almost reach net-zero emissions by 2050. 
 
b) Equality (Contraction and Convergence approach) 
 After the 30-year convergence period, this approach allocates emissions based on a 
country’s population compared against the global population.302  
 
301 Government of Canada, “GHG Emissions”, supra note 11; “Canadian Environmental Sustainability”, supra note 
40 at 5; du Pont et al, 2016, supra note 140. 
302 After the convergence period, national emissions allowances are calculated through the following formula: Ec(y) 
= Eglobal(y) x Popc(y)/Popw(y), “where Pop is the population, E(y) represents the emissions at a year, Eglobal(y) 
represents the ‘Target’ scenario’s emissions at a year y to be shared, and the subscripts c and w stand respectively for 
the considered country and the world.” See du Pont et al, “National Contributions Supplementary”, supra note 300 
at 8. 
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Figure Twelve: Canada’s Total Emissions for Selected Years in Comparison to its 2030 Target 




 Even with the inclusion of a convergence period until 2040, Canada’s 2030 emissions 
reduction target under this approach is significantly more stringent than its present-day target.   
 
c) GDR  
du Pont et al’s article also analyzed the distribution of national emissions under a GDR 
approach. Here, du Pont et al used the standard development threshold of $7,500 and started 
accounting for cumulative emissions in 1990. Their RCI was informed by the total emissions of 
the population who live above the development threshold (responsibility) and the total wealth of 
the population whose incomes are above the threshold (capability).304 This index yielded the 
following figures for Canada’s emissions allocations:  
 
 
303 Government of Canada, “GHG Emissions”, supra note 11; “Canadian Environmental Sustainability”, supra note 
40 at 5; du Pont et al, 2016, supra note 140. 
304 The formula used is 𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑖 = 𝑎 𝑅𝑖 / ∑ Nj=1 Rj + (1 − 𝑎) 𝐶𝑖 / ∑ Nj=1 𝐶𝑗. See du Pont et al, “National Contributions 
Supplementary”, supra note 300 at 10-11. 
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Figure Thirteen: Canada’s Total Emissions for Selected Years in Comparison to its 2030 Target 




This approach calls for Canada to reach net-zero emissions prior to 2040 and to undertake 
significant mitigation efforts internationally thereafter to meet its full fair share of the mitigation 
burden. All four analyses conducted with the CERP’s calculator call for Canada to reach net zero 
emissions prior to 2030 as well as undertake significant international mitigation efforts to fulfill 
this fair share.  
 
 
305 Government of Canada, “GHG Emissions”, supra note 11; “Canadian Environmental Sustainability”, supra note 
40 at 5; du Pont et al, 2016, supra note 140. 
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d) ECEPC  
In considering the distribution of national emissions under an ECEPC approach, du Pont 
et al created an Autonomous Energy Efficiency Index to account for technological gains in 
efficiency. This index begins at “1” in the year 2010 and decreases incrementally to 1990 (when 
cumulative emissions begin to be accounted for under this approach). Historical emissions are 
multiplied by this index to ensure that these emissions contribute less to a country’s cumulative 
budget than its future emissions.306 This approach yielded the following figures for Canada’s 
emissions allocations:  
 
Figure Fourteen: Canada’s Total Emissions for Selected Years in Comparison to its 2030 Target 





306 The formula used is as follows:   See du Pont et al, 
“National Contributions Supplementary”, supra note 300 at 8. 
307 Government of Canada, “GHG Emissions”, supra note 11; “Canadian Environmental Sustainability”, supra note 
40 at 5; du Pont et al, 2016, supra note 140. 
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These figures call for Canada to greatly reduce its emissions more than its 2030 emissions 
reduction target, and calls for Canada to become net-zero by 2042. 
 
e) Average of Multiple Approaches 
In addition to individually analyzing five equity approaches, du Pont et al also 
determined the average of these approaches. This average is significant, in that it illustrates that 
an international consensus on the superior equity approach is not necessary to compel stronger 
targets. Agreeing on a set of equity approaches to aid in informing or creating national targets 
would result in more ambitious fair share targets.  
 
As highlighted earlier, the paper before you excludes the findings of du Pont et al’s 
iteration of the constant emission ratio approach, and, as such, the author of this paper has not 
used du Pont et al’s average figures, but instead calculated the average of the remaining four 
equity approaches (capability, equal per capita, GDR, and ECEPC) to provide a revised fair 














Figure Fifteen: Canada’s Total Emissions for Selected Years in Comparison to its 2030 Target 




The average of these four prominent equity approaches results in a 2030 target of 69 
percent below Canada’s 2005 emissions levels, which is more than twice as ambitious as 
Canada’s present 2030 target. This approach also calls for Canada to near net-zero emissions by 
2040. 
A complementary paper by Yann Robiou du Pont and Malte Meinshausen carried out 
domestic emissions allocations using three equity approaches (capability to pay, equal per capita, 
and ECEPC).309 In this paper, du Pont and Meinshausen cleverly eliminated the need to reach 
international consensus by assigning each country the least stringent emissions allocation of the 
 
308 Government of Canada, “GHG Emissions”, supra note 11; “Canadian Environmental Sustainability”, supra note 
40 at 5; du Pont et al, 2016, supra note 140. 
309 Yann Robiou du Pont & Malte Meinshausen, “Warming Assessment of the bottom-up Paris Agreement 
emissions pledges” (2018) 9 Nature Communications 1. At the time of publication, du Pont was affiliated with the 
Australian-German Climate & Energy College at the University of Melbourne. Meinshausen was also affiliated with 
this centre as well as the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. 
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three approaches for the year 2030.310 While the methods of allocating emissions are identical to 
du Pont et al’s findings presented above, du Pont and Meinshausen’s approach is interesting in 
that it recognizes the challenges in trying to persuade countries to agree on a common equity 
approach, particularly due to “national preferences for relative gain”,311 and reflects countries’ 
tendency to advocate for equity approaches that serve their self-interest.312 Of the three 
approaches analyzed, Du Pont and Meinshausen found that Canada’s most generous emissions 
allocation in the year 2030 was afforded through the equal per capita approach. 
 
3. Climate Action Tracker313 
For each country it assesses, CAT draws from seven effort sharing categories 
(responsibility, capability/need, equality, ECEPC, responsibility/capacity/need, capability/cost, 
and staged) to compile effort-sharing ranges. The 10th to 90th percentile of these ranges 
comprise CAT’s fair share range, and is used to assess countries’ ambition levels. If a country’s 
commitment falls within this range, the target is considered fair by at least one of the equity 
principles. However, a country’s target that falls within the upper portion of the fair share range 
relies on other countries’ commitments to accordingly fall below the upper portion of the range 
to meet the global pathway. In these instances, CAT classifies these countries’ ambition levels as 
“insufficient”, as they require other countries to act ‘more fairly’. Conversely, countries whose 
pledges call for emissions reductions below their fair share range are deemed “role models”, as 
they are committing to more than their fair share.314 
By comparing the global effort-sharing scenarios against their selected 1.5°C and 2°C 
global emissions pathways (to the year 2100), CAT determines “the minimal emissions reduction 
level that would be required in order to make sure that the global target is met without relying on 
other countries making a comparably bigger effort to reduce emissions.”315 Countries who meet 
 
310 Ibid at 3.  
311 Ibid at 2. 
312 Ibid at 3. 
313 “Climate Action Tracker” (last visited 29 October 2019), online: Climate Action Tracker 
<climateactiontracker.org/> [Climate Action Tracker, “Climate Action Tracker”]. 
314 “Rating System” (last visited 24 October 2019), online: Climate Action Tracker 
<climateactiontracker.org/countries/rating-system/> [Climate Action Tracker, “Rating System”]. 
315 “Comparability of effort” (last visited 24 October 2019), online: Climate Action Tracker 
<climateactiontracker.org/methodology/comparability-of-effort/>. 
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this level of emissions reduction fall within their fair share range, and are deemed to be “2°C 
compatible” or “1.5°C Paris Agreement Compatible”.316  
 
Lastly, CAT uses its individual country analyses to map out three global pathway 
scenarios based upon countries’ current policy projections, short-term pledges to the year 2030, 
and long-term pledges to the year 2050.317 Those countries whose ambitions levels would allow 
warming to reach between 3°C and 4°C or go above 4°C are deemed “highly insufficient” and 
“critically insufficient”, respectively.318 Using the averaged results of studies categorized under 
these equity principles provided Canada’s emissions allocations under a 1.5°C pathway as 














316 Climate Action Tracker, “Rating System”, supra note 314. 
317 For the countries it does not analyze, CAT includes their Kyoto Protocol commitments in the pledge pathways, or 
otherwise assumes that their emissions will follow a business-as-usual pathway. See Climate Action Tracker, 
“Global Pathways”, supra note 262. 
318 Climate Action Tracker, “Rating System”, supra note 314. Historically, CAT has considered Canada’s NDC to 
be “highly insufficient”, due in part to uncertainty “around the extent to which it would rely on its forestry sector 
sink to meet its target.” In 2018, however, Canada clarified that by 2030, accounting for contributions from 
LULUCF would lower Canada’s emissions by approximately 24 million tonnes of Co2eq by 2030. With this 
understanding, CAT upgraded Canada’s ranking to “insufficient”. See “Climate crisis demands more government 
action as emissions rise” (June 2019) at 10-11, online (pdf): Climate Action Tracker 
<climateactiontracker.org/documents/537/CAT_2019-06-19_SB50_CAT_Update.pdf>; Environment and Climate 
Change Canada, “2018 Canada Projections”, supra note 171 at 33. 
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Figure Sixteen: Canada’s Total Emissions for Selected Years in Comparison to its 2030 Target 





Under this approach, CAT suggests that Canada’s fair share emissions reduction target is 
a 71 percent reduction of Canada’s 2005 emissions by 2030—more than twice as ambitious as 
Canada’s present-target. By 2050, this approach suggests that Canada should not only be net-
zero, but also undertake mitigation efforts to reduce emissions in developing countries by 500 
million tonnes.  
 
319 Government of Canada, “GHG Emissions”, supra note 11; “Canadian Environmental Sustainability”, supra note 
40 at 5; “Detailed effort sharing data” (last modified 28 November 2018), online: Climate Action Tracker 
<climateactiontracker.org> [Climate Action Tracker, “Detailed effort sharing"]. Copyright © 2018 by Climate 




Figure Seventeen: Canada’s Total Emissions for Selected Years in Comparison to its 2030 




Although CAT’s average 2030 target under this approach is more generous than that 
provided by the CERP (121 or 143 percent below Canada’s 2005 emissions levels) and Du Pont 
et al (76 percent below Canada’s 2005 emissions levels), the target presented by CAT (57 
percent below Canada’s 2005 emissions levels) is still nearly twice as ambitious as Canada’s 
present 2030 target. Du Pont et al’s figures, while more stringent than CAT’s, still fall within the 
fair share range suggested by CAT (the target is based on the median figure). The scope of 
emissions included and slight differences within CERP, Du Pont et al and CAT’s formulas may 
have also impacted these findings.321 
 
320 Government of Canada, “GHG Emissions”, supra note 11; “Canadian Environmental Sustainability”, supra note 
40 at 5; Climate Action Tracker, “Detailed effort sharing", supra note 319. 
321 For instance, du Pont et al use cumulated wealth to inform its capability indicator of the RCI, 
whereas the CERP calculator does not tally capacity on a cumulative basis. See du Pont et al, “National 
Contributions Supplementary”, supra note 300 at 10; Climate Equity Reference Project, “CERP Calculator 




Figure Eighteen: Canada’s Total Emissions for Selected Years in Comparison to its 2030 Target 




CAT’s 2030 target under this approach (67 percent below Canada’s 2005 emissions 
levels) is very similar to the target advanced by du Pont et al (65 percent below Canada’s 2005 
emissions levels). As an equality approach compares a country’s population in relation to the 
global population, it is not surprising that these studies suggest a similar target. While du Pont et 
al used a 30-year convergence period, CAT uses an average of studies and is thus likely drawing 
from sources that both include and exclude a convergence period. The slight variations in these 




excluded international shipping and aviation emissions from its analysis. For further information, see du Pont et al, 
2016, supra note 140 at 44. 
322 Government of Canada, “GHG Emissions”, supra note 11; “Canadian Environmental Sustainability”, supra note 




Figure Nineteen: Canada’s Total Emissions for Selected Years in Comparison to its 2030 Target 




Under this approach, CAT advances the same target as suggested by du Pont et al for the 
year 2030: a 69 percent reduction below Canada’s 2005 emissions levels. It is not surprising that 
these iterations arrived at a similar finding given that the information populating these figures is 





323 Government of Canada, “GHG Emissions”, supra note 11; “Canadian Environmental Sustainability”, supra note 




Figure Twenty: Canada’s Total Emissions for Selected Years in Comparison to its 2030 Target 




As this approach combines the responsibility and capability approaches, the previously-
explained variations between the studies in those approaches are also relevant here (i.e., the use 
of a convergence period, differing formulas, and scope of emissions included). CAT’s 2030 
target suggested here (90 percent below Canada’s 2005 emissions level) is more stringent than 
the target suggested by du Pont et al under this approach (67 percent below Canada’s 2005 
 
324 Government of Canada, “GHG Emissions”, supra note 11; “Canadian Environmental Sustainability”, supra note 
40 at 5; Climate Action Tracker, “Detailed effort sharing", supra note 319. 
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emissions level), but less stringent than all four of the targets advanced by CERP (which ranged 




Figure Twenty-One: Canada’s Total Emissions for Selected Years in Comparison to its 2030 




Under this approach, the burden of reducing emissions falls largely upon developed 
countries, either for a period of time or until states reach a certain level of development. 
According to CAT’s findings, allowing for these differentiated commitments within the 
international community would mean that Canada’s emissions reduction target would need to 




325Government of Canada, “GHG Emissions”, supra note 11; “Canadian Environmental Sustainability”, supra note 
40 at 5; Climate Action Tracker, “Detailed effort sharing", supra note 319. 
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g) All – Lower & Upper bound  
 
Figure Twenty-Two: Canada’s Total Emissions for Selected Years in Comparison to its 2030 




Canada’s present target, if met, would result in emissions of 511 million tonnes of Co2eq 
in 2030.327 While this emissions level would technically fall within the upper portion of 
Canada’s fair share range (30 to 82 percent below 2005 levels by 2030), such a level would still 
be deemed “insufficient”, as it requires other countries to take on a greater portion of their fair 
share to meet a global pathway. Canada’s target would thus have to call for at least a 56 percent 
 
326 Government of Canada, “GHG Emissions”, supra note 11; “Canadian Environmental Sustainability”, supra note 
40 at 5; Climate Action Tracker, “Detailed effort sharing", supra note 319. 
327 Environment and Climate Change Canada, “Canadian Environmental Sustainability”, supra note 40 at 5. 
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reduction below 2005 levels by 2030 (the middle of this range) to avoid placing a larger burden 
on other countries and be deemed “fair”. 
 
C. Summary & Conclusion 
 
Regardless of the equity approach invoked or supported, these findings detail the 
inadequate nature of Canada’s present emissions reduction target. It is significant that each 
finding requires more ambition than Canada’s fair share emissions reduction target, with some 
proposed targets calling for more than four times the ambition of Canada’s present target. The 
following table summarizes the targets presented above:  
 
Table Three: Canada’s Fair Share Emissions Targets as Suggested by CERP, Du Pont et al, and 
CAT 328 
 Fair 2030 Emissions 
Reduction Target 
Comparison to Canada’s 
Present 2030 Emissions 
Reduction Target (30% 
below 2005 levels)329 
RESPONSIBILITY 
CERP 79-84% below 2005 levels 2.60-2.80x as ambitious 
CAT 71% below 2005 levels  2.36x as ambitious 
CAPABILITY 
CERP 121-143% below 2005 levels 4.03-4.76x as ambitious 
Du Pont et al 76% below 2005 levels 2.53x as ambitious 
CAT 57% below 2005 levels  1.90x as ambitious 
RESPONSIBILITY-CAPABILITY-NEED 
CERP 122-153% below 2005 levels 4.07-5.10x as ambitious 
Du Pont et al 67% below 2005 levels 2.23x as ambitious 
CAT 90% below 2005 levels 3.00x as ambitious 
EQUALITY 
Du Pont et al 65% below 2005 levels 2.17x as ambitious 
CAT 67% below 2005 levels 2.23x as ambitious 
ECEPC 
Du Pont et al 69% below 2005 levels  2.30x as ambitious 
CAT 69% below 2005 levels 2.30x as ambitious 
 
328 “Canadian Environmental Sustainability”, supra note 40 at 5; Ekholm et al, supra note 250; du Pont et al, 2016, 
supra note 140; Climate Action Tracker, “Detailed effort sharing", supra note 319. 
329 “Canadian Environmental Sustainability”, supra note 40 at 5. 
 79 
STAGED 
CAT 57% below 2005 levels 1.90x as ambitious 
MULTIPLE APPROACHES 
Du Pont et al (Average of 4 
approaches) 
69% below 2005 levels 2.30x as ambitious 
CAT (Middle of Fair Share 
Range) 
56% below 2005 levels 1.87x as ambitious 
 
 Every “fair” target suggested by these three studies is significantly larger than Canada’s 
present emissions reduction target. At minimum, these proposed targets call for Canada to nearly 
double its emissions reduction target, however, multiple suggested targets call for Canada to 
reach net-zero emissions by 2030 and undertake mitigation efforts to further reduce emissions 
beyond its own borders. 
 
The author of this paper finds the GDR framework (under the RCN equity principle) to 
be the most fair standalone approach, as it considers both a state’s historical responsibility and its 
per capita income. The outcome of this approach is greatly impacted by several factors, including 
the start year to begin accounting for emissions, the use of a convergence period, and the use of 
development and luxury thresholds. Even the least stringent iteration of this approach included in 
this analysis, however, calls for Canada to more than double its present emissions reduction 
target.  
 
CAT’s Fair Share Range is attractive in that it negates the need to latch onto a specific 
equity approach. As each state may have different ideas on which equity approach is preferable, 
this approach (which includes calculations from the six equity approaches) perhaps has the best 
chance of being integrated into climate negotiations. Under this approach, Canada would also 
need to almost double its 2030 emissions reductions target. 
 
While these equity approaches suggest varying levels of ambition for Canada to 
contribute its fair share of global emissions reduction, each approach calls for, at minimum, a 
near doubling of ambition. Considering that Canada is not presently on track to meet its 2030 
target, significant changes must be made to Canada’s mitigation efforts in order to meet either 
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this present target or any of the proposed fair targets. The following section considers how 
Canada could undertake efforts to meet its fair share of the global emissions reduction burden. 
VII. How Do We Get There: Meeting our Fair Share 
 
In a February 2019 letter to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, several ENGOs suggested 
that the federal government follow BC’s lead in closing the gap between its planned initiatives 
and its 2030 emissions reduction target.330 BC’s recent climate strategy, “CleanBC”, 
acknowledges that its current initiatives will only provide 75 percent of the emissions reductions 
needed to meet its target. This plan differs from the Pan-Canadian Framework, however, in that 
it also sets a timeline (of 18 to 24 months) to identify the additional initiatives that will reduce 
BC’s emissions to its target level, and provides a list of possible initiatives.331 
While closing the emissions gap between Canada’s policy trajectory emissions and its 
reduction target is an important first step, Canada must do more than meet this target. If Canada 
is to bear its fair share of the global mitigation burden, a significantly more stringent target is 
required. This section of the paper introduces several approaches to consider how Canada can 
work to introduce and meet such a target.  
A. Set Stronger Targets 
1. Revise Canada’s 2030 target to align with a fair share target 
Canada’s NDC to the UNFCCC states that “[w]ith this contribution Canada is affirming 
our continued commitment to developing an international climate change agreement that is fair, 
effective and includes meaningful and transparent commitments from all major emitters."332 To 
demonstrate its commitment to a fair international climate change agreement, Canada could 
simply revise its emissions reduction target to align with a fair share target under one or more 
equity approaches as detailed in Table Two.  
 
330 The group of ENGOs included West Coast Environmental Law, Clean Energy Canada, Ecojustice, Georgia Strait 
Alliance, Pembina Institute, Sierra Club BC, Stand.earth, and the Wilderness Committee. See Letter from West 
Coast Environmental Law et al to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau (25 February 2019) on “CleanBC: An 
Accountability Model for the Pan-Canadian Framework”, online (pdf): West Coast Environmental Law 
<www.wcel.org/sites/default/files/publications/pcf-cleanbc-letter-2019.pdf>.  
331 “CleanBC: Our Nature. Our Power. Our Future.” (last updated March 2019) at 59, online (pdf): Government of 
British Columbia <blog.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/436/2019/02/CleanBC_Full_Report_Updated_Mar2019.pdf>.  
332 Government of Canada, “Canada’s INDC Submission”, supra note 14. 
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Recognizing that some “fair” emissions reduction targets would be very difficult to 
implement, Climate Action Network Canada suggests that Canada at least double the ambition of 
its 2030 target (leading to an amended target of reducing emissions by 60 percent below 2005 
levels), and engage in international efforts to reduce the remaining portion of its fair 
obligation.333 
 
2. Carbon neutrality targets 
During the 2019 election campaign, Prime Minister Trudeau pledged, if re-elected, to 
introduce a net-zero 2050 emissions reduction target and legally-binding five-year targets to 
work towards this goal.334 Setting a net-zero emissions target would align Canada with the 65 
other countries who have already committed to net-zero emissions by, at the latest, the year 
2050.335 These commitments are frequently expressed through policy documents, as was done in 
Uruguay, Finland, Iceland, Denmark, Portugal, Costa Rica, Fiji, and the Marshall Islands.336 
 
Other countries have opted to legislate a net-zero target. Following a strong 
recommendation by its Committee on Climate Change in May 2019,337 the United Kingdom 
(“UK”) became the first major economy to pass legislation binding its 2050 net-zero target.338 
 
333 Christian Holz, “Deriving a Canadian Greenhouse Gas Reduction Target in Line with the Paris Agreement’s 
1.5°C goal and the Findings of the IPCC Special Report on 1.5°C” (December 2019), online: Climate Action 
Network <climateactionnetwork.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/CAN-Rac-Fair-Share-%E2%80%94-Methodology-
Backgrounder.pdf>. 
334 Victoria Gibson, “Liberals promise net-zero emissions by 2050, offer sparse detail on path ahead” (24 September 
2019), online: <ipolitics.ca/2019/09/24/liberals-promise-net-zero-emissions-by-2050/>. 
335 65 other countries had committed at the time of the following press release in September 2019. See “In the face 
of worsening climate crisis, UN Summit delivers new pathways and practical actions to shift global response into 
higher gear” (23 September 2019), online: UN Sustainable Development Goals 
<www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2019/09/in-the-face-of-worsening-climate-crisis-un-summit-delivers-
new-pathways-and-practical-actions-to-shift-global-response-into-higher-gear/>. 
336 Owen Gaffney et al, “Meeting the 1.5°C Climate Ambition: Moving from Incremental to Exponential Action” 
(2019) at 31, online (pdf): Exponential Roadmap <exponentialroadmap.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Meeting-
the-1.5%C2%B0C-Climate-Ambition-September-19-2019.pdf>. 
337 “Net Zero: The UK’s Contribution to stopping global warming” (May 2019) at 8, online: Committee on Climate 
Change <www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Net-Zero-The-UKs-contribution-to-stopping-global-
warming.pdf>. 
338 Chris Skidmore, “UK becomes first major economy to pass net zero emissions law” (27 June 2019), online: 
Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy <www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-becomes-first-major-
economy-to-pass-net-zero-emissions-law>. 
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Net-zero targets have also been legislated by Denmark and France,339 as well as Sweden, who 
committed to achieving net-zero emissions by 2045.340  
 
Whether legislated or embedded in policy, a long-term target can help inform short and 
medium-term milestone targets. For instance, Sweden adopted several interim targets to marshal 
a path towards its longer-term target, including:  
• To reduce emissions by 40 percent below 1990 levels by 2020;  
• To reduce emissions by 63 percent below 1990 levels by 2030; and 
• To reduce emissions by 75 percent below 1990 levels by 2040.341  
 
Denmark’s newly-elected Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen also recently passed a law that calls 
for the creation of emissions reduction targets to be set every five years beginning in 2020.342  
 
3. Legislated carbon budgets 
While some countries have legislated emissions reduction targets, other jurisdictions have 
alternatively, or additionally, opted to legislate carbon budgets to assist with planning. With the 
passing of the Climate Change Act in 2008,343 the UK “became the first country in the world to 
require mandatory economy-wide carbon budgets”.344 These carbon budgets, which are set for 
 
339 “New climate plan to make Denmark carbon neutral by 2050” (9 October 2018), online: Copenhagen Capacity 
<www.copcap.com/newslist/2018/new-ambitious-climate-plan-will-make-denmark-carbon-neutral-by-2050>; Felix 
Bate, “France sets 2050 carbon-neutral target with new law” (27 June 2019), online: Reuters 
<www.reuters.com/article/us-france-energy/france-sets-2050-carbon-neutral-target-with-new-law-
idUSKCN1TS30B>. Norway has also conditionally pledged carbon neutrality by the year 2030 “as part of an 
ambitious global climate agreement where other developed nations also undertake ambitious commitments”. While 
this goal has also been approved by its parliament, Climate Action Tracker excluded it from its assessment given its 
“vague character and the fact that it was not yet adopted by the government.” See “Norway” (last modified 19 
September 2019), online: Climate Action Tracker <climateactiontracker.org/countries/norway/pledges-and-
targets/>. 
340 “Sweden’s Climate Act and Climate Policy Framework” (last modified 24 September 2019), online: Swedish 
Environmental Protection Agency <www.swedishepa.se/Environmental-objectives-and-cooperation/Swedish-
environmental-work/Work-areas/Climate/Climate-Act-and-Climate-policy-framework-/>. 
341 Ibid. 
342 Jocelyn Timperley, “Denmark adopts climate law to cut emissions 70% by 2030” (6 December 2019), online: 
Climate Change News <www.climatechangenews.com/2019/12/06/denmark-adopts-climate-law-cut-emissions-70-
2030/>. 
343 Climate Change Act 2008 (UK) [Climate Change Act, UK].  
344 Andrew Gage, “A Carbon Budget for Canada: A Collaborative Framework for Federal and Provincial Climate 
Leadership” (December 2015) at 13, online (pdf): West Coast Environmental Law 
<www.wcel.org/sites/default/files/publications/CarbonBudget%20(Web)_0.pdf>. 
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five-year periods, help “ensure that government decision makers stay within a carbon budget, 
similar to a financial budget.”345 The following graph by Andrew Gage details how the UK has 
achieved its carbon budgets and is on track to meet its emissions reduction targets. 
Figure Twenty-Three: UK’s Carbon Budget Compared against its Emissions Reduction 
Targets346 
 
The UK’s Climate Change Act also establishes a Committee on Climate Change, which 
the federal government must consult with to set each carbon budget.347 In 2008, this Committee 
recommended that the UK adopt a target of reducing emissions by at least 80 percent below 1990 
levels by 2050, as informed by “an equal per capita share of global emissions in 2050” based on 
the pathways the Committee analyzed at the time.348 The UK recently updated this target to set a 
net-zero target for 2050.349 
Shortly after the UK’s Act was passed, Scotland passed its Climate Change Act in 
2009.350 Although largely similar to the UK’s Act, Scotland’s carbon budgets are set annually, 
 
345 Gibson et al, supra note 69 at 84. 
346 This chart is presented in megatonnes. 1 megatonne = 1 million tonnes of Co2eq. See Gage, supra note 344 at 
13-14. 
347 Climate Change Act, UK, supra note 343, s32. 
348 Committee on Climate Change, supra note 337 at 19. 
349 Climate Change Act, UK, supra note 343, s1. 
350 Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009 (Scot), ASP 12 [Climate Change Act, Scotland]. 
 84 
which increases accountability.351 Scotland’s Act initially prescribed a minimum 80 percent 
reduction of emissions below 1990 levels by 2050,352 however, a recent amendment set a new 
net-zero emissions target by the year 2045.353 Scotland also has “interim” targets to reduce 
emissions by at least 42 and 75 percent below 1990 levels by 2020 and 2030, respectively.354  
When setting its annual carbon budget, the Scottish Ministers are to consider several 
criteria, the first of which is “the objective of not exceeding the fair and safe Scottish emissions 
budget”.355 The Act defines the “fair and safe Scottish emissions budget” as  
the aggregate amount of net Scottish emissions for the period 2010-2050 recommended 
by the relevant body as being consistent with Scotland contributing appropriately to 
stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.356  
4. Compel more stringent targets through climate litigation 
Net zero targets, interim targets, and legislated carbon budgets are all productive means 
to help countries take on their fair share of the global mitigation burden. These measures also 
require significant political will and capital to be introduced and adopted into law. When this will 
or capital is not present, citizens may turn to the courts to try and compel more stringent national 
emissions reduction targets.  
This precedent was set by a case brought by the Urgenda Foundation in the Netherlands, 
which was recently affirmed by the Dutch Supreme Court.357 The foundation claimed that the 
Netherlands government had breached its duty of care towards its citizens by failing to adopt a 
 
351 Ibid, s3(1). Gage, supra note 344 at 16. 
352 Ibid, s1.  
353 “Climate change: MSPs approve beefed up emissions target” (25 September 2019), online: BBCNews 
<www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-49819905>. 
354 For Scotland’s 2020 target, see Climate Change Act, Scotland, supra note 350, s2. For more information on 
Scotland’s recently passed 2030 target, see BBCNews, supra note 353. 
355 Climate Change Act, Scotland, supra note 350, s4(4)(a). 
356Ibid, s 4(6). 
357 “Supreme court upholds Urgenda ruling, Dutch state must cut pollution” (20 December 2019), online: 
DutchNews.Nl <www.dutchnews.nl/news/2019/12/supreme-court-upholds-urgenda-ruling-dutch-state-must-cut-
pollution/?fbclid=IwAR0Sn5rishT18rxyxMSSIjdiFXakKOnQwoQ4eXfFfC8gWLKIXzt1ayZsJJs>; Urgenda v 
Government of the Netherlands (Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment (20 December 2019) ECLI: NL: 
HR: 2019: 2006 (Netherlands). See also Urgenda v Government of the Netherlands (Ministry of Infrastructure and 
the Environment (9 October 2018) C/09/00456689 (English translation) (Netherlands). 
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sufficient emissions reduction target.358 The Hague District Court found the emissions reduction 
target—to reduce emissions by 17 percent below 1990 levels by 2020— insufficient, as it did not 
meet the norm for developed countries to reduce emissions by 25 to 40 percent below 1990 
levels (as put forth in Box 13.7 of the IPCC’s fourth assessment report).359 The government was 
ordered “to limit the joint volume of Dutch annual greenhouse gas emissions (...) by at least 25% 
at the end of 2020 compared to the level of the year 1990”.360  
It is notable that the Court rejected the government’s defence that the brunt of emissions 
reduction ought to be undertaken by higher-emitting countries.361 In doing so, the Court stated 
that “[t]he fact that the amount of the Dutch emissions is small compared to other countries does 
not affect the obligation to take precautionary measures in view of the State’s obligation to 
exercise care. After all, it has been established that any anthropogenic greenhouse gas emission, 
no matter how minor, contributes to an increase of CO2 levels in the atmosphere and therefore to 
hazardous climate change.”362 
As Patrícia Galvâo Ferreira notes, this case was the first time that a court “issued a 
mandatory order for a government to adopt nationwide mitigation targets, outside a statutory 
mandate” as well as the first time that a court “determined a mandatory minimum emissions-
reduction target for a developed state.”363 Du Pont & Meinshausen are mindful, however, that the 
Court did not pick a specific approach of equity, instead ruling that the Dutch government must 
“follow the least-ambitious end of an equity range”—an approach which “would be insufficient 
to achieve the Paris Agreement.”364 
 
 Despite meaningful efforts, this case has yet to be successfully replicated in other 
jurisdictions. In Ireland, Friends of the Irish Environment sought a court order to quash the 
government’s decision to approve its National Mitigation Plan, claiming that the plan violated 
 
358 Urgenda v Government of the Netherlands (Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment (24 June 2015) 
C/09/00456689 (English translation) (Netherlands) at 3.1 [Urgenda]. 
359 See Section II of this paper for further discussion of Box 13.7. 
360 Urgenda, supra note 358 at 5.1. 
361 Ibid at 4.79. 
362 Urgenda, supra note 358 at 4.79.  
363 Patrícia Galvão Ferreia, “‘Common But Differentiated Responsibilities’ in the National Courts: Lessons from 
Urgenda v. The Netherlands” (2016) 5:2 Transnational Envtl L 329 at 330-1. 
364 du Pont & Malte Meinshausen, supra note 309 at 2. 
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Ireland’s Climate Act and lacked mitigation measures to urgently reduce emissions and meet its 
international obligations. In September 2019, the Dublin High Court dismissed the claim, stating 
that “[i]t cannot be concluded that it is the Act itself which places rights at risk, and I couldn’t 
reasonably conclude as specified in legislation that it is contrary to national policy for climate 
change.”365 In November 2019, Friends of the Irish Environment appealed the ruling at the Court 
of Appeal, and filed an application to appeal directly to the Supreme Court.366 
 
 Over the last four years, a group of American youth have been forging a different path to 
try and compel adequate domestic climate action through the courts. In Juliana v United States, 
21 students (represented by Our Children’s Trust) sought to hold the US government accountable 
for continuing to use fossil fuels, as their current policies and plans will fail to achieve the 
needed emissions reduction, violating the youths’ constitutional rights to equal protection, life, 
liberty, and property, and failing to protect essential public trust resources.367 The youth asked 
the court to compel the government to stop violating their rights and “swiftly phase-down Co2 
emissions aimed at atmospheric Co2 concentrations that are no more than 350 ppm by 
2100”368—which Burger & Wentz remind readers is “a science-based target consistent with the 
goal of limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees C.”369 In January 2020, this case was dismissed, 
with the Court calling for emissions policies to be addressed by Congress or the electorate.370 
 
A similar case was launched in Canada in October 2019 by fifteen youth who claim that 
the Federal government is violating their Charter rights to life, liberty, and security, as well as 
equality. The plaintiffs are seeking an order from the Federal Court requiring the Federal 
government to “develop and implement an enforceable plan that is consistent with Canada’s fair 
 
365 Aoife Moore, “Court rules for Irish government in historic climate case” (19 September 2019), online: 
Independent.Ie <www.independent.ie/breaking-news/irish-news/court-rules-for-irish-government-in-historic-
climate-case-38514770.html>. 
366 Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, “Friends of the Irish Environment v Ireland” (last visited December 21 
2019), online: Climate Case Chart <climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/friends-of-the-irish-environment-v-ireland/>. 
367 Juliana v United States “Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief” 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (US DC-Oregon, 
Eugene) at paras 8,9 and 91. 
368 Ibid at para 12. 
369 Michael Burger & Jessica Wentz, “A Preview of How Climate Science Could Play Out in ‘Juliana v. United 
States’ Courtroom” (11 January 2019), online: Sabin Center for Climate Change Law 
<blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2019/01/11/climate-courtroom-juliana-v-us/>. 
370 Juliana v United States, No 18-36082 DC No 6:15-cv-01517- AA (US CA 9th Cir 2020). 
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share of the global carbon budget necessary to achieve GHG emissions reductions consistent 
with the protection of public trust resources subject to federal jurisdiction and the plaintiffs’ 
constitutional rights”.371  
 
This youth-led case is not Canada’s first. In November 2018, a youth-led class action 
lawsuit was filed by ENvironnement JEUnesse (“ENJEU”) on behalf of people aged 35 and 
under in Quebec. ENJEU alleged that the federal government had violated its international 
obligations in failing to meet its emissions reduction targets, and that its climate inaction 
interfered with human rights protected under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom and 
the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.372  
 
This claim declared that states’ failure to “take today the necessary measures to prevent 
dangerous global warming” places a much higher burden on younger generations than “on the 
generations that precede them”373, and forces young people to assume “higher economic and 
social costs than their elders.”374 In its motion for authorization of a class action, ENJEU detailed 
that a national emissions reduction target ought to be determined based on a global temperature 
limit target, the total global emissions that are compatible with this target, and each country’s fair 
share of the total emissions.375  
 
ENJEU demonstrated the inadequacy of the Canadian government’s 2030 target by 
calling for Canada to reduce its emissions in alignment with the reduction range advocated for in 
the IPCC’s fourth assessment box (25 to 40 percent below its 1990 levels by 2020), which would 
result in emissions of 362 to 452 million tonnes of Co2 in 2020.376 
 
  In July 2019, Justice Gary Morrison of the Superior Court of Quebec rejected the case’s 
class action status,377 finding that ENJEU had failed to justify its choice of age, rendering the 
 
371 La Rose et al, “Statement of Claim”, supra note 88 at para 9. 
372 Theroux, Gill & Gagne, supra note 87.  
373 EnJeu, “Motion for Authorization”, supra note 86 at 2.92. 
374 Ibid at 2.94.   
375 Ibid at 2.43. 
376 Ibid at 2.66-71.  
377 Environnement Jeunesse c Procureur Général du Canada (2019), 2019 QCCS 2885 (Canlii). 
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class arbitrary, subjective and inappropriate.378 Justice Morrison noted, however, that the issues 
raised by ENJEU were justiciable and rejected the government’s argument that the Court lacked 
the jurisdiction to hear the case.379  
Lastly, the “People’s Climate Case” was filed at the European General Court in May 
2018 by a group of 37 applicants from Kenya, Fiji, Portugal, Germany, France, Italy, Romania, 
and the Swedish Saami Youth Association.380 These applicants were comprised of children and 
their parents who worked in agriculture and tourism “who are and will increasingly be adversely 
affected in their livelihoods and their physical well-being by climate change effects”, alongside 
an association of equally-affected indigenous Saami youth.381 The applicants argued that the EU 
was “obliged under higher rank legal norms to avoid harm caused by climate change and 
associated infringements of fundamental human rights.”382 The applicants noted that climate 
change is “already causing damage” and, as subsequent emissions will contribute to its dangers, 
“any target set for the reduction of emissions must be based on an assessment of capability, in 
light of the EU’s legal obligations and the trade threat posed by climate change.”383 The 
applicants argued that the EU set its reduction target without “seeking to inquire into the 
feasibility of requiring more, so as to avoid the harm prohibited by higher rank law, and so as to 
fulfil the commitments made most recently in the 2015 Paris Agreement”.384 
This action sought a court order to set aside several laws that comprise part of the EU’s 
2030 Climate and Energy Framework (and are to be implemented between 2021 and 2030), and 
order the implementation of more stringent emissions reduction measures.385  
 
 
378 Theroux, Gill & Gagne, supra note 87. 
379 Ibid. 
380 Armando Ferrão Carvalho and others v The European Parliament (2018), “Application for Annulment Pursuant 
to Article 263 TFEU and Application/Claim for Non-Contractual Liability Pursuant to Articles 268 and 340 TFEU 
and Application for Measures of Inquiry Pursuant to Articles 88 and 91 of the Rules of Procedure of the General 
Court” (Case T-330/18-resubmitted) [Armando Ferrão Carvalho, “Application for Annulment”]. 
381 Ibid at para 1. 
382 Ibid at para 3. 
383 Ibid at para 3. 
384 Ibid at para 3. 
385 The laws include the Emissions Trading Directive, the Effort Sharing regulation, and the LULUCF Regulation. 
See Annalisa Savaresi & Juan Auz, “Climate Change Litigation and Human Rights: Pushing the Boundaries” (2019) 
Climate L 1 at 10.  
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The applicants detailed how the EU’s 2030 target (to reduce emissions by 40 percent 
below 1990 levels) violate their duty not to exceed their equitable share of the global budget. 
They created a global carbon budget using IPCC budgets from 2011 that seek to limit 
temperature increases to 1.5°C and 2°C. After accounting for emissions from 2011 to 2016, they 
projected the remaining global carbon budget to 2021.Their findings were as follows:  
• 342 to 992 billion tonnes of Co2 (with a 66 percent change of limiting warming to 
2°C); and 
• 142 to 192 billion tonnes of Co2 (with a 50 percent change of limiting warming to 
1.5°C). 386 
The applicants also conducted a second analysis that accounted for historical emissions from 
1990 to 2010. 
 
Using these figures, the applicants applied a per capita allocation (using the EU’s 
projected population for 2020) to determine the EU’s share of the global budget.387 
 
Table Four: Range of CO2 emissions available to the EU in 2021388 
 Start Date: 1992 Start Date: 2021 
66% of staying below 2°C -18.5 to +24.1 billion 
tonnes of Co2 
22.4 to 65.0 billion tonnes 
of Co2 
50% of staying below 1.5°C -31.6 to -28.3 billion 
tonnes of Co2 
9.3 to 12.6 billion tonnes of 
Co2 
 
Finally, the applicants used a constant emissions and linear reduction rate to derive a 
timeline of when the EU’s fair share of the carbon budget would be exhausted. In each instance, 
the EU would need to reduce emissions by greater than its 2030 target of reducing emissions by 
40 percent below 1990 levels.389 Based on its analysis for limiting warming to 1.5°C, the EU 
would be required to reach net-zero emissions before 2030.390  
 
386 Armando Ferrão Carvalho, “Application for Annulment”, supra note 380 at paras 194-6. 
387 In 2020, the EU’s projected population is 6.55 percent of the global population. See Ibid at para 192. 
388 Ibid at para 196. 
389 Ibid at para 208. 
390 Ibid at para 209(a). 
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This is a reiteration of the ECEPC approach. As described earlier in this paper, a key 
benefit of this approach is the ease of calculating emissions allocations. However, this approach 
ignores a state’s ability to fund mitigation efforts and can thus unduly burden developing 
countries. Given the relative prosperity of the EU, however, this was likely not a concern of the 
applicants.  
 
 Unfortunately, this case was dismissed in May 2019 based on the Court’s finding that, 
since climate change affects everyone, the plaintiffs lacked the specific harm needed to grant 
their standing. The judgment stated that the applicants were “neither directly nor individually 
concerned by the legislative package.”391 The plaintiffs filed an appeal in July 2019.392  
 
B. Corporations’ role in national emissions reduction targets 
Over the last several years, groundbreaking research by Richard Heede has 
revolutionized discussions about holding corporations accountable for their roles in causing 
climate change. Heede’s first report, released in 2014, analyzed historic data to trace emissions 
back to 83 of the world’s largest oil, gas and coal companies, as well as 7 of the largest cement 
companies. Cumulative emissions were attributed to these companies for the years 1854 through 
to 2010, which were then compared to the cumulative emissions in our atmosphere to estimate 
each company’s contribution to climate change. Together, these ‘carbon majors’ “represent 63.4 
percent of global industrial Co2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion, flaring, and cement over 
the period from 1751 to 2010”.393 Chevron alone is responsible for 3.52 percent of the global 
emissions between 1751 to 2010.394 
 
Should these companies be required to meet a similar reduction target to that of the state 
in which it is headquartered and/or operating in? Further, can a state achieve the level of 
 
391 Armando Ferrão Carvalho and others v The European Parliament (2018) at para 33 (EU). 
392 Dana Drugmand, “EU Families Appeal ‘People’s Climate Case’ Dismissal” (11 July 2019), online: Climate 
Liability News <www.climateliabilitynews.org/2019/07/11/eu-climate-case-emissions/>. 
393 Richard Heede, “Carbon Majors: Accounting for carbon and methane emissions 1854-2010-Methods & Results 
Report” (7 April 2014) at 16, online: Climate Accountability 
<climateaccountability.org/pdf/MRR%209.1%20Apr14R.pdf>. 
394 Ibid at 27. 
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emissions reduction needed to accomplish its mitigation “fair share” without incorporating a 
mandated corporate emissions reduction target or other legal obligations to compel these 
companies to reduce their emissions? A recent report by Carbon Tracker Initiative suggests that 
the world will not be able to accomplish its international climate targets unless the major oil and 
gas companies reduce their combined production by 35 percent by 2040,395 highlighting the 
importance of corporate emissions reductions. 
 
Each country bears the onus of determining how it will meets its emissions reduction 
target. In some developed countries, including Canada, the oil, gas and coal companies represent 
a sizeable portion of the state’s total GHG emissions (as discussed in Section IV of this paper). 
Without a mandated emissions reduction target or other legal obligations to compel emissions 
reduction, these companies are likely to continue producing and expanding their operations. 
While many frameworks propose fair methods for allocating a global carbon budget amongst 
nations, there has been little dialogue on the role of large oil and gas companies in reducing their 
emissions to “fairly” contribute to a state’s national emissions reduction target.  
 
A group of legal experts, many of whom developed the Oslo Principles on Global 
Climate Change Obligations, have developed a set of Climate Principles for Enterprises to 
consider the legal obligations of companies in responding to climate change. They state that 
companies have four sets of obligations: to reduce the emissions from their own activities; to 
reduce emissions from their products and services; to consider the emissions of their suppliers; 
and procedural obligations regarding disclosure and impact assessment.396 
 
1. Corporations’ emissions reduction efforts  
A 2018 paper analyzing 138 companies in seven high-emitting sectors—who collectively 
account for 21 percent of the global emissions for listed companies—found that most of these 
companies had not yet set quantified emissions reduction targets.397  
 
395 “Balancing the Budget: Why deflating the carbon bubble requires oil & gas companies to shrink” (1 November 
2019), online: Carbon Tracker Initiative <www.carbontracker.org/reports/balancing-the-budget/>. 
396 “About” (last visited December 11 2019), online: Climate Principles for Enterprises < 
climateprinciplesforenterprises.org/about/>. 
397 Simon Dietz et al, “An assessment of climate action by high-carbon global corporations” (2018) 8 Nature 
Climate Change 1072 at 1072.  
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According to an analysis conducted by Transition Pathway Initiative, the emissions 
intensity performance and targets (where applicable) for the world’s top ten oil and gas 
companies were all well above 2°C and ‘below 2°C’ scenarios.398 The Union of Concerned 
Scientists also analyzed eight major oil, gas and coal companies, and found that “[n]one of these 
companies have demonstrated a level of ambition consistent with keeping global temperature rise 
within the Paris climate agreement limits that some of them claim to support.”399 
 
The following Canadian companies were included in Heede’s analysis and are thus 
deemed carbon majors:  
Table Five: Canadian Carbon Majors and their Historical Emissions400 
Entity Total Emissions (Co2eq) Percent of global emissions: 
1751-2010 
EnCana401 1.69 billion tonnes 0.12% 
Suncor 1.41 billion tonnes 0.10% 
Canadian Natural Resources 0.96 billion tonnes 0.07% 
Talisman402 0.92 billion tonnes 0.07% 
Husky Energy 0.66 billion tonnes 0.05% 
Nexen403  0.65 billion tonnes 0.04% 
 
398 Simon Dietz et al, “Carbon Performance Assessment in Oil and Gas: Discussion Paper” (November 2018), online 
(pdf): Transition Pathway Initiative <www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/tpi/wp-
content/uploads/2018/11/Oil_and_gas_discussion_paper_061118.pdf>. This paper (at 9) defines a “below 2 °” 
scenario as being “consistent with a more ambitious interpretation of the Paris Agreement’s overall aim.” 
399 “The 2018 Climate Accountability Scorecard: Insufficient Progress from Major Fossil Fuel Companies” (October 
2018) at 1, online: Union of Concerned Scientists <www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2018/10/gw-
accountability-scorecard18-report.pdf>. 
400 Ibid at 27-8. 
401 Encana recently announced, however, that it plans to relocate its corporate headquarters to the US, and change its 
name to Ovintiv Inc. See Nicole Gibillini, “Encana sheds Canadian identity with name change, U.S. domicile” (31 
October 2019), online: BNN Bloomberg <www.bnnbloomberg.ca/encana-sheds-canadian-roots-with-name-change-
and-u-s-domicile-1.1340681>. 
402 Talisman went defunct in 2015. 
403 Nexen was acquired by Hong Kong–based CNOOC Limited in 2012. 
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While these six companies were amongst those most responsible for global cumulative 
emissions, only three (Suncor, Canadian Natural Resources Limited, and Husky Energy) remain 
part of an oligopoly in Canada’s oil sands today. These three companies, alongside Cenovus 
Energy and Imperial Oil, collectively control nearly 80 percent of Canada’s productive capacity 
of bitumen as well as 90 percent of the existing upgrading capacity of bitumen.404  
Which portion of Canada’s emissions reduction should be allocated either to the carbon 
majors headquartered within its jurisdiction or the five companies monopolizing Canada’s 
highest-emitting sector today? The Expert Group of the Climate Principles for Enterprises 
believes that companies should generally reduce the emissions of their activities “to the same 
extent as the country or countries in which those activities take place”, as this places the primary 
burden on such companies.405  
For instance, should Suncor be required to reduce its emissions by 30 percent below its 
2005 levels by 2030 (mirroring Canada’s present emissions reduction target)? Even matching 
Canada’s present target would require a pivotal shift from its projected emissions increase. 
Suncor’s absolute GHG emissions increased from 2016 to 2017, and the company predicts that 
its company-wide emissions will increase by 19 percent between 2017 to 2022.406 Although 
Suncor has made some effort to diversify its products and services, approximately 99 percent of 
its revenue still comes from high carbon products,407 and in 2018, Suncor more than doubled its 
spending for exploring the oil sands from the previous year.408 Its emissions management 
 
404 Ian Hussey et al, “Boom, Bust, and Consolidation: Corporate Restructuring in the Alberta Oil Sands” (November 
2018) at 1, online: Parkland Institute 
<d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/parklandinstitute/pages/1664/attachments/original/1542129868/boombustconsolid
ation.pdf?1542129868>. 
405 Climate Principles for Enterprises, supra note 396.  
406 Suncor, “2018 Climate Risk and Resilience Report” (2018) at 6, online: Suncor <sustainability.suncor.com/-
/media/project/ros/2018/documents/2018-climate-risk-and-resilience-report-en.pdf?modified=20180810193032>. 








approach focuses on reducing emissions intensity from the production of oil and petroleum 
products but it does not specify a numerical target for absolute emission reductions.  
These figures illustrate the incompatibility of Suncor’s business plans with playing a role 
in any emissions reduction path in Canada. In 2017, Suncor’s emissions comprised 2.89 percent 
of Canada’s total GHG emissions.409 This number, and the proportion of other large-emitting 
companies’ emissions in Canada’s total national emissions, will only increase as Canada lowers 
its total emissions. Determining the role that large-emitting corporations ought to play in 
Canada’s emissions reductions will be a pivotal consideration of planning to meet any of the 
proposed “fair” targets suggested in this paper. 
2. Sectoral targets 
Rather than requiring oil and gas companies to comply with a national target, or hoping 
that corporations will act on their own accord, some “fair share approaches” create sectoral 
targets to derive the national emissions reduction target. This focus allows states to consider the 
ease or difficulty of decarbonizing within an industry when setting targets.410 
 
a) Multi-sector emission convergence 
Similar to the triptych approach (described in Section V of this paper), this scheme 
considers emissions in several high-emitting sectors, including power, households, 
transportation, industry, services, agriculture and waste. For each sector, a yearly reduction rate 
in global per capita emissions is identified and the rate is transformed into a global sector 
emissions standard (“GSES”). A country-specific per capita emissions pathway is created for 
each sector to reach the GSES, and the summation of GSES within a state inform the national 
emissions target. The GSES for each sector are also added together to create the global per capita 
total emission standard.411 
 
 
409 Suncor, “2018 CDP”, supra note 407 at 47, 59. Suncor’s contribution to Canada’s total emissions were calculated 
using the greenhouse gas emissions figure listed by the Government of Canada in 2017. See Government of Canada, 
“GHG emissions”, supra note 11. 
410 For example, heat and electricity sectors are easier to decarbonize than cement and aviation industries. See 
Gaffney et al, supra note 336 at 26. 
411 Bodansky, supra note 197 at 46. 
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b) Sectoral Development Approach  
A newly-developed “fair share approach” translates a sectoral pathway into company-
specific targets. The sectoral development approach (“SDA”) is comprised of the following 
steps:  
i) A global carbon budget is developed; 
ii) This budget is allocated to different regions and sectors through an energy 
systems model; 
iii) Within each sector, a benchmark path for emissions intensity (emissions divided 
by activity) is created to allow for comparison between various-sized companies;  
iv) Individual company intensity pathways are based on the sectoral pathways; and 
v) A company’s intensity pathway can be multiplied with the company’s projected 
activities to determine absolute emissions reduction targets for each year.412 
 
This approach ensures that each company’s emissions intensity reductions collectively 
align with an overall carbon budget. The SDA is one of six methods listed under the “sectoral 
approach” of the Science-Based Targets Initiative (“SBTI”), a project developed by the Carbon 
Disclosure Project, the UN Global Compact, the World Resources Institute, World Wildlife 
Fund, and We Mean Business.413 The SBTI also includes an absolute-based approach and an 
economic-based approach, and the SBTI supports corporations in setting these science-based 
targets.414 Corporate use of the SBTI approaches may be another successful avenue to reduce 
corporate emissions and help meet a country’s fair share of the global mitigation burden. 
 
3. Cap and trade systems 
Cap and trade systems are another method countries can use to regulate industry 
emissions. For instance, the EU’s Emissions Trading System (“ETS”) uses a “cap”, which 
decreases by nearly 2 percent each year, to set a maximum level on the total amount of emissions 
 
412 Oskar Krabbe et al, “Aligning corporate greenhouse-gas emissions targets with climate goals” (2015) 5 Nature 
Climate Change 1057 at 1058.  
413 “About the Science Based Targets Initiative” (last visited 25 October 2019), online: Science Based Targets 
<sciencebasedtargets.org/about-the-science-based-targets-initiative/>. 
414 “Methods” (last visited 25 October 2019), online: Science Based Targets <sciencebasedtargets.org/methods/>.  
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to be traded within the system.415 Industrial products (such as steel or cement) are assigned a 
benchmark, which is determined in consideration with annual reduction rates.416 Benchmarks are 
considered alongside an installation’s output to determine a participant’s free emissions 
allowances. The “trade” aspect allows participating parties to auction emission allowances to one 
another.  
 
The ETS works in conjunction with EU member states. For instance, Germany’s 
Allocation Act 2012 specifies emissions budgets for participating and (non-participating) sectors 
to apportion its mitigation efforts, while France centrally creates sectoral approaches through 
consulting and negotiating with relevant stakeholders.417 The European Council has stated that 
its ETS, if well-functioning, “will be the main European instrument to achieve the reduction 
target of at least 40% [below 1990 levels by 2030]”.418 In 2015, however, Corporate Europe 
Observatory reported that while the EU’s emissions had fallen over the last decade, there is scant 
evidence that these reductions were caused by the scheme, suggesting that reductions could 
instead “by explained almost entirely by a combination of increases in renewable energy, the 
economic downturn post-2008, improved energy efficiency, and fuel switching (from coal to 
gas) in response to other policies and economic variables.”419  
 
4. Sectoral Approach in Canada 
In July 2019, Canada finalized the regulations for its output-based pricing system 
(“OBPS”) for large industry emitters. The OBPS has been implemented in the provinces which 
chose not to enact an equivalent industry tax, namely Manitoba, New Brunswick, Prince Edward 
 
415 “The EU Emissions Trading System: an Introduction” (last visited 14 October 2019), online: Climate Policy Info 
Hub <climatepolicyinfohub.eu/eu-emissions-trading-system-introduction>. 
416 See Directive (EU) 2018/410 of the European Parliament and of the Council: amending Directive 2003/87/EC to 
enhance cost-effective emission reductions and low-carbon investments, and Decision (EU) 2015/1814 (14 March 
2018, Art 1,14(b), online: <eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018L0410&from=EN> 
[Directive EU 2018/410]. 
417 The IPCC notes, however, that the French approach “risks a dilution of measures through the influence of lobbies 
that may lose from mitigation actions.” See Eswaran Somanathan et al, “National and Sub-national Policies and 
Institutions” in O Edenhofer et al, eds, Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of 
Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge, 
United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 1141 at 1151.  
418 Directive EU 2018/410, supra note 416 at 2 (para 5), 6 (para 23). 
419 “EU emissions trading: 5 reasons to scrap the ETS” (26 October 2015), online: Corporate Europe 
<corporateeurope.org/en/environment/2015/10/eu-emissions-trading-5-reasons-scrap-ets>. 
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Island, Saskatchewan and Ontario. This system creates thresholds based on a portion (80, 90 or 
95 percent) of an industry’s average emissions intensity. Emitters who exceed this threshold 
must pay fines, while those who emit less than the threshold receive credits to sell or use in the 
future. The Pembina Institute notes that “[t]he federal system has set 80% standards for 42 
sectors, 90% standards for 19 sectors, and 95% standards for 14 sectors,” meaning “that the 
majority of sectors under the system will pay the price on pollution on 20% of their 
emissions.”420 
 
The Government of Canada states that “[t]his creates an ongoing financial incentive for 
facilities to reduce their emission intensity in order to reduce the amount owed for compensation 
or to emit below their limit and earn surplus credits.”421 While the system constitutes an 
important initial step, large industry actors will need to reduce their emissions beyond simply the 
least efficient of their peers in order to meet Canada’s present or fair share emissions target.  
 
C. Subnational allocation 
As the IPCC notes, many countries delegate “the formulation and implementation of 
national mitigation approaches” to sub-national levels.422 Just as states have disagreed at the 
international level on how to allocate emission reductions and allowances, however, so too have 
the provinces, regions, or states within a country. Such allocation is particularly difficult in a 
country such as Canada, whose provinces are immensely heterogeneous. Böhringer et al notes 
that “the significant geographic heterogeneity in emissions intensity across regions in Canada is 
unparalleled in other federations.”423 The following graph from Boothe & Boudreault illustrates 





420 Isabelle Turcotte, Jan Gorski and Brianne Riehl, “Carbon Emissions: Who makes big polluters pay" (November 
2019) at 15, online: Pembina Institute <www.pembina.org/reports/obps-comparative-analysis-final2.pdf>. 
421 “Output-Based Pricing System: Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement” (28 June 2019), online: Government of 
Canada <www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2019/2019-07-10/html/sor-dors266-eng.html>. 
422 Somanathan et al, supra note 417 at 1152. 
423 Christoph Böhringer et al, “Sharing the burden for climate change mitigation in the Canadian federation” (2015) 
48:4 Cdn J Econ 1350 at 1354. 
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Figure Twenty-Four: Provincial per capita Emissions for 1990-2013, as well as projected levels 
for 2020 and 2030 provincial targets424 
 
A fair subnational allocation must recognize these differing circumstances. For instance, 
given that Northern Canada must deal with the effects of warming at a quicker rate than the rest 
of Canada, should it be held to the same level of emissions reduction? Should the province’s 
makeup (number of urban centres and the proportion of the population living in or near urban 
centres) be considered, due to the difficulties of reducing transport emissions in rural areas?  
Should a province’s ability to transition to alternative energy sources, such as hydro energy, be a 
determining factor? These are but a few of the many relevant questions that would need to 
inform subnational allocation discussions in Canada. 
 
In 2000, a federal-provincial process, known as the Joint Meeting of Ministers of 
Environment and Energy (“JMM”),425 created an Emissions Allocation and Burden Sharing 
 
424 This chart is presented in megatonnes. 1 megatonne = 1 million tonnes of Co2eq. See Paul Boothe & Félix-A 
Boudreault, “By the Numbers: Canadian GHG Emissions” (2016) at 7, online: Lawrence National Centre for Policy 
and Management <www.ivey.uwo.ca/cmsmedia/2112500/4462-ghg-emissions-report-v03f.pdf>. 
425 The JMM refers to the regularly meetings that occurred, beginning in 1993, between federal and provincial 
ministers of energy and environment. See Douglas Macdonald et al, “Allocating Canadian Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Reductions Amongst Sources and Provinces: Learning from the European Union, Australia and Germany” 
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Working Group (“EABSWG”) to analyze “possible approaches to provincial/territorial or 
sectoral allocations of any Canadian target, and how any resulting burden would be shared”.426 
Academic Douglas Macdonald states that the EABSWG was created after Quebec left the JMM 
process due to the JMM’s refusal to “explicitly negotiate provincial, as well as sectoral, 
reduction targets.”427 The EABSWG commissioned studies on burden-sharing approaches and 
equity principles as well as analyses on the varying financial implications for provinces and 
territories.428 Unfortunately, the JMM process concluded in December 2002 without the 
EABSWG ever having issued a final report.429 
 
Given the historical and continued lack of coordination in creating provincial and 
territorial targets, the summation of these figures does not achieve the level of emissions 
reduction needed to meet Canada’s target. Andrew Gage compares the nonsensical relationship 
of provincial and federal emissions targets in Canada, stating: 
This type of management in finances would never be accepted. Little would be gained by 
setting a national goal of reducing the collective federal and provincial debt by 2020 by 
17% relative to 2005 debt, but with a target for BC of reducing the share that it had in 
2007 by 33%. Quite aside from whether those are good enough goals, the approach is 
confusing, and understanding the relationship between the BC goal and the federal goal 
requires some serious number crunching.430  
To consider how Canada’s mitigation efforts could be fairly allocated amongst the 
provinces, Böhringer et al used six different burden-sharing approaches to allocate provincial 




(April 2013) at 48, online (pdf): University of Toronto 
<tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/77153/1/AllocatingGHGReductions2013.pdf>. 
426 Ibid at 48. 
427 Ibid at 52. 
428 Ibid at 48. 
429 Ibid at 49. 
430 Gage, supra note 344 at 12. 
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Figure Twenty-Five: Allocation of Permits as Percent of Projected Benchmark Emissions431   
 
 
 These figures demonstrate the significant impacts that a particular equity approach will 
have on provinces. For instance, Saskatchewan’s allowance ranges from 38.31 percent to 82.53 
percent of benchmark levels, depending on the equity approach used. Böhringer et al note that 
the equal per capita approach allows Quebec, Ontario, British Columbia, and Manitoba to emit 
more than their benchmark levels, while allocating Alberta less than one-fourth of its 
emissions.432 This table elucidates that an equal per capita approach, which ignores the emissions 
intensity and different circumstances of provinces, is ill-suited for determining subnational 
allocation in Canada.433  
Böhringer et al conclude that, while there are a wide range of potential equity approaches 
to consider burden-sharing methods, most will require larger reductions from emission-intensive 
provinces, such as Alberta and Saskatchewan, whose current emissions (351 million tonnes of 
 
431 The six criteria were: constant emissions ratio; equal per capita; ability to pay; ex-post (equal relative welfare 
losses); abatement costs; and Rawlsian (minimize cost to poorest region). The provincial and territorial codes are as 
follows: AB= Alberta; BC= British Columbia; MB= Manitoba; NB= New Brunswick; NL=Newfoundland and 
Labrador; NS= Nova Scotia; ON= Ontario; QC=Quebec; SK=Saskatchewan; RC= Rest of Canada (Nunavut, Prince 
Edward Island, Yukon, and the Northwest Territories). See Christoph Böhringer et al, supra note 423 at 1357, 1369. 
432 Ibid at 1351. 
433 Paul & Boudreault, 2016(b), supra note 253 at 5. 
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Co2) collectively account for nearly 70 percent of the emissions allowed under Canada’s 2030 
target. 434    
 
As the Ontario government has demonstrated through its abrupt cancellation of its cap 
and trade system, provincial efforts can also be abandoned. Subnational allocation can ensure 
that provinces and territories are working together towards a specific target or goal, and as a 
factum by the Intergenerational Climate Coalition noted, a federal climate framework can 
prevent “carbon leakage”, whereby companies would otherwise relocate their emitting activities 
to provinces or territories with less stringent polluting or carbon pricing regulations.435 Given 
that Canada’s Constitution allocates jurisdiction over natural resources to the province (and both 
federal and provincial governments share jurisdiction over the environment), federal efforts in 
this area must tread carefully so as not to overstep this division of powers. Both the 
Saskatchewan and Ontario Court of Appeals have ruled that the federal Greenhouse Gas 
Pollution Pricing Act is a valid use of the federal government’s “peace, order and good 
government” power, stating the federal government has the authority to set minimum national 
standards.436 The Alberta Court of Appeal recently ruled, however, that this Act was not a valid 
use of the federal government’s power. Would a minimum emissions reduction target fall within 
this power? This matter has yet to be defined by the courts or legislation.  
VIII. Conclusion 
 
In his recent report on human rights obligations regarding a healthy environment, UN 
Special Rapporteur on human rights and the environment David Boyd highlighted the alarming 
disconnect between the climate emergency and state actions. 
Climate change is already harming billions of people, violating human rights, 
exacerbating inequality and perpetuating injustice. Parties to the Paris Agreement are not 
on track to meet their commitments. Instead of falling, global emissions are rising. 
 
434 Christoph Böhringer et al, supra note 423 at 1372; Barry Saxifrage, “Surprise! Most of Canada is on track to hit 
our 2020 climate target” (27 May 2019), online: National Observer 
<www.nationalobserver.com/2019/05/27/analysis/surprise-most-canada-track-hit-our-2020-climate-target>. 
435 Pollution Pricing Reference, ICC Factum, supra note 85 at para 52.  
436 Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2019 ONCA 544; Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution 
Pricing Act, 2019 SKCA 40; Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2020 ABCA 74. The SCC was set 
to hear these cases in March 2020, however, the hearings have been postponed due to the coronavirus pandemic. 
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Instead of phasing out fossil fuels, States provide subsidies and banks offer financing, 
both measured in trillions of dollars annually. New coal-fired power plants are still being 
built. Instead of reforestation, deforestation continues.437 
  
As of August 2019, more than 400 Canadian municipalities had declared climate 
emergencies,438 as did the Canadian federal government in June 2019.439 Prime Minister Justin 
Trudeau is well-aware of both the global and local impacts of climate change. In his speech 
regarding Canada’s ratification of the Paris Agreement, he stated that  
 
If one lives in Canada’s north or in our coastal communities, or really in any community 
that is subject to extreme weather conditions and the resulting floods, droughts, and wild 
fires, the effects of climate change itself cannot be denied. There is no hiding from 
climate change. It is real and it is everywhere.440 
 
The existing and expected impacts of climate change in Canada are widespread. The 
following graphic from the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development to 












437 Boyd, supra note 51 at para 73. 
438 Melanie Woods, “All the Places in Canada that have Declared States of Climate Emergency” (28 August 2019), 
online: Huffington Post <www.huffingtonpost.ca/entry/climate-emergency-edmonton-
declare_ca_5d671036e4b022fbceb5caff>. 
439 Hannah Jackson, “National climate emergency declared by House of Commons” (17 June 2019), online: Global 
News <globalnews.ca/news/5401586/canada-national-climate-emergency/>. 
440 House of Commons Debates, 42-1, No 086 (3 October 2016) at 12:15 (Right Hon Justin Trudeau). 
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Figure Twenty-Six: Examples of Climate Change Impacts Experienced Across Canada441 
 
 
Despite these localized impacts—and cognizant of the climate impacts faced by the rest 
of the world—Canada has failed to undertake sufficient mitigation efforts. Although the 
Government of Canada’s 2018 Submission to the Talanoa Dialogue stated that “[t]he [Pan 
Canadian Framework] plan sets Canada on a path towards meeting or exceeding its 2030 
target,”442 its 2018 emissions projection report confirmed that Canada is not on track to meet its 
2030 target.443  
 
Since setting its first emissions reduction target 28 years ago, Canada’s national 
emissions have, in fact, increased by 116 million tonnes of Co2eq.444 From 2010 to 2017, 
Canada’s total emissions grew by 23 million tonnes of Co2eq.445 The Globe and Mail columnist 
Gary Mason also notes that “[s]ince the government introduced its first climate plan in 2016, it 
 
441 Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development to the Parliament of Canada, “Report 2-
Adapting to the Impacts of Climate Change” (2017) at Exhibit 2.1, online: Office of the Auditor General of Canada 
<www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_cesd_201710_02_e_42490.html>. 
442 “Government of Canada: Submission to the Talanoa Dialogue” (2018) at 2, online (pdf): Environment and 
Climate Change Canada <publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2019/eccc/En4-351-2018-eng.pdf> 
[Environment and Climate Change Canada, “Talanoa Submission”]. 
443 Environment and Climate Change Canada, “2018 Canada Projections”, supra note 171 at viii. 
444 Government of Canada, “GHG Emissions”, supra note 11. 
445 Ibid. 
 104 
has purchased a pipeline and approved a massive liquefied natural gas project in B.C.”446 The 
Climate Change Performance Index, which ranks the climate action of high-emitting countries, 
placed Canada 54th out of 60 in 2019, a decrease from its 51st place holding in 2018.447 
 
Despite this duplicity, the Talanoa submission stated that Canada was “committed to 
explore the possibilities for stepping up our ambition.”448 According to the David Suzuki 
Foundation’s factum in the recent carbon tax court challenge, the Federal government’s use of 
the “national emergency” branch of the peace, order and good government power was in 
response to the “risk that Canada will miss the tight deadline to fulfill is [sic] commitments under 
the Paris Agreement, undermining the global effort to stave off the most disastrous effects of 
climate change”.449 To fulfill its Paris commitments, it is pivotal that Canada adopt and 
implement a more ambitious 2030 emissions reduction target.  
 
The Oslo Principles on Global Climate Change state that “all States and enterprises have 
an immediate moral and legal duty to prevent the deleterious effects of climate change” and 
notes that under international law, “each State is legally responsible for the deleterious 
transborder effects that human activities in its territory have on other states.”450  
 
This paper has sought to organize sets of facts regarding the distribution of historic, 
current and projected emissions, alongside other indicators, to inform ideas regarding Canada’s 
fair share of the global mitigation burden. While Canada ought to bear responsibility for all the 
emissions it produces, whether the final product is used within its borders or not, the nature of 
emissions reporting at this time only measures emissions that occur within Canada. The targets 
proposed in this paper thus only consider these emissions, but Canada’s fair target is likely even 
 
446 Gary Mason, “Meaningful climate action in Canada is doomed” (28 September 2019), online: The Globe & Mail 
<www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-meaningful-climate-action-in-canada-is-doomed/>. 
447 This index ranks the countries and the EU who collectively emit 90 percent of global emissions. See Jan Burck et 
al, “Climate Change Performance Index: Results 2019”, online (pdf): German Watch 
<germanwatch.org/sites/germanwatch.org/files/CCPI-2019-Results-190614-WEB%20A3.pdf>; “Climate Change 
Performance Index 2018”, online: Climate Change Performance Index <www.climate-change-performance-
index.org/climate-change-performance-index-2018>. 
448 Environment and Climate Change Canada, “Talanoa Submission”, supra note 442 at 7. 
449 Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2019 ONCA 544 (Factum of the Intervenor, the David 
Suzuki Foundation at para 39). 
450 Expert Group on Global Climate Obligations, supra note 213. 
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more ambitious than those proposed in this paper in light of these emissions.  
 
Every “fair” target suggested by the three studies included in this paper (as well as the 
two “outdated” studies) is significantly larger than Canada’s present emissions reduction target. 
At minimum, these proposed targets call for Canada to nearly double its emissions reduction 
target, however, multiple suggested targets call for Canada to reach net-zero emissions by 2030 
and undertake mitigation efforts to further reduce emissions beyond its own borders. 
 
The author of this paper finds the GDR framework to be perhaps the most fair standalone 
approach, given its consideration both of a state’s historical responsibility in contributing to the 
emissions that caused climate change and a state’s per capita income as an indicator of its 
capability to fund climate mitigation efforts. The least stringent iteration of this approach 
included in this analysis calls for Canada to more than double its present emissions reduction 
target, while the most stringent iteration calls for Canada to reach net-zero emissions by 2030 as 
well as undertake further mitigation efforts. 
 
CAT’s Fair Share Range is attractive in that it negates the need to latch onto a specific 
equity approach. As each country may advocate for the specific approach or approaches that 
create the least-stringent emissions reduction target for their state—and there is little time to 
quibble over philosophical considerations of equity—the creation of a fair share range that 
incorporates multiple categories of equity may be a fitting solution for international negotiations. 
CAT’s fair share range for Canada calls for at least a 56 percent reduction below 2005 levels by 
2030 (nearly doubling its 2030 emissions reductions target). 
Regardless of the equity principle used to allocate emissions, however, it is evident that 
Canada’s present 2030 emissions reduction target does not meet its fair share of the global 
mitigation burden. While the equity approaches suggest varying levels of ambition for Canada to 
contribute its fair share of global emissions reduction, each approach calls for, at minimum, a 
near doubling of ambition. The most stringent allocation (the GDR framework as iterated by the 
CERP) calls for a 2030 emissions reduction target that is four to five times as ambitious as 
Canada’s 2030 target. 
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To meet such a target, Canada will need to develop a clearer climate plan. Some 
countries have legislated long-term reductions targets as well as short-term interim targets to 
guide efforts. While Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has pledged to introduce legislated targets, 
further details have not been reported at this time.  
 
Canada also needs to consider who should bear responsibility for its emissions 
reductions. Subnational allocation of the national burden amongst Canada’s provinces and 
territories will be a treacherous, but perhaps necessary, exercise. An alternative method is to 
develop sectoral targets or an economy-wide cap and trade system. The level of ambition 
required by Canada to meet any of the proposed “fair” targets is incompatible with Canada’s 
projected continuation and expansion of fossil fuel production (as discussed in Section IV). The 
Expert Group of the Climate Principles for Enterprises also calls for corporations to bear some of 
a nation’s responsibility in reducing emissions. Without laying out who is responsible for how 
much of its total national emissions reduction, Canada will not have a clear plan to meet its 
target.  
 
Canada’s highest court has repeatedly affirmed the importance of protecting the 
environment, recognizing it as “a fundamental value in Canadian society”.451 The IPCC has 
made clear that swift and far-reaching actions are immediately needed in order to limit warming 
to 1.5°C.452 As the tenth highest-emitting state today,453 Canada’s continued failure to reduce 
emissions may derail global mitigation efforts. Canada must strengthen its emissions reduction 
target to comprise a fair share of the global mitigation burden and propose a detailed plan to 
meet this target. 
 
In addition to strengthening its own emissions reduction target, Canada ought to advocate 
that a set of equity approaches be adopted to inform stronger emissions targets around the world. 
 
451 Ontario v Canadian Pacific Ltd, [1995] 2 SCR 1031 at para 55. See also 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, 
Société d’arrosage) v Hudson (Town), 2001 SCC 40 at para 1; Friends of the Oldman River Society v Canada 
(Minister of Transport), [1992] 1 SCR 3 at 16; British Columbia v Canadian Forest Products Ltd, 2004 SCC 38 at 
para 7. 
452 IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers 2018”, supra note 1 at 17.  
453 Statista, supra note 13. 
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As states are presently invited to update their NDCs prior to the end of 2020,454 such 
conversations ought to commence immediately. It is only once Canada pledges and undertakes to 
meet its fair share of the global mitigation burden, however, that it can then ask other countries 
to do the same. 
  
 




A. Outdated Studies & Findings 
1. Can multi-criteria rules fairly distribute climate burdens? OECD results 
from three burden sharing rules455 
This paper utilized three formulas to illustrate different burden-sharing approaches to 
inform subsequent climate negotiations. Each formula was carried out through four cases that 
weighted the components of the formula differently to reflect states’ differing priorities and 
opinions. 
 
Formula One calls for an “average OECD country” (in terms of Co2 emissions/capita, 
Co2 emissions/unit of GDP, GDP, and GDP/capita) to reduce its emissions by 20 percent.456 
This formula was defined as follows:  
 
Yi = {wA Ai/A + wB Bi/B + wc Ci/C + wD Di/D}Z, where Yi is the percentage emission 
reduction target for country i. Ai is emissions per capita for country i, Bi is GDP for 
country i, Ci is emissions per unit of GDP for country i, and Di is GDP per capita for 
country i. A, B, C and D represent OECD averages for the same indicators. ... Z is a 
scaling factor which is determined so as to make the total emissions abatement for OECD 
equal to 20%.457 
 
Formula Two, which considers a state’s percentage share of the OECD total for the 
following indicators: population, Co2 emissions, and GDP. Formula two was defined as: “Xi = 
{wE Ei + wF Fi + wG Gi}”, where “Xi is the percentage share of country i of the total emission 
reduction commitment for OECD. Ei is the percentage population share of country i, and Gi is the 
percentage GDP share of country i.”458 
 
Formula Three is similar to Formula One, however it excludes Co2 emissions/capita from 
its consideration. This formula was defined as: “Vi = {wB Bi + wc Ci + wd Di}/ ∑j {wB Bj + wc Cj + 
wd Dj}”, where “Vi is the percentage share of country i of the total emissions reduction 
commitment of OECD. Bi is GDP for country i, Ci is emissions per unit of GDP for country i, 








455 Ringius, Torvanger & Holtsmark, supra note 99. At the time of publication, the three authors were affiliated with 
the Center for International Climate and Environmental Research in Oslo, Norway. 
456 Ibid at 784. 
457 Ibid at 784. 
458 Ibid at 786. 
459 Ibid at 788. 
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emissions per capita, GDP, Co2
 
emissions per unit of GDP and GDP per 
capita 
Case 1: Equal weights 
25 (Co2/pop +GDP + CO2/GDP + GDP/pop)  
2.3% 10.5% 
Case 2: Extra weight on CO2/pop  
55 Co2pop + 15 (GDP + Co2/GDP + GDP/pop)  
2.7% 12.4% 
Case 3: Extra weight on Co2/GDP 
55 Co2/GDP + 15 (Co2/pop + GDP + GDP/pop)  
2.9% 13.7% 
Case 4: Extra weight on GDP/pop 
70 GDP/pop +10 (Co2/pop + GDP +Co2/GDP)  
2.7% 12.7% 
Formula 2 
Indicators: Each OECD country’s % share of population, CO
 
emissions and GDP of the 
OECD total 
Case 1: Equal weights 
1/3(Co2
 
+ pop + GDP) 
3.7% 17.0% 
Case 2: Extra weight on emissions 
0.05pop + 0.6Co2 + 0.35GDP  
3.9% 18.2% 
Case 3: Even more weight on emissions 
0.05pop + 0.8Co2 +0.15 GDP 
 
4.1% 19.1% 
Case 4: Extra weight on GDP 




Indicators: GDP, emissions per unit of GDP, and GDP per capita 
Case 1: Equal weights 
33.3(GDP +Co2/GDP + GDP/pop)  
3.6% 16.5% 
Case 2: Extra weight on GDP 
10(GDP/pop + Co2/GDP)+ 80GDP  
3.4% 15.7% 
Case 3: Extra weight on GDP/pop 
20(GDP +Co2/GDP) + 60GDP/pop  
3.6% 16.7% 
Case 4: Extra weight on emissions/GDP 




460 Ibid at 792.  
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Based on these twelve cases, Ringius, Torvanger and Holtsmark submit that Canada’s 
emissions ought to reduce its 1993 emissions by 10.5 percent to 19.1 percent by a pre-
determined year (the authors provide the year 2010 as an example). Using the data provided in 
this article regarding Canada’s energy-related Co2 emissions in 1993 (443 million tonnes of 
Co2), this range would call for Canada’s emissions to reduce by 46.5 to 84.6 million tonnes of 
CO2, leading to emission levels of 358 to 396 million tonnes of Co2 in 2010.461 
 
2. Effort sharing in ambitious, global climate change mitigation scenarios462 
 
In this paper, Ekholm et al utilize a multistage approach and a triptych approach to 
allocate emissions in the years 2020 and 2050, using two different limits of permissible 
atmospheric concentration of Co2. Their findings provide Canada with the following emissions 
allocations in the years 2020 and 2050: 
 




















485 ppm 1200-1400 750 to 790 
million 
tonnes 
590 to 640 
million tonnes 
370 to 410 
million tonnes 
360 to 400 
million 
tonnes 
550 ppm 370 to 410 
million tonnes 




485 ppm 1800-2700 830 million 
tonnes to 1.1 
billion tonnes 
73 million to 
250 million 
tonnes 
65 to 73 million 
tonnes 




550 ppm 360 to 390 
million tonnes 
150 to 190 
million tonnes  





461 See Ibid at 783. 
462 Ekholm et al, supra note 250. At the time of publication, all six authors of this study were associated with the 
VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, Ecofys Germany GmbH and/or TKK Helsinki University of 
Technology. 
463 Ibid at 1808-9. 
464 Allowance trading may be impacted by market conditions that affect transaction costs and participation in the 
market. Ekholm et al adjusted this study to account for these uncertainties. See Ibid at 1805. 
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B. Studies and Findings for Analysis  
 
1. Climate Equity Reference Project465 
 
To determine a country’s fair share, the calculator compares a country’s allocated emissions 
for 2030 (under the selected emissions pathway) against a projected baseline figure for 2030466 to 
determine the amount of global mitigation required. The calculations below have all used the 
1.5°C Low Energy Demand pathway, which has a global mitigation requirement of 36.22 billion 
tonnes of Co2eq below global baseline emissions in 2030. This figure is then multiplied by a 
country’s share of the global RCI to determine its fair level of emissions reduction.  
 
Beyond choosing the weighting of indicators, the user can also select from several variables, 
including the year to begin accounting for emissions (available in ten-year periods, beginning in 
1850 through to 2010) and whether to include non-Co2 gases, land-use emissions, and embodied 
emissions. Most of the calculator’s indicators were set at the default values for this paper’s 
calculations. Non-Co2 gases were included, while land-use emissions and emissions embodied in 
trade were excluded. The cost indicators are not relevant for this analysis. Kyoto obligations 
were excluded and the mitigation-period RCI was averaged. The development and luxury 
threshold were excluded for the responsibility analysis. For the capability analysis, the 
development threshold was $7,500, the luxury threshold was $50,000, the indicator was 
progressive between the thresholds, a multiplier of 1 was applied on incomes above the luxury 
threshold, and emissions elasticity was set to 1.0.   
 
For each approach, “Canada’s mitigation fair share” as stated by the CERP was 
subtracted from Canada’s baseline emissions to determine “Canada’s Fair Share Emissions in 
2030”. I then converted this figure into “Canada’s Fair Share Emissions Reduction Target for 
2030” as a percentage level below Canada’s 2005 emissions levels to compare the suggested 
allocation against Canada’s present emissions reduction target. This calculation divided 
“Canada’s Fair Share Emissions Allocation” by Canada’s 2005 emissions levels (730 million 
tonnes of Co2eq) to determine a fair share percentage allocation, which was then subtracted from 




465 Climate Equity Reference Project, “Climate Equity Reference Calculator”, supra note 149. 
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2. Equitable Mitigation to achieve the Paris Agreement goals470 
 
The information presented below is from this study’s supplementary data, which used a 
scenario set containing two pathways in which emissions peaked by 2020 with a greater than or 
equal to 50 percent chance of returning to 1.5°C in 2100. As detailed earlier, this study excludes 
emissions resulting from international shipping and aviation. 
 
A 30-year convergence period was applied in the capability and equality approaches to 
transition from present-day international emissions ratios to an equitable ratio. After this period, 
two formulas are used.471 The average figures cited in each table were combined with the 
 
469 Ibid. 
470 du Pont et al, 2016, supra note 140. 
471 In both formulas, i is the index of the sum over all countries. If the target pathway’s net emissions are positive: 𝐸𝑐 
(𝑦) = 𝐸𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙(𝑦) x 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑐 (𝑦)2 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑐 (𝑦) ⁄ ∑i = {countries} 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖 (𝑦)2 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 (𝑦). If the target pathway’s net emissions are 
negative, the second formula is used: 𝐸𝑐 (𝑦) = 𝐸𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙(𝑦) x 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑐 (𝑦)/ ∑i = {countries} 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 (𝑦). See Yann Robiou du Pont 
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Canadian government’s emissions data for 2010 (693 million tonnes of Co2eq), to determine 
Canada’s emissions allocations in tonnes. The following formula was used: (0.693) x (1 +/- 
average emissions allocation figure). For instance, the formula used to determine Canada’s 2025 
emissions allocations under the capability approach would be: 693 million tonnes x (1-0.59) = 
284.13 million tonnes. This number is then converted into a percentage below Canada’s 2005 
emissions levels by dividing the allocation figure by Canada’s 2005 emissions (730 million 
tonnes). This equals a fair share allocation percentage, which is then subtracted from 1 to equal a 
fair share emissions target as a percentage below 2005 emissions levels. If the fair share 
allocation is a negative figure, then this number is multiplied by -1 to equal the portion of the fair 
share emissions target that is over 100 percent and 1 is added to the total to equal the full fair 
share emissions target below 2005 levels.  
Capability 
 
Table Eleven: Canada’s Fair Share Emissions Reduction (du Pont et al, Capability)472 
 

























[-48 to -67] 
-75 
[-68 to -81] 
-98 
[-97 to -99] 
-99 



























et al, “National Contributions for decarbonizing the world economy in line with the G7 agreement”, Supplementary 
Information (2016) Envtl Research Letters 1 at 10. 
472 du Pont et al, 2016(b), supra note 287. 
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Equality  
Table Twelve: Canada’s Fair Share Emissions Reduction (du Pont et al, Equality)473 
 
 2025 (% of 2010 
levels; average 
and range) 




















[-35 to -59] 
-63 
[-53 to -71] 
-86 
[-81 to -92] 
-93 



























Table Thirteen: Canada’s Fair Share Emissions Reduction (du Pont et al, GDR)474 
 
 2025 (% of 2010 
levels; average 
and range) 




















[-25 to -73] 
-65 
[-40 to -83] 
-106 
[-86 to -125] 
-137 






























Table Fourteen: Canada’s Fair Share Emissions Reduction (du Pont et al, ECEPC)475 
 
 2025 (% of 2010 
levels; average 
and range) 




















[-38 to -75] 
-67 
[-51 to -100] 
-97 
[-77 to -116] 
-126 



























Average of Approaches 
Table Fifteen: Canada’s Fair Share Emissions Reduction (du Pont et al, average)476 
 
 2025 (% of 2010 
levels) 
2030 (% of 
2010 levels) 
2040 (% of 
2010 levels) 












































3. Climate Action Tracker477 
 
CAT uses results from seven effort sharing categories to inform a global effort sharing 
best case scenario where all countries reduce national emissions to the bottom 10 percent of their 
fair share range, as well as a global effort sharing worst case scenario where all countries only 
reduce emissions to the top 10 percent of their fair share range. CAT excludes any outlying data 
by utilizing the range between these two scenarios as its “fair share range”. As detailed in the 
paper, CAT uses this range to assess a country’s ambition level to reduce emissions.  
 
Table Sixteen: Canada’s Fair Share Emissions Allocations & Targets (CAT )478 
 




























Responsibility 483 million 
tonnes 
[452 to 534] 
345 million 
tonnes 
[322 to 369] 
210 million 
tonnes 
[187 to 227] 
-520 million 
tonnes 




34% below 2005 
levels  
53% below 2005 
levels  




2005 levels  
Capability 562 million 
tonnes 
[247 to 654] 
492 million 
tonnes 
[225 to 634] 
311 million 
tonnes 
[134 to 613] 
86 million 
tonnes 
[-32 to 460] 
Capability Fair 
Share Target 
23% below 2005 
levels 
33% below 2005 
levels 
57% below 2005 
levels 
88% below 2005 
levels 
Equality 487 million 
tonnes 
[354 to 655] 
343 million 
tonnes 
[280 to 541] 
240 million 
tonnes 
[177 to 431] 
64 million 
tonnes 
[38 to 80] 
Equality Fair 
Share Target 
33% below 2005 
levels 
53% below 2005 
levels 
67% below 2005 
levels 
91% below 2005 
levels 
 
477 Climate Action Tracker, “Climate Action Tracker”, supra note 313. 
478 Climate Action Tracker, “Detailed effort sharing", supra note 319. The author of this paper calculated and 
inserted the target rows below the emissions allocations for each equity approach (using the median figures to 
calculate the fair share target). 
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[344 to 344] 
227 million 
tonnes 
[227 to 227] 
-183 million 
tonnes 
[-183 to -183]  
ECPCE Fair 
Share Target 
/ 53% below 2005 
levels 








[119 to 627] 
238 million 
tonnes 
[-272 to 557] 
73 million 
tonnes 
[-555 to 511] 
-263 million 
tonnes 





45% below 2005 
levels 
67% below 2005 
levels 




Staged 595 million 
tonnes 
[452 to 667] 
465 million 
tonnes 
[353 to 572] 
314 million 
tonnes 
[223 to 495] 
45 million 
tonnes 
[-148 to 208] 
Staged Fair 
Share Target 
18% below 2005 
levels 
36% below 2005 
levels 
57% below 2005 
levels 
94% below 2005 
levels 
All (Lower 













66% below 2005 
levels 
69% below 2005 
levels 


















11% below 2005 
levels 
22% below 2005 
levels 
30% below 2005 
levels 
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